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ABSTRACT
This thesis evaluates the impact on the wealth of stock-
holders when the incumbent managers of a corporation subject
to a takeover bid resist the offer by employing a variety
of antitakeover defensive tactics. Such defensive tactics
include antitakeover charter and by-law amendments, various
forms of governmental regulation of takeovers, antitrust and
other litigation intended to block the offer, issuance of
"poison pill" preferred stock, "scorched earth" tactics to
make the target less attractive to the bidder, the search
for a "white knight," standstill agreements and negotiated
premium stock repurchases, and "double pac-man" counter tender
offers.
First, the thesis analyzes the various motivations
for bidders to attempt a takeover bid and describes the three
primary methods used i:' : te marf.et ofr crpcr-at3 ccntrol.
Next, several hypotheses possibly explaining why target manag-
ers use antitakeover defensive tactics are presented.
The full array of defensive tactics is catalogued and
the previous analytical literature on defensive tactics is
reviewed. Using the classic event study methodology, the
stock price impacts of five broad classes of defensive tactics
are measured over multi-company samples.
The thesis concludes with two chapters drawing on the
results of the empirical studies to develop several general-
izations about the efficacy and effects of defensive tactics.
Two different policy alternatives toward defensive tactics
are considered.
Thesis Supervisor: Richard S. Ruback, Assistant Professor
Thesis Reader: Edward B. Dunn, Morgan Stanley & Co.
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5Chapter 1. Introduction: Objectives and Outline of Thesis
No aspect of the mergers and acquisitions business
elicits more interest and debate in the business, financial
and legal communities than the antitakeover defensive tactics
potentially available to the target of an unsolicited takeover
bid and the prospects of successful assertion of those anti-
takeover defenses. These defensive tactics and their related
law have undergone significant development in the last few
years in response to the takeover "bocr" which has witnessed
numerous highly-publicized takeover bids involving vigorously
contested battles. Not only the Wall Street community, but
the general public daily watched with excitement the attacks
and counter-attacks unfold in the three-way battle for Conoco,
the bitter struggle between Bendix and Martin Marietta which
nearly destroyed both companies, and the role T. Boone Pickens
played in forcing giant Gulf Oil into a takeover. As would-
be acquirors have become increasingly sophisticated in their
acquisition techniques, so too have targets developed sophis-
ticated defensive responses, turning the market for corporate
control into a tactical game of timing and intrigue.
For those who possess a trading mentality, one can
imagine a competitive market for nearly any tangible or intan-
gible good or service, in which supply and demand rule supreme
and just about everything has its price. Such a market exists
for corporate control - the rights to set the strategic pol-
6icies of the corporation, to productively utilize the assets
of the corporation, and to hire, fire and set the level of
compensation of the managers of the corporation. In their
recent survey of the scientific literature on takeovers,
Jensen & Ruback (1983) define the market for corporate control
as a market "in which alternative managerial teams compete
for the rights to manage corporate resources." Thus, the
takeover market can be viewed as an arena in which compet-
ing management teams battle for the control of corporations
with the stockholders functioning as the ultimate judges.
The takeover laws provide the rules of the game around which
the bidders and targets develop their takeover and defensive
strategies. When viewed in this context, one can readily
see how and why antitakeover defensive tactics have flourished.
1.1 Purpose and Use of Thesis
The purpose of this thesis is to describe and catalogue
the various antitakeover defensive tactics available to target
management teams, and to determine the impact on the wealth
of target stockholders when incumbent managers use these
defensive tactics. Most of these defensive measures provide
only a minimum line of defense and have become quite common-
place in publicly-held corporations. Other defensive tactics
could be considered almost violent in nature and have been
employed in only a handful of instances.
Takeover battles create a great deal of pressure on
7target managers and often are fairly compressed in time.
Most often the takeover bid is a new experience to the target
manager, far from the ordinary day-to-day business operational
situation, and presents the most challenging and important
decision of his business career. Consequently, there exists
a great potential for incumbent managers to lose sight of
their primary function - to serve the best interests of the
stockholders - during the heat of the takeover battle. Target
managers hire investment bankers and takeover lawyers to
provide advice on the appropriate level and type of defense.
But too often this advice is cloaked in very qualitative
terms and focuses only on broad generalities. Hopefully,
this thesis will provide some quantitative substantiation
for the qualitative reasons for or against the various defen-
sive tactics.
This thesis serves two purposes and attempts to speak
to two audiences. First, the thesis takes an academic per-
spective in that it begins by proposing several hypotheses,
then empirically tests these hypotheses, and finally draws
some conclusions from the empirical evidence. Second, the
thesis intends to function as a useful guide to practitioners
in the mergers and acquisition community. When making presen-
tations to target-company clients, the evidence from the
thesis will enable the investment banker to say that "such
and such a defensive tactic will likely deter the takeover
bid, but the tactic will also likely affect your stockholders
8by 'x' percent." Thus, the thesis attempts to blend theory
and practice as applied to antitakeover defensive tactics.
1.2 Outline of Thesis
The next chapter opens with a theoretical discussion
on why potential bidders attempt takeovers and what are the
sources of gains in takeovers - thus, justifying the payment
of a premium for the target company's stock. Then the chapter
describes the various mechanical techniques of takeovers:
mergers, tender offers and proxy contests.
In Chapter Three, I propose two competing hypotheses
on why target managers use defensive tactics. Other authors
in the takeover literature have used these two competing
hypotheses - the managerial entrenchment hypothesis and the
stockholder interests hypothesis - as the possible motivating
forces behind various target management actions.
The description and catalogue of antitakeover defensive
tactics available to target managers is detailed in Chapter
Four. Conceivably, this chapter could function as a reference
manual for target managements, describing the alternative
defensive measures at their disposal.
I review the scientific literature that has been written
on antitakeover defensive tactics to date in Chapter Five.
Generally, these empirical studies have focussed on one par-
ticular defensive tactic and have used takeover data preceding
the 1980s. I intend to provide a more comprehensive survey
9of defensive tactics and to run various empirical tests on
takeovers which have occurred more recently (i.e. up through
1983).
Chapter Six presents the event study methodology,
describes the sources and selection criteria used in construct-
ing five different samples of target firms which have used
defensive tactics, and reports the empirical results of running
event studies on these samples. From this empirical evidence,
I have determined an average economic impact on the price
of the target firm's stock for each defensive tactic.
The findings are then compared with the evidence of
other researchers and conclusions are drawn from the evidence
in Chapter Seven. The thesis concludes with a final chapter
discussing the relative merits of two different policy alter-
natives toward the use of antitakeover defensive tactics.
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Chapter 2. Theory and Practice of Takeovers
2.1 The Theory: Management's Motivations in Takeovers
Takeovers are investment decisions by the bidding
firm, and the basic principles of capital investment decisions
apply. The expected benefits of the takeover are the incre-
mental cash flows generated by the combination of the two
previously independent firms or by the more effective manage-
ment of the target's assets once control has been achieved.
The cost of the takeover investment decision includes, in
addition to the actual amount paid for the target firm,
the costs associated with the takeover search and with the
negotiating of the transaction.1  The net present value
(NPV) of the takeover represents the expected dollar gain
to the stockholders of the bidding firm. This takeover
NPV - either positive or negative - should be compounded
into the market value of the bidder on the day of announcement
of the takeover, causing a rise or fall in the bidder's
stock.2
Thus, in theory, bidding firms could apply standard
NPV capital budgeting techniques to takeover investments,
1 The direct cost of employing takeover specialists
(e.g. investment bankers and lawyers) for both parties can
in some instances exceed four percent of the value of the
transaction. Also, one should consider the internal costs
of using management time and resources in the takeover.
The empirical tests in this thesis use event studies
to analyze the stock price effects of the announcement of
various antitakeover provisions.
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proceeding with those takeovers which make net positive
contributions to stockholders' wealth. But in practice
many other factors, besides the raw NPV numbers, influence
the decision to attempt a takeover (from the bidder's view-
point) or the decision to defend against a takeover (from
the target's viewpoint). For many managers involved in
takeover attempts, the takeover is something quite extraordi-
nary relative to his normal day-to-day business operating
decisions, and presents the classical agency problem between
the manager's welfare and that of the stockholders. 3 Takeovers
are often awkward and complicated to evaluate, much more
difficult than valuing the purchase of a piece of machinery.
This section of Chapter Two will explore the motivations
of why managers attempt takeovers; the next section will
discuss the mechanics and techniques used in the market
for corporate control. The intent is to provide some back-
ground for the discussion in Chapter Three on why antitakeover
provisions exist and for the analytical tests used later
in the thesis.
Over the last several decades, economists have put
forward a variety of theories to explain why companies acquire
other companies, usually viewing corporations as decision-
3Quite often a takeover threatens the target manager's
continued employment and his pride in managing a large orga-
nization. Although one would like to believe that takeover
investments are always valued on NPV, emotions and personal-
ities often play significant roles in takeover transactions.
For a discussion of agency problems, see Jensen & Meckling
(1976).
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making units within the classical market framework.4  Most
of these theories have some validity in explaining takeovers,
and each could likely be applied depending upon the circum-
stances of the particular takeover. All acquisition theories
can be lumped into one of two main categories: (1) non-
value maximizing motivations of bidder managements, and
(2) value maximization reasons based on maximizing stockholder
wealth.5
The first category includes many takeovers which
are attempted in order to maximize growth in sales or assets,
and often involve the ego-gratification of controlling a
large empire. One must not forget that growth is not neces-
sarily synonymous with increased profitability (although
in some cases, growth is a necessary condition for increased
profitability). Takeovers which are motivated solely by
a manager's desire to control a larger asset base or show
greater sales rarely create any economic gains when the
two firms are combined relative to their market values as
separate entities. For these types of takeovers, the trans-
action costs of the takeover and the potential loss of mana-
gerial efficiency from coordinating a larger organization
will likely cause a substantial economic loss to the bidder's
4Manne (1965) was the first to present the theory,
which is accepted by most finance people today, that the
control of corporations constitutes a valuable asset and
that an active market exists for these corporate control
assets'5Halpern (1983) provides a useful and concise discussion
of merger-takeover theories.
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stockholders. On the other hand, the target stockholders
will most likely earn the appropriate risk-adjusted return
as a result of the merger. The net economic result is nega-
tive.
These growth-for-growth's-sake takeovers are often
conducted by conglomerates which basically function as holding
companies for unrelated business units. At some level of
complexity, one management team cannot effectively manage
a widely diverse group of businesses. Second, these non-
value maximizing mergers often involve firms whose top manager
needs to acquire an increasingly large empire to satisfy
his ego. Although at some level the loss of stockholder
wealth caused by the manager's ego-gratification is large
enough to justify someone bearing the costs of changing
control, 7 the wealth loss due to the manager's ego may be
quite large before any individual stockholder or external
bidder has enough incentive to battle for control. In the
absence of continual pressure from stockholders, some managers
can lose sight of stock-price maximization in favor of grati-
fying their own desires to run a large organization.
Also included in the category of non-value maximizing
acquisitions are some takeovers done for reasons of "diversi-
fication." Although diversification may be a valid basis
for a takeover (as argued below), diversification as an
6This is the case when the whole is worth less than
the sum of the parts.
7For instance, waging a proxy fight (see next section).
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end in itself is usually not economically efficient at the
level of the corporation. Usually diversification is more
easily and more cheaply achieved by individual stockholders
than for the corporation. 8  In addition, the "bootstrap
game" of using acquisitions as a means of boosting earnings
per share creates no real economic gains. 9  Many of the
aggressive merger programs of the late-1960s were carried
out under this theory. The moral is that the market can
rarely be fooled, and never for very long!
The second large class of acquisition theories -
those which maximize stockholder wealth - include six basic
reasons. Any takeover attempted for one of these six reasons
should result in some economic gain to be split up between
the bidder's and target's stockholder groups. How much
of the gain either group receives depends upon their relative
negotiating strengths, but in any case, the bidder should
earn at least a normal risk-adjusted rate of return (i.e. in
that case, the takeover is zero NPV investment).
The largest wealth gains from takeovers result from
"synergies" between the two merging entities. The synergies
may be the result of increased economies of scale, as in
the case of most horizontal mergers and some vertical mergers.
It is generally accepted that investors are not willing
to pay premiums for diversified firms, in fact, many conglom-
erates actually trade at discounts to the values of their
individ al assets.
See Brealey & Myers (1981), pp. 663-665, for an expla-
nation of this crazy game.
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Managers sometimes find these economies of scale rather
elusive as it is generally easier to buy another company
than it is to integrate it into the buyer's existing opera-
tions. Another source of synergies results when the two
firms have complementary resources, often creating opportuni-
ties for the combined entity which neither firm could pursue
on its own. This is the classic case of the whole being
worth more than the sum of the parts. Other synergies between
the two companies are the result of utilizing excess capacity
in either firm - physical plant, managerial talent, or excess
financial resources. Related to synergy gains is a second
reason for takeovers which is driven by the search for monopoly
power. The increase in value comes from the increase in
post-acquisition cash flows due to the ability to extract
larger monopoly rents. Many horizontal mergers fall into
this category (although the antitrust laws prevent many
such mergers).
Two further reasons cited in the value-maximizing
class are motivated by financial factors. One argument
is that an acquisition permits a redeployment of excess
cash held by either the acquiror or the target. Large cash
balances often make a company a susceptible takeover target.
Another argument is that diversification through takeovers
can reduce the probability of default and bankruptcy. This
reduction in the likelihood of default decreases the expected
bankruptcy costs and increases the debt capacity of the
16
firm. If the direct and indirect costs10 of bankruptcy
are relatively large, a merger may be a less costly (and
more civilized) way for the target to go bankrupt. This
type of takeover is a voluntary liquidation which transfers
assets from falling to rising firms. Both of these financial
factors will create increased wealth relative to the values
of the two independent firms, but the order of magnitude
is likely to be much smaller than in the case of synergistic
gains.
A fifth motivation is the attempt of the bidding
firm to take advantage of asymmetry in information. The
bidder may feel that based on public information the market
is under-valuing the target (i.e. the stock market is not
perfectly efficient), or the bidder may for some reason
possess information not currently available to the public
which is not reflected in the target's stock price. In
effect, the bidding firm's management can act as security
analysts. Although it is generally well accepted that it
is difficult to pick under-valued stocks on the basis of
broadly distributed public information, it is conceivable
that a bidder in the same or related industry as the target
may at times hold valuable nonpublic information about the
target. The announcement of the takeover attempt should
send a signal to the market about the "true" value of the
10Direct bankruptcy costs include lawyer fees. Indirect
costs are the result of disrupted operations, and may be
significantly greater than direct bankruptcy costs.
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target, and the asymmetry in information should then be
ameliorated.
Finally, a takeover for value-maximizing reasons
may be attempted simply to obtain control of the target,
driven by the belief that the target's management under-
utilizes the assets under its control. The bidder believes
that either the incumbent management is incompetent or seeks
to force that management to follow a profit-maximizing strat-
egy. Takeovers based on the former case can be explained
by the "managerial competition model." 1  Under this model,
different management teams compete for the right to manage
and control the assets of firms. Each management team has
a different propensity to create value from a given set
of corporate assets. Stockholders have no loyalties to
any one particular team, but rather they simply select the
highest market value among those presented by the competing
management teams. Jensen and Ruback view the stockholders
as passive players fulfilling a judicial role, whereas the
competing management teams are the primary activists. Thus,
the takeover market complements the traditional managerial
labor market in disciplining managers and forcing them to
act in the best interests of the stockholders.
The later case, where the bidder forces incumbent
managers to follow a profit maximizing strategy, is best
1 1 Jensen & Ruback (1983) in their review of the literature
on corporate control provide a concise description of this
model and how it disciplines management teams.
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explained by the theory of financial contracting. Jensen
and Meckling (1976) suggest that the value of a firm reflects
the valuation by stockholders which includes the value of
the perquisites consumed by managers as the agents of the
stockholders. Any time a separation exists between the
ownership and the management of a corporation, agency problems
arise due to the conflicting interests between the owners
of the firm and those having control of the firm's assets.
Financial contracting theory says that constraining contracts
are made between owners and managers if the costs of writing
and monitoring those contracts are less than the potential
agency costs. Usually no one individual stockholder is
willing to bear these costs alone (given that the benefits
would accrue to all stockholders), and consequently, investors
will reflect these agency costs in the price of the firm's
shares. If this depression on a firm's stock price due
to principal-agent problems is quite large, the company
is a good candidate for a takeover (or possibly a leveraged
buy-out by the top managers 12 ).
Under either of the two above takeover-for-control
cases, the target firm's stock price is depressed and the
bidder expects to gain from purchasing the target through
a subsequent capital gain. One would expect that the target
1 2 A leveraged buy-out (LBO) is a transaction where
a group of investors takes a firm private by putting up
a small percentage of the firm's value as equity (usually
around 5%) and borrowing the remaining amount to purchase
the firm using the firm's assets as collateral.
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firm had been earning below normal returns (on a risk-adjusted
basis) prior to the takeover.
2.2 The Practice: Mechanics of Mergers and Acauisitions
Having considered the various motivations for attempting
a takeover, one needs to understand the rules and mechanics
governing the market for corporate control. This section
describes the various techniques employed in takeovers and
examines the many rules and regulations governing these
takeover techniques. Equipped with both the theoretical
basis for takeovers and the institutional factors directing
those takeover attempts, this thesis will then be ready
to examine just why and how defensive tactics are used by
target managements to defend against takeovers (Chapters
Three and Four).
Takeovers and other battles for corporate control
can occur through merger, tender offer or proxy contest.
In more complex corporate transactions, potential acquirors
may use all three takeover techniques. A merger is a trans-
action in which one corporation (the bidder) secures title
to the outstanding shares or assets of another corporation
(the target). All state corporate codes require that proposed
mergers be approved by the holders of a majority of the
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outstanding shares of the target firm. 13 Mergers are negoti-
ated directly with the target's management and approved
by the target's board of directors before being presented
for a vote of approval by the target shareholders. Generally
then, mergers are "friendly" transactions with the managements
of the bidder and the target privately negotiating an equitable
price, and together working out the strategic plan for the
combined entity and the roles played by each individual
in the new management team. 14  Obviously, agreeing on a
price for the merger transaction may involve difficult and
heated negotiations, but many other issues in addition to
price can create hurdles for the successful completion of
the merger. For many corporate managers, especially those
representing the smaller target firms, a merger transaction
is likely to be the largest business decision of his life
and something he goes through only once in his career.
Consequently, other factors besides rational economics,15
such as emotions and pride in one's position, can intervene
and determine the outcome of a merger.
13The percentage of favorable votes required for approval
of the merger depends upon state code and the target firm's
corporate charter. Supermajority approval (i.e. an approval
percentage greater than 50 percent) is often used as an
antitak$ ver defensive tactic (see chapter 4).
Merger specialists, such as investment bankers and
legal counsel, assist the merging managements by valuing
the separate and combined entities, giving a fairness opinion,
and suggesting the most appropriate legal and tax structure
for the ransaction.
Rational economics dictates that decisions be based
on the theory of net present value, which are in the best
interests of the stockholders.
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Because any merger must first be approved by the
target's board of directors (often containing many members
of the target management team), the target board effectively
has the power to veto all merger proposals and can refuse
to put any proposal to a stockholder vote. A consequence
of this veto power by incumbent management is that merger
proposals become discretionary decisions delegated to manage-
ment by stockholders. Stockholders have the final word
to approve or reject a merger proposal recommended by the
board of directors, but do not get the opportunity to vote
on merger proposals which the incumbent management chooses
to reject.16 Very rarely does a merger proposal not receive
shareholder approval once the management and board has given
the proposal its approval. In theory, stockholders should
be willing to accept any offer of a tax-free exchange of
new marketable securities worth more than their old shares.
Because merger transactions are generally friendly and are
worked out in close consultation with the target management
team, few defensive measures are directed particularly at
mergers. Only supermajority vote approval - a percentage
greater than a simple 50% majority - by shareholders creates
any impediment to mergers.
16This presents the classic agency problem created
by the separation of ownership and control, leading quite
often to antitakeover defensive tactics. Chapter 3 analyzes
how defensive tactics deal with these agency problems.
For a more detailed explanation of agency problems, see
Jensen & Meckling (1976) and Fama & Jensen (1982a and 1982b).
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When merger negotiations break down or when a bidder
has reason to believe that the target management would oppose
any merger proposal, the bidder can go over the heads of
the target management and appeal directly to the target
company's stockholders. The bidder can achieve control
of the target by going directly to the stockholders in two
ways: (1) tender offer or (2) proxy fight. Tender offers
and proxy fights are generally considered "unfriendly" trans-
actions, and the bidder assumes that the target management
is not going to take the offer lying down.1 7  In a tender
offer, the bidder makes an offer directly to the target
shareholders to tender their shares for a specified amount
of cash or securities. The decision to accept or reject
the offer is made by each individual stockholder, and the
success or failure of the tender offer depends upon the
proportion of stockholders tendering their shares. The
incumbent target managers are formally involved only to
the extent that they are also stockholders. However, the
incumbent management typically announces its approval or
disapproval of the offer, and can legally expend corporate
resources (e.g. money, management time, etc.) trying to
prevent the offer from being successful. Most antitakeover
defensive tactics employed by target managements have been
created either as preliminary fronts to ward off potential
170cassionally friendly tender offers are made with
the acquiescence of the selling firm's management.
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bidders from ever attempting a takeover or as a line of
defense in a hostile tender offer.
Whereas mergers can proceed in many different manners
and are generally friendly negotiations, tender offers are
made according to specific rules and regulations determined
by federal and state statutes and by the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC). Tender offer rules have evolved
in the law over time seeking to maximize the welfare of
the target firm's shareholders and to create a "fair" balance
of bargaining power between the bidder and the target manage-
ment. Most of these tender offer rules cause delays in
the tender offer process to prevent the bidder from taking
advantage of small target stockholders under the theory
that smaller stockholders possess less capability to evaluate
a proposed tender offer than do larger, more sophisticated
investors.
The federal, state and SEC codes change from time
to time as bidders develop new techniques to facilitate
the tender offer transaction in their favor. Although the
purpose of these tender offer rules is to provide equity
among all stockholders and to protect the interests of small
stockholders, target managements often use these rules as
defensive measures to block a tender offer in an effort
to remain independent. Takeover specialists, such as invest-
ment bankers and legal counsel, are required by both sides
to plot the appropriate tender offer strategy around the
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complex maze of rules and regulations. If a bidder violates
any of the tender offer regulations (however trivial), the
target management will file a lawsuit delaying the tender
offer and greatly reducing its chances of success. These
federal, state and SEC tender offer regulations, how they
are manipulated by target managements, and their effects
on target firms' stock prices will be examined in depth
in Chapters Four, Five and Six.
Alternative to the tender offer, the bidder 1 8 may
attempt a proxy fight to obtain controlling seats (or at
least a voice) on the target firm's board of directors.
The board of directors has the legal authority for the manage-
ment and the direction of the corporation, and is required
to supervise the general course of the business in the best
interests of the stockholders. The board has the authority
to delegate responsibility for the day-to-day operations
of the company to internal managers, and has the right to
remove or replace these officers. A proxy contest is a
mechanism by which shareholders can change the firm's board,
and thus, effectively change the "control" of the firm.
State corporation laws and the company's corporate charter
and by-laws establish the rules governing proxy contests.
A proxy contest usually begins in the months prior
to the firm's annual meeting, at which time a new board
18In the case of proxy contests, the bidder is usually
a single large stockholder or group of investors, often
referred to as "dissidents" or "insurgents."
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of directors must be elected by a vote of the firm's stock-
holders. The incumbent board nominates itself (plus any
new directors to replace retiring board members), mails
out a proxy statement to the stockholders describing the
backgrounds, compensation and stock ownership of the nominated
directors, and collects the returned ballots. 19 The outside
group - the dissidents - puts together its own slate of
directors and initiates a campaign in opposition to the
incumbent management. Both the dissident group and the
incumbent management seek votes from shareholders using
public relations techniques similar to political campaigns.
Small stockholders are addressed in large, full-page adver-
tisements taken out in the Wall Street Journal and New York
Times, and larger investors are contacted directly over
the telephone. Stockholders sign and return their proxy
forms having voted for their preferred slate of directors;
and the agents for each group collect and cast the votes
at the annual meeting.
Generally, the group obtaining the majority of stock-
holder votes will elect a majority of the directors, and
thus, maintains control of the corporation. The exact alloca-
tion of votes depends upon the method of voting, which is
dictated by the firm's charter and by-laws. Corporations
in the United States have one of two ways of voting: (a)
19A stockholder may vote in person at the annual meeting
of the company or cast his ballot in advance by returning
the "proxy" through the mail.
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non-cumulative or (b) cumulative. In non-cumulative voting,
each director is treated as a separate election. Stockholders
are entitled to cast votes (equal to the number of shares
held) for each director position. Since each group presents
an entire slate of directors and since the successful nominee
for each position is the one attracting the majority of
votes, non-cumulative voting usually precludes minority
stockholder groups from electing any directors. On the
other hand, cumulative voting does permit minority groups
to elect a minority of the directors. Proxy-holders are
entitled to cast, in total, votes equal to the number of
shares held multiplied by the number of directors. Stock-
holders may distribute their votes across positions in any
way, including casting all votes for a single director.
The nominees from both incumbent and dissident groups are
ranked in descending order according to the number of votes
received, and the required number of directors elected are
then taken from this list.
Proxy contests clearly threaten the continued employment
of the incumbent board and influence the direction of the
corporation. Even if the dissident group fails to win a
majority of the board seats (or even any at all), the proxy
fight has sent a clear signal to incumbent management that
assets are under-utilized and that changes need to be taken
to improve the firm's stock value. Furthermore, actual
proxy fights constitute only a small percentage of threatened
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fights. The parties generally prefer to negotiate a settlement
in accordance with their respective strengths than incur
the costs of soliciting proxies. Thus, the threat of a
proxy contest is often sufficient to discipline management
and is a cost-efficient method of reducing the agency problems
created by the separation of management and ownership.
Many of the antitakeover charter amendments, which limit
shareholder rights and make it more difficult to remove
directors, are directly targeted at the threat of proxy
contests.
But proxy contests do have problems and limitations.
First, proxy fights are expensive relative to the expected
payout results. Proxy-fight expenses include the direct
expenses of mailings, advertising, telephone calls, and
visits to large shareholders. These costs - borne entirely
by the dissident group - often dwarf the gains received
on their small fractional holding of the corporation. On
the other hand, the incumbent management can use corporate
resources to put forward its position and fend off the dissi-
dents. Second, the dissident group always has difficulty
conveying its message, which is often quite complex and
subject to interpretation by the media, especially to smaller
investors who generally automatically side with incumbent
management and who often do not even bother to look at proxy
materials. Particularly as equities are increasingly held
by institutions, stockholders speak more freely about their
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dissatisfaction with management's performance, and incumbent
managements can no longer take for granted the outcome of
proxy votes at annual meetings.20  Finally, proxy contests
face the "free-rider" problem (to be discussed more fully
in Chapter Three) whereby most stockholders do not have
the incentive to monitor management and to come up with
an alternative strategic corporate plan and slate of direc-
tors.21 The dissident group bears the full cost of the
proxy fight for all the firm's stockholders, whereas any
increase in value generated as a result of the proxy fight
must be shared with all stockholders alike (according to
each person's percentage ownership). Thus, a dissident
group must hold a sizable position in the company (usually
greater than five percent of the outstanding shares) to
make a proxy fight worth its while.
2 0 Institutions traditionally followed the "Wall Street
Rule" (which was more a habit than a rule) which dictated
that professional investment managers either supported corp-
orate management on policy questions or divested the company's
stock, ýyt never were they to confront management directly.
Grossman & Hart (1980b) examine this "free-rider"
problem and suggest socially optimal corporate charters
to minimize this problem.
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Chapter 3. Hypotheses of Why Antitakeover Tactics Exist
Chapter Two examined the theoretical and practical
motivations and vehicles for takeovers. Generally, the
viewpoint was from that of the bidder. With that background,
this chapter will explore the possible arguments of why
antitakeover provisions exist from the viewpoint of the
target's management.
Several authors have each presented two similar compet-
ing hypotheses to explain the existence of various antitakeover
provisions and to test whether these defensive provisions
add to or distract from stockholder's wealth.1  Briefly
summarized, the "managerial entrenchment hypothesis" predicts
that stockholders suffer wealth losses when incumbent manage-
ment uses antitakeover defensive tactics to deter a credible
takeover threat, especially when the transfer of control
involves receiving a premium over the current market for
the stockholders' shares. The competing "stockholder interests
hypothesis" suggests that stockholders gain from antitakeover
defensive tactics because the reduced threat of competition
IThe literature related to the market for corporate
control contains many references to these two hypotheses.
For the topic of this thesis, these hypotheses are best
discussed in Cary (1969-70), DeAngelo & Rice (1983), and
Dann & DeAngelo (1983). Although the terms are not used,
several legal writers have also presented these arguments:
see Easterbrook & Fischel (1981a,b) and Lipton (1979, 1981).
Related arguments to these antitakeover hypotheses have
been advanced by Bradley (1980), Grossman & Hart (1980b),
and Jarrell & Bradley (1980).
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for control allows management to concentrate on running
the business and avoids expending real resources in the
costly process of competition. Although at odds with one
another, each hypothesis likely has some explanatory power
over the wealth effects of antitakeover defensive tactics
depending upon the situation. But one hypothesis likely
dominates the other for most antitakeover defensive actions.
The empirical part of the thesis tests the validity of each
hypothesis. The next two sections will analyze these two
hypotheses, the third section will discuss the free-rider
problem, and the final section in this chapter will look
at how the courts have interpreted the roles of the board
of directors and incumbent management.
3.1 The Managerial Entrenchment HyDothesis
The managerial entrenchment hypothesis suggests that
antitakeover defensive tactics primarily act to increase
incumbent management's job security and decision-making
powers at the expense of stockholders. This hypothesis
recognizes that the separation of ownership by stockholders
from control by management gives rise to agency costs.2
If both parties in the agency relationship maximize their
own respective wealth, then there are situations in which
2Jensen & Meckling (1976) define the agency relationship
as "a contract under which one or more persons (the principal)
engage another person (the agent) to perform some service
on their behalf which involves delegating some decision
making authority to the agent" (p. 308).
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the agent will not necessarily act in the best interests
of the principal. For example, an incumbent manager faced
with a hostile tender offer may recommend to stockholders
not to tender their shares even though the bidder is offering
a substantial premium over the current market value, and
he may use corporate resources in an attempt to defeat the
tender offer. According to the managerial entrenchment
hypothesis, the manager's recommendation and actions are
not motivated by the best interests of the stockholders,
but rather are taken to save his own job and position of
power within the firm. Managers benefit from consuming
corporate perquisites, but bear their costs only to the
extent to which they are also stockholders of the firm.
These perquisites include the right to make strategic business
decisions, control sizable amounts of assets, earn large
salaries, work in plush offices, and travel to and from
work in limousines.
Generally, when negotiating in a takeover situation,
managers have no incentive (as managers as opposed to as
stockholders) to buy management services for the company
at the lowest possible price. Managers possess the obvious
self-interest to preserve their own jobs with as high a
level of compensation (including perquisites) as the stock-
holders will bear. To minimize these agency costs inherent
in the stockholder-manager relationship, several mechanisms
serve to discipline managers: (1) explicit management-stock-
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holder contracts,3 (2) managerial labor market forces, and
(3) the threat of losing one's job through takeover or stock-
holder vote. None of these disciplinary mechanisms are
costless (in some cases the monitoring costs may be quite
high). As a result, these mechanisms are imperfect in disci-
plining managers, never fully eliminating the agency problem.
Stockholders incur wealth losses as they trade off the costs
of monitoring and contracting with management against the
expected wealth drain due to the agency problem. So long
as the cost of management's inefficiency is less than the
cost of an outside bidder taking over control, the incumbent
managers will remain secure in their positions with their
protected high salaries.
To the extent that the wealth loss due to antitakeover
provisions is less than the costs to stockholders of monitoring
and contracting with management or less than the cost of
taking over control, innovative managers will devise ways
to minimize the likelihood of being displaced. For example,
many antitakeover charter amendments make the transfer of
control more difficult and raise the costs of ousting inef-
ficient managers through a proxy contest or tender offer,
but each individual stockholder nearly always votes to approve
the amendment because the cost of fighting the proposed
change is relatively greater. Given the extreme complexities
3A good example of such a contract is the compensation
packages of top managers which make compensation contingent
on managerial performance (e.g. bonuses and stock options).
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of valuing takeover proposals, some actions taking by target
managers preceding and during a hostile takeover attempt,
such as issuing "blank check" preferred stock or selling
off "crown jewel" assets to make the target less desirable
to the bidder, are difficult to evaluate. Were the actions
taken for sound business reasons or were the actions motivated
by the managers desire to retain his job and position?
Many antitakeover devices must be approved directly
by stockholder vote, and for those that are not, stockholders
still have the opportunity each year to oust management
(and their antitakeover actions) at the annual meeting.
Then how does the managerial entrenchment hypothesis explain
the existence of antitakeover defensive tactics? Several
explanations are possible. First, conceivably stockholders'
failure to reject antitakeover devices could simply be irra-
tional or lack of interest in the subject (e.g. not bothering
to even look through a proxy statement). This explanation
is contrary to all capital asset pricing theory and the
idea of efficient markets.5  A second explanation is that
large block stockholders (primarily institutions) may realize
that negative wealth effects of antitakeover provisions,
but will still approve them to maintain a working relationship
4These "poison pill" and "scorched earth" defensive
tactics will be described in detail in the next chapter.
5The capital asset pricing model assumes that investors
are rational. Countless studies (both theoretical and empiri-
cal) over the last 20 years have upheld the notion of at
least relatively efficient markets - markets in which investors
maximize their own individual wealth (or utility).
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with the incumbent management.6  These large blockholders,
who have substantial voting power, believe that future consid-
erations received from management outweigh the loss in share
value due to antitakeover provisions. This explanation
is difficult to swallow in light of the substantial premiums
(sometimes over 100 percent of current market value) that
are often paid in control transfer situations.
Finally, the information and transaction costs required
to wage a fight against the antitakeover tactic may be quite
high relative to the wealth loss caused by the defensive
action. When asked to approve an antitakeover provision,
each stockholder considers the net costs and benefits in
terms of his own wealth maximization and acts accordingly.
The costs of evaluating the antitakeover provision and acting
to oppose it may simply be greater than the stockholder's
expected loss of just going ahead and accepting it. Anyway,
as with other agency costs, investors will take into account
management's likelihood of using defensive tactics and the
expected costs associated with those tactics in pricing
the shares of the company. To the extent that investors
anticipate management's antitakeover desires and reflect
these costs when pricing the firm's stock, the wealth loss
due to antitakeover provisions will fall back onto the manag-
ers.
In summary, the takeover mechanism serves as an effect-
6DeAngelo & Rice (1983), P. 334.
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ive monitor of a corporation's managers. Antitakeover defen-
sive tactics make takeovers more difficult, and reduce the
incentives for bidders to seek out takeover candidates and
to pay takeover premiums. If takeovers produce real gains
for both the bidder and the target, this suggests that defen-
sive tactics cause real losses. Given that the bidder pays
a substantial control premium, if defensive tactics preserve
incumbent management's "independence," then the target stock-
holders are unambiguously worse off.
3.2 The Stockholder Interests Hvoothesis
The stockholder interests hypothesis predicts that
antitakeover defensive tactics increase current stockholder
wealth. The stockholder interests hypothesis recognizes
the existence of possible agency problems, but believes
that stockholder-management contracting and the managerial
labor market mechanisms are sufficient in disciplining managers
to act in the best interests in shareholders. The threat
of a takeover does not necessarily motivate managers to
perform more efficiently.
The stockholders interest hypothesis focuses on three
main issues. First, the competition for control between
incumbent management and potential bidders is assumed to
be a costly process. Current stockholders bear the costs
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of management's defensive efforts to maintain control.7
These costs include the monitoring costs of maintaining
a stockholder relations department, publishing a detailed
annual report, and direct mailings to stockholders. If
a takeover battle develops, managers use the firm's money
to hire takeover defense specialists, to take out advertise-
ments in the financial press, and to buy assets incompatible
with the bidder.8 In addition to these direct costs, management
time is consumed in the defensive effort, time which is
diverted away from generating profits for the stockholders.
The costs of this competitive process include the productive
business opportunities foregone when managerial effort is
instead used to maintain the incumbent position.9
The stockholders interests hypothesis suggests that
stockholders benefit from the reduction in competition in
the market for corporate control, because the probability
of incurring the above defensive costs is reduced. Antitake-
over provisions are basically contracts which directly limit
takeover competition or which increase the costs to outside
bidders attempting to take control. These defensive cost
savings outweigh the inefficiencies inherent in the stockholder-
7 Remember that management can legally use corporate
resources in the takeover battle (see section 3.4). These
are not simply out-of-pocket expenses.
This is a defensive tactic whereby the target acquires
assets in a regulated industry (e.g. a television station)
which the bidder does not want to be involved in, or acquires
a competitor of the bidder which would create antitrust
problem .
Dann & DeAngelo (1983), p. 281.
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manager agency relationship.
Second, in the view of the stockholders interests
hypothesis, antitakeover defensive tactics function to induce
higher takeover premiums from bidders. Defensive tactics
can be used to trigger a bidding contest.1 0  Confronted
by a tender offer, target managements routinely oppose the
first bid with the intention of holding out for a higher
premium or to buy time allowing competing bidders to make
offers as well. Although most federal, state and SEC tender
offer regulation was created with the intention of protecting
the small stockholder, the tender offer rules have the effect
of extracting higher premiums from bidders and increase
the power of the target. Target managers often proclaim
that the bidder's offer is "grossly inadequate" or that
it does not "reflect the true long-run value of the firm,"
even though the offer often represents a 50 to 100 percent
premium over the current market value of the target's stock.
Countering this claim, one could argue that antitakeover
defensive tactics do not, in fact, raise takeover premiums,
but rather they tend to discourage takeovers. Transactions
for which the synergistic gains created by combining the
two firms are relatively small (and thus a large takeover
premium is not justified by the deal's economics) will
1 0 0ne should remember that auctions often lead to higher
prices, but auctions can also be quite expensive both in
terms of direct costs and in terms of inside information
given up.
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be discouraged by the antitakeover provisions. Many positive
net present value takeover investments will not be undertaken
by bidding firms because the costs of overcoming the defensive
tactics outweigh the positive NPV of the transaction. Fur-
thermore, given the complexities of evaluating acquisition
investments, antitakeover provisions may discourage bidding
firms from even searching for worthwhile acquisition targets.
The managerial entrenchment hypothesis would argue in this
case that the reduction in competition in the takeover market
increases the likelihood of managerial inefficiency due
to agency problems.
Suppose a bidder makes a tender offer to the stock-
holders of a target firm for 51% of the outstanding shares
of the target at a substantial premium over the target's
current stock price. But assume the currently offered price
is not as high as the bidder is willing to pay (i.e. the
takeover premium does not reflect 100 percent of the potential
synergy gains created by combination). Target stockholders
are uncertain as to whether the bidder will increase the
offering percentage or whether he will conclude a post-tender
offer merger for the remaining 49% (and a what price?).
No other competing bids have surfaced, but others bids are
certainly possible. Should the stockholder tender his shares
capturing the premium, or should he hold out in hopes that
a competing bidder offers a higher price? If a post-tender
offer merger takes place, will the remaining shares get
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paid the same tender-offer premium?
The third issue argued by the the stockholder interests
hypothesis revolves around how the target stockholders make
tendering decisions as in the above predicament, and how
the synergy gains - the incremental cash flows created by
combining the two firms - are split up between the bidder
and target. The above hypothetical case places each stock-
holder in a prisoner's dilemma1 1 in deciding whether to
tender his shares. As an individual, each stockholder has
the private-level incentive to tender his shares at the
first offer - in effect, take the money and run. But if
the target stockholders all held out as one unified cohesive
group, the bidder would be forced to up his offering price
towards his maximum level. Obviously, target stockholders
are unable to enforce a perfectly cohesive cartel to hold
out against the bidder for a higher price. If any one stock-
holder participates in the group holdout, he runs the risk
of losing the currently offered takeover premium should
other stockholders opportunistically tender. The stockholder
interests hypothesis suggests that antitakeover defensive
tactics encourage a cartelized stockholder response to a
takeover offer, and thus, push up the premiums paid.
Target stockholders obviously will not accept a
11The prisoner's dilemma is a classic case in gaming
theory, and comes up in many different situations throughout
life. For a good description of the prisoner's dilemma
and how it explains making economic choices, see Nicholson
(1978), pp. 164-166.
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value for their shares less than the current market; and
the acquiror will not bid more than the sum of the target
as an independent entity plus the value of the synergistic
gains created. Thus, a range is established in which both
parties will benefit from the transaction, but how the range
is split up depends upon the relative negotiating strengths
of the two parties. The stockholder interests hypothesis
claims that antitakeover defensive tactics enable the target
stockholder group to extract a larger percentage of those
synergy gains. Antitakeover provisions reduce each stock-
holder's private incentive to tender shares at a relatively
low offer price in order to appropriate a larger takeover
premium. The antitakeover provision enables the target
stockholders as a group to holdout for a larger premium.
3.3 The Free-Rider Problem
Suppose that incumbent management is taking advantage
of potential agency problems by not acting exclusively in
the best interests of the stockholders, or that another
management team could create more value from the target's
assets. The bidder tenders for the shares of the target,
buying the shares at a low price (relative to the value
achieved under his management) and hopes for price appreciation
under his more efficient control. If the target stockholder
thinks that the takeover will succeed and that the bidder
will increase the value of the firm beyond what he pays
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to the tendering stockholders, he will retain his shares
and "free ride" on the price appreciation created by the
bidder's better management.12
The bidder bears the entire cost of paying the premium
to gain control of the target, but he must share the benefits
of his superior management with the free-riding stockholders
not tendering their shares. As discussed in Chapter Two
in the case of proxy fights, the expected gain to the bidder
must at least compensate him for taking on the battle for
control and for carrying all the takeover costs for the
entire stockholder group. Thus, when considering a potential
takeover, the bidder must not only consider the cost of
waging the takeover battle, but he must also calculate the
costs created by free-riding stockholders.
Grossman & Hart (1980b) argue that antitakeover provi-
sions in corporate charters can help reduce the "externality"
of the free-rider problem. Grossman & Hart support the
idea of two-tier takeovers in which different groups of
stockholders are treated unequally. 1 3 They view the management
of a diversely-held corporation as a public good which should
be run for the good of all, and that free-riders should
12 The free-riding stockholder runs the risk that his
decision to hold out could cause the tender offer to fail,
or that the bidder does not buy the remaining shares at
a later date (in which case the target's stock price will
fall to1 eflect the loss of gains due to synergies).
The merits of two-tier takeovers will be discussed
in length in Chapter Eight when considering the socially
optimal level of antitakeover provisions and tactics.
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not receive the same benefits as the bidder (bearing the
costs) or the tendering stockholders (who give the bidder
the right of control):
The only way to create proper incentives for the
production of a public good is to exclude nonpayers
from enjoying the benefits of the public good. .
This can be accomplished by permitting the raider
[bidder] to treat the shares of those who %q ve not
tendered differently from the shares he owns.
These arguments concerning the problems associated with
free-riding stockholders lead to the same conclusions about
antitakeover defensive tactics as does the stockholder inter-
ests hypothesis - defensive tactics increase stockholder
wealth.
3.4 How the Courts View Defensive Tactics
Before discussing how the courts rule on defensive
tactics, it is helpful to briefly review the role of directors
in the corporate governance system. Ultimate power rests
with the stockholders who cannot act directly but only through
elected representatives - the directors. Directors owe
a fiduciary duty to the stockholders meaning that they are
supposed to act as prudent businessmen, in good faith and
on a reasonable basis in the best interests of the stockhold-
ers. In the past the board of directors focussed solely
on the interests of its stockholders. In last several decades
public opinion, legislation and the courts have forced boards
1 4 Grossman & Hart (1980b), p. 59.
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of directors to consider a broader constituency including
employees, consumers, the community, the environment and
the national welfare.
In stockholder suits against management, the courts
generally give management a great deal of leeway (rarely
do stockholders ever win) by applying the "business judgement
rule." Under the business judgement rule, a board of directors
"enjoys a presumption of sound business judgement, and its
decisions will not be disturbed if they can be attributed
to any rational business purpose. A court under such circum-
stances will not substitute its own notions of what is or
is not sound business judgement." 15 Generally, the application
of the business judgement rule contributes to the efficient
management of the corporation. There is no reason to believe
that the courts could improve on the performance of managers.
Courts lack the experience, the speed, and, most importantly,
the necessary information necessary to make business deci-
sions. Furthermore, the courts recognize that market forces
(e.g. the labor market, compensation packages, and the takeover
market) operate more efficiently than judicial scrutiny
in disciplining managers and providing incentives for managers
to act in the best interests of stockholders.
The court's rulings on the legality of antitakeover
defensive tactics is somewhat mixed, but generally the courts
15Gimbel v, Signal Companies, 316 A.2d 599, 609 (Del.Ch)
aff'd per curiam, 316 A.2d 619 (Del.Supr. 1974).
side with the target management deferring to their better
business judgement. In Panter v. Marshall Field & Co.,
a stockholder action attacking the rejection of a takeover
proposal and the defensive measures taken by the board of
Marshall Field against Carter Hawley Hale, the court held
that the business judgement rule governs the actions and
consideration of a takeover bid by the board of directors
of a target. 16 The court said:
Directors of a publicly owned corporation do not
act outside of the law when they, in good faith,
decide that it is in the best interest of the company
and its shareholders that it remain an independent
business entity. Having so determined, they can
authorize management to oppose offers which, in their
best judgement are detrimental to the company and
its shareholders. 1
On the other hand, the courts have sometimes questioned
the motives of management, overriding the business judgement
rule and ruling against management. The courts recognize
that severe conflicts of interests between management and
stockholders can arise in corporate control situations.
In these cases, the burden of proof in court is on the board
16This is the leading case in defense of antitakeover
defensive tactics. Critics would argue that the Marshall
Field case was a special, isolated case. Marshall Field's
growth had lagged that of other firms in its industry and
had been approached repeatedly as a takeover candidate,
each time rejecting the approach. Marshall Field has (quite
vigorously) used the full array of defensive tactics against
these merger proposals. Critics question how stockholders
benefit by a legal rule that allows target managers to spend
huge sums of stockholder's money for the purpose of preventing
them fr more than doubling their investment.
Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 486 F. Supp. 1168
(N.D. Ill. 1980), appeal docketed, No. 375 (7th Cir. March
21, 1980).
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of directors to demonstrate a "compelling business purpose"
to render their defensive actions fair rather than in their
own self-serving interest. In Kennecott Cor,. v. Smith,
for example, the Third Circuit explained that "[w]hile being
subjected to these [defensive] actions, which are designed
to influence their decision, the shareholders cannot enjoy
their federally protected right . . . to make a choice about
the governance of their corporation or the disposition of
their shares." 18 The Seventh Circuitl9 expressed its opinion
against defensive tactics even more strongly in MITE Corn, v,
Dixon:
[I]f the weapons in management's arsenal are drama-
tically augmented [by state antitakeover statutes],
the vigor of the tender offer device will at some
point be impaired, denying protection to shareholders
in an obvious dimenaion: the right to tender their
shares at a premium.
Thus, the courts do recognize the rights of target stockholders
to receive a control premium, but at the same time do not
want to take away the business judgement flexibility of
management.
The Williams Act 2 1 permits management to remain neutral
when presented with a takeover bid. However, under some
circumstances, management is legally obligated to take a
1 8Kennecott Corp. v. Smith, 637 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1980),
at 189.
1 9 The same court which gave the Marshall Field opinion.2 0 MITE Corp, v. Dixon, 633 F.2d 486 (7th Cir. 1980),
at 496
2 1See Chapter Four for a description of federal, state
and SEC regulation of the market for corporate control (includ-
ing the Williams Act).
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position (for or against) regarding a takeover bid. The
court ruled in Insuranshares Cor. v. N•orthern Fifscal Corp
that "those who control a corporation . . . owe some duty
to the corporation in respect to the transfer of control
to outsiders." 2 2  Insuranshares has been interpreted to
require that management oppose transfers of control "if
the circumstances surrounding the proposed transfer would
alert suspicion in a prudent man that the purchasers are
an irresponsible group who will mismanage and loot the corp-
orate assets." 2 3  Once again, the business judgement rule
is the governing doctrine most often followed by the courts.
2 2 InsuransharesCorp, v, NortherFiscal Corp,,35F.Supp.
22 (ED i. 1940), at 25.
McDaniel v. Painter, 418F.2d545, 547 (10thCir.1969).
See also Swinney v. Keebler Co., 329 F.Supp. 216 (DSC 1971);
Gerdes v. Reynolds, 28 N.Y.S. 2d 622, 651 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
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Chapter 4. How Antitakeover Defensive Tactics Are Used
So far this thesis has explored the possible motivations
behind a bidder's takeover attempt of a target firm, and
has discussed the mechanics and techniques of control battles.
Next the thesis presented two competing hypotheses as to
why target managements often resist takeover attempts, and
considered how the courts deal with these defensive actions.
This chapter will describe (a catalog, so to speak) the
full range of defensive tactics available to target-company
managements. With this background, the thesis will be ready
to test the wealth effects of these tactics and compare
these findings to the results of others. The following
is a description of currently legal defensive tactics.
Some of these tactics are used prior to a control situation
(e.g. antitakeover charter provisions), but most are under-
taken by management when faced with a takeover bid or proxy
fight.
4.1 Antitakeover Charter and Byv-Law Amendments
Antitakeover amendments made to a company's charter
or by-laws tend to fall into one of three groups: (1) voting
methods and approval percentages, (2) terms, nominations
and powers of the board of directors, and (3) rights of
the stockholders. These antitakeover charter provisions
have been aptly named "shark repellents," serving as a first
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line of defense to ward off potential raiders. Generally,
these charter amendments serve to either make the approval
of a takeover more difficult or to delay any transfer of
control (particularly within the board of directors). Each
of the following antitakeover amendments will be described
in detail:
1. Supermajority voting approval
a) Merger
b) Remove/change number of directors
c) Amend charter/by-laws
2. Changes in business or capital structure
3. Board of directors
a) Removal for cause only
b) Staggered board (classified)
c) Advance nomination required
4. Fair price provisions
5. Changes in by-laws or amendments by board only
6. Creating class of voting preferred (see section 4.6)
7. Elimination of cumulative voting
8. Reduce stockholders' rights
a) No written consent
b) Increase percentage to call special meeting
c) Only board can fill vacancies
d) Elimination of preemptive rights
e) Special meeting called by board only
f) Limit voting power of substantial stockholders
9. Board must consider social factors i.n merger review
The incumbent management and board must present the arguments
(pro and con) for these new amendments in the firm's proxy
statement, and the amendments must be approved by the stock-
holders at the annual meeting. Typically, combinations
of the above amendments (e.g. staggered board and elimination
of cumulative voting) will be put together for approval
all at one time, rather than presenting single amendment
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changes at separate meetings.1
4.1.1 Defenses Against Changing the Board at Annual Meeting
Staggered board provisions divide the board of directors
into three equal classes of directors, each serving a three-
year term with each such term ending in a successive year
(this is a classified board). In contrast, with a non-clas-
sified board, every member stands for election at each annual
meeting. The business justification for a classified board
is that, at any given time, two-thirds of the directors
will have had prior experience as directors of the company.
However, the practical effect (whether intended or not)
is that even a substantial majority-stockholder would have
to wait for at least two successive annual meetings in order
to elect a majority of the board and, thus, gain control.
Furthermore, under Delaware law,2 classified board members
may not be removed before their terms expire without estab-
lishing cause, whereas non-classified board members may
be removed at any time by a majority stockholder vote without
specifying cause (unless stipulated by the firm's charter,
see below). A classified board's incumbency is secured
by this "lock-up" provision and by supermajority voting
requirements to change the total number of directors.
1But stockholders have the right to vote separately
on each proposed amendment, choosing only those that he
feels enhance his equity holding in the company.
Approximately 45% of the corporations listed on the
New York Stock Exchange are incorporated in Delaware.
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Cumulative voting to elect members of the board3
has long been considered primarily a device to facilitate
minority stockholder representation on the board and, there-
fore, has usually been looked upon with disfavor by manage-
ment. In the absence of a staggered board, the incumbent
management would likely propose an amendment to eliminate
cumulative voting. However, when coupled with a classified
board, cumulative voting can have the effect of extending
the time it might otherwise take for a majority of dissident
stockholders to obtain control of the board. For example,
with a board of nine consisting of three classes of three
directors, it would take a majority of the votes cast to
elect two of the three directors standing for election in
any one year. Voting under a cumulative system, even a
dissident stockholder controlling 70 percent of the votes
might, after two successive annual meetings, find that he
had been able to elect only four of the nine directors. 4
Nonetheless, few companies have combined cumulative voting
with a staggered board, fearing that a dissident stockholder
could gain representation on the board.
By requiring advance nomination for director positions,
the incumbent board can ward off surprise nominations made
from the floor at the annual meeting. Usually, management
will have no fear of surprise nominations if dissidents
3See section 2.2 (the practice of takeovers) on the
effects of cumulative voting in proxy contests.
Example taken from Hochman & Folger (1979), p. 539.
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did not solicit proxies or if the dissidents' intentions
were not disclosed early enough by Schedule 13D filings.
But if the company has a large block stockholder (e.g. 30
percent), the substantial stockholder could potentially
propose his own slate of directors and get them elected
from the floor of the annual meeting. By requiring advance
nomination, the incumbent management has the time to establish
a defense using the standard proxy fight techniques (including
delaying the annual meeting). Although the right to make
nominations from the floor seems like an inherent right
of stockholders, one could argue that this provision gives
stockholders time to consider the qualifications of all
nominees before voting. 5
Some companies have proposed (and even passed!) amend-
ments limiting voting power of substantial sized stockhold-
ers. 6 The statutes of most states allow firms to establish
almost any voting practice they please. In almost every
corporation, each common share has one vote, and only those
shares possess votes. In a few instances, target firms
have passed an amendment which dilutes the one share, one
5A further by-law limitation on the right to nominate
directors has been held legal in several cases: director
nominees must meet certain qualifiactions, including residency
in the county in which the corporation has its principal
place of business. See McKee & Co. v. First Nat'l Bank,
265 F.S pp. 1 (S.D. Cal. 1967).
Easterbrook & Fischel (1983) provide an excellent
discussion on the practices and values of voting in corpor-
ate law. They describe how managers can effectively use
the proxy machinery to their own advantage.
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vote status for those shares held in single blocks. For
example, the charter amendment may dictate that the shares
held in any single block greater than 20% of the outstanding
stock will carry only 1/10th of a vote per share, rather
than a full one vote.
4.1.2 Defenses Against Changing Board Prior to Annual Meeting
Several antitakeover amendments limit the rights
of stockholders to influence management outside the setting
of the annual meeting. Limitation of right to call special
meetings depend upon each particular state's statute, but
in many cases the by-laws can be changed to permit only
the board - and not the stockholders - to call a special
meeting.
Some states' corporate codes (including Delaware)
allow stockholders to take action by written consent, if
the requisite proportion of stockholders sign the written
consent and prompt notice thereof is sent to all other stock-
holders, rather than through a formal meeting. Thus, a
bidder could request written consent from the target's stock-
holders approving changes in the corporate charter, including
approval of changes in the way in which the board is elected
or how a proposed merger is approved. An amendment to elimi-
nate written consent would force a bidder to wait at least
until the next stockholder's meeting to implement changes
in the firm's activities (even if the bidder owned a majority
of the outstanding shares).
Other amendments have been adopted to increase the
difficulty of removing incumbent directors. In some states,
charter changes allow directors to be removed from office
for specific causes only. Typically, with a non-classified
board, stockholders can remove any or all directors for
virtually any reason. The exact conditions constituting
"cause" are spelled out in the charter amendment, sometimes
limiting cause to criminal or quasi-criminal types of conduct.
Furthermore, even in the "cause" conditions are satisfied,
the amendment may require a supermajority vote for removal
of the directors - often 80 percent of the shares outstanding.
This amendment limits a bidder's ability to quickly replace
an incumbent board with its own slate of directors even
if the bidder controls a majority of the outstanding shares
(but not a supermajority).
In order to prevent a majority stockholder from circum-
venting the effect of a classified board, management may
propose an amendment to provide that the power to determine
the number of directors and the power to fill vacancies
be vested solely in the board and not with the stockholders.
Otherwise, a majority stockholder could obtain control by
enlarging the size of the board and filling the new vacancies
with his own directors. This amendment is obviously comple-
mentary to staggered board and supermajority voting amendments.
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4.1.3 Defenses Against Attempts to Impede Incumbent Board
The statutes which govern the vote required to amend
the charter and by-laws differ considerably from state to
state. In Delaware, the charter can be amended only if
the proposed amendment is first approved by the board of
directors and then by the stockholders. Thus, as long as
incumbent management controls the board of directors, anti-
takeover charter provisions remain secure. In New York,
on the other hand, stockholders can act directly to amend
the charter without action by the board. In such states,
a large stockholder could use various charter amendments
to frustrate the board getting around the above described
amendments. For example, this stockholder could through
charter and by-law amendments:
a) elect and determine the duties of corporate officers;
b) pack the board by filling vacancies, whether arising
by resignations of from an increase in the number
of directors;
c) permit the calling of special meetings, the removal
of directors, the abolition of other defensive charter
amendments;
d) abolish provisions indemnifying officers and directors;
e) require unanimous votes for all board actions (just
one board seat has veto power); or
f) slow down the board by requiring board action only
at actual meetings or (more frustrating) only at
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meetings in the state of incorporation.7
To prevent stockholders from using by-law changes as such
a weapon against incumbent management, an amendment could
be considered which required supermajority approval of any
charter and by-law amendments. This effectively "locks
up" the other antitakeover amendments. Or even more stringent,
an amendment could remove the stockholders' right to make
amendments directly, requiring that charter and by-law amend-
ments be made only by the board.8
4.1.4 Antisqueezeout Charter Provisions
Supermajority merger approval provisions require
that more than a simple majority (e.g. 80 percent) of the
outstanding shares must approve a merger or similar trans-
action such as liquidation, consolidation or sale of major
assets. Supermajority approval usually applies only when
the transaction involves a "substantial stockholder," most
often defined as a holding of more than 10 percent. Most
supermajority provisions stipulate approval percentages
from 67 to 80 percent, although some have required as much
7 These examples are taken from Hochman & Folger (1979).
See Hochman & Folger for cited statuates and common law
cases. They cite an interesting case whereby DPF Incorporated,
through the use of by-law changes, completely handcuffed
the ability of the board of Interstate Brands Corporation
from mafing normal business decisions.
The corporate codes of some states may not allow
this (e.g. New York). In this case, management might consider
amending the charter to require board action as a precondition
to all future charter amendments.
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as 95 percent (under certain conditions). Other supermajority
amendments require a majority or supermajority of shares
not held by the substantial stockholder. This supermajority
approval requirement may delay or block a bidder from imple-
menting a merger strategy even though he controls the target's
board of directors.
Because supermajority merger approval may in some
cases be too constraining to the decision-making of the
company, supermajority provisions often include escape claus-
es. Transactions covered by the escape clauses usually
include (1) internal corporate reorganizations where the
transaction is between the target company and its own subsidi-
ary or (2) friendly external transactions where the target's
board approves the merger.
Fair price provisions inhibit a bidder from squeezing
out minority shareholders even after the bidder has gained
control of the target's board of directors. Such provisions
are strong forms of supermajority approval whereby stockholders
who do not tender their shares in a takeover bid will receive
a price for their shares in any follow-on merger at least
as high as the original tender offer price. The determination
of the "fair" price to the remaining minority stockholders
is usually stated in terms of market values or as some P/E
multiple of earnings per share. Some fair price redemption
clauses stipulate that any remaining stockholder may demand
payment (at any time) at the specified "fair" price for
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the shares he still owns once the bidder acquires more than
50 percent of the currently outstanding stock. As with
supermajority merger approval, escape clauses exist for
fair price provisions: (1) when a very large percentage
of the stockholders waive them or (2) when the same board
of directors continues on with the new entity.
Fair price provisions discourage takeovers in several
ways. First, they reduce the pressure on stockholders to
tender their shares at the initial offer by assuring them
that they will receive a price at least as high as the tender
offer price if they do not tender (assuming the bid is suc-
cessful). Second, they prevent the bidder from buying the
target at a bargain price and then squeezing out the remaining
stockholders at a lower price. With fair price provisions,
the buyer loses some control over what price he will ultimately
have to pay. Although many more companies have adopted
supermajority merger approval than fair price provisions,
some stockholders may find the fair price amendment easier
to accept. Fair price provisions focus directly on the
fair treatment and interests of public stockholders, rather
than "entrenching" management's position by increasing the
approval percentage needed for a transfer of control.
4.1.5 Other Antitakeover Charter Defenses
Change of state of incorporation to a state where
the corporate codes contain more antitakeover provisions
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or where state officials impose more regulation on tender
offers was once a viable defensive tactic, but today a large
majority of states have adopted antitakeover statutes.
Relatively few states remain with no tender offer regulation.
Hochman & Folger (1979) suggest changing incorporation to
states having milder, more neutral statutes which are not
likely to be inconsistent with the Williams Act. 9
Another charter amendment authorizes the board of
directors to consider the social effects of a merger in
addition to the exclusive interests of the stockholders.
Control Data Corporation first made this sort of proposal
to its stockholders in 1978 whereby the directors are expressly
asked to review the social and economic effects on employees
and local communities of any transaction proposed by another
corporation. Presumably, the purpose is to legitimize for
directors another area as grounds for rejection of proposed
offers. Many companies that agree with Control Data on
the morality of hostile takeovers, however, find it difficult
to use this kind of defense. It puts on the record commitments
that a company may find undesirable to keep in the future,
such as laying off a large number of employees or selling
an unprofitable plant.
9 The Williams Act (see section 4.2) is a federal statuate
regulating tender offers. Bidders have at times attacked
a particular state's antitakeover statuates and subsequently,
have successfully completed the takeover of the target.
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4.1.6 How Shark Repellents Have Been Accepted
Antitakeover charter and by-law amendments have general-
ly been approved by stockholders. During the 1983 proxy
season, 95 percent of the 180 companies that proposed the
two most common shark repellents (staggered boards and super-
majority merger approval) got them approved.10 Some companies
whose proposals were turned down actually received majority
votes, but fell short of the two-thirds margin often required
for approval. Roughly 20 to 30 percent of all New York
Stock Exchange companies currently have some antitakeover
provisions in effect, and an additional 10-20 percent intend
to add shark repellents in 1984.
Thus, stockholders nearly always approve antitakeover
charter amendments. But resistance to these shark repellents,
particularly among institutional investors, has been rising
rapidly in the past several years. In the past, institutional
investors followed the "Wall Street Rule" whereby professional
money managers either supported incumbent management or
sold their position in the firm's stock. Given the 1983
proxy season and the number of battles shaping up currently
in 1984, institutional investors seem to have speeded up
the gradual movement away from the Wall Street Rule towards
10 There were some notable exceptions in 1983: Data
General, International Paper and Black & Decker. Each of
these companies has been rumored from time to time to be
a takeover candidate. In these cases, stockholders had
a clearer view of the takeover premium they could potentially
receive.
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greater independence. Those institutional investors acting
as fiduciaries, most notably pension fund managers subject
to the strict fiduciary standards of the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act (ERISA), often have had no choice but
to oppose antitakeover proposals that could diminish the
value of portfolio securities: 11 "As fiduciaries, we cannot
justify voting for provisions which would make it easier
for incumbent management to fend off buyers who would like
to pay a premium for our stock." 12
By deferring to the business judgement rule (discussed
in section 3.4), the courts have generally allowed incumbent
management to make antitakeover proposals which the board
views as prudent. But some securities regulators have taken
a somewhat dim view of antitakeover amendments, such as
the Wisconsin Securities Commissioner:
We believe that certain of the common defensive
charter amendments [are] an anathema to shareholder
democracy and entirely inconsistent with the concept
of public 1ownership of corporate issuers. For that
reason, for the last two years or so, Wisconsin has
been reviewing the articles and by-laws of issueqr
seeking to register their securities in this state.-I
Furthermore, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) screens
any proposed charter or by-law changes involving defensive
measures to ascertain that they do not conflict with NYSE
1 1The empirical results in Chapter Six will show the
actual 0ock price effects of antitakeover provisions.
Alan Strassman, Batterymarch Financial Management,
quoted 19 the Wall Street Journal (March 30, 1984).
Jeffrey B. Bartell, Securities Commissioner of Wiscon-
sin, quoted in Hochman & Folger (1979), p. 546.
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policies. The Exchange is likely to object to provisions
impinging upon the voting rights of stockholders or that
differentiate between the rights of several holders of the
same security. The Exchange has, on occasion, refused to
authorize the listing of additional shares or threatened
to delist the company's securities unless the offending
policy violations were removed.
4.2 Federal, State and SEC Regulation
Until the late 1960s, no federal laws specifically
regulated takeovers. The Securities Act of 1933 concerned
itself largely with disclosure matters pertaining to the
sale of securities to the general public. 14 The three anti-
trust statutes - the Sherman Act (1890), the Clayton Act
(1914), and the Cellar-Kefauver Act (1950) - blocked some
vertical and horizontal mergers but not the conglomerate
or multi-industry types that were the rave of the late 1960s.
In addition, other federal laws and their related administra-
tive agencies (e.g. the Federal Communications Act, the
Atomic Energy Act) influenced takeovers in certain regulated
industries by: (1) requiring advance clearance for changes
in control of firms under their regulation, and (2) imposing
limits on the extent of foreign ownership in those firms.
The rash of conglomerate mergers in the late 1960s
14 0bviously, this act covered any new securities issued
for exchange in a merger or tender offer transaction, but
did not apply to any cash transactions.
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prompted Congress to take some action to regulate takeovers,
primarily targeted at cash tender offers. 15  In July of
1968, Congress enacted into law the Williams Bill. A good
deal of regulatory legislation has followed right up to
the present day - federal and state laws, and SEC regulations.
The primary intent of all this regulation was to establish
disclosure and timing requirements that will protect the
rights of stockholders and balance the relative positions
of bidders and targets. The remaining parts of section
4.2 describe the principal federal, state, and SEC statutes
regulating takeovers, primarily cash tender offers. The
section concludes with a discussion of how target managements
can use these regulations to deflect takeover bids.
4.2.1 Securities Act (1933) & Securities Exchange Act (1934)
The Securities Act of 1933 provides for "truth in
securities." The 1933 Act had twc basic objectives: (1)
to provide investors with material financial and other infor-
mation concerning securities offered for public sale, and
(2) to prohibit misrepresentation, deceit and other fraudulent
acts and practices in the sale of securities. The Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 filled in some of gaps in the 1933
1 5 Cash takeover bids were very rare in the United States
prior to the mid-1960s. It has been argued that changes
in proxy rules in 1964 raised bidders' costs of obtaining
control via a proxy contest which, in turn, lead to the
increased usage of the cash tender offer to achieve a change
in control.
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Act and extended securities regulation by creating the Securi-
ties Exchange Commission (SEC). The 1934 Act requires that
companies16 register any new securities with and provide
periodic financial information to the SEC. Furthermore,
the 1934 Act regulates the solicitation of proxies by regis-
tered companies and prevents the manipulation of security
prices in the exchange markets. These two landmark acts
provide the primary regulation governing control transactions
which involve the exchange of securities, and set the basic
rules governing proxy contests. But these acts in no way
influence transactions which do not involve the exchange
of securities (i.e. cash transactions).
4.2.2 The Williams Act
The Williams Act extended the jurisdiction of the
1934 Act's provisions for disclosure and antifraud to include
tender offers, open market purchases of a target's securities,
and repurchases by the target of its own securities. The
major provisions of the Williams Act are its disclosure
requirements, its regulated minimum tender period, and its
antifraud provisions that give the target management standing
to sue for injunctive relief. The intent of this act when
passed in 1968 was to prevent the sudden takeovers of the
1960s by providing target stockholders with more information
16This covered companies which either have securities
listed on national exchanges or meet certain asset and public
ownership tests.
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about the bidder and to give them more time to decide whether
or not to tender. The proponents of the act reasoned that
disclosure provisions coupled with greater time for evaluation
would enable target stockholders to make better decisions
and would lessen the chance of the bidder taking advantage
of target stockholders - especially small investors.
After acquiring beneficial ownership of at least
five percent of a target's common stock, the bidder is required
to file a Schedule 13D with the SEC and the target within
ten days of the purchase. 17  This requirement holds for
all equity purchases whether made privately,18 on the open
market, or by tender offer. The Schedule 13D statement
must disclose: (1) the purchasers identity including any
associates, (2) the source and amount of funds used in the
purchase (including details about borrowings), (3) the purpose
for which the purchase is being made, (4) the number of
shares the purchaser now owns, and (5) any details about
arrangements the purchaser has made with other parties with
respect to the acquired stock. If the purpose of the purchase
is to acquire control of the target, the bidder must also
disclose a description of any plans to liquidate the target,
17The percentage ownership was initially set at ten
percent, but was made more stringent to five percent in
the 1978 Amendments to the Williams Act.
The Securities Act of 1933 had exempted private trans-
actions from disclosure. The Williams Act extends the SEC's
jurisdiction over these private transactions as well; thus,
requiring disclosure on all acquisitions of stock over five
percent.
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sell its assets, merge it, or make any changes in its basic
corporate structure.
If after disclosing on Schedule 13D that the bidder
intends to proceed with acquiring control of the target,
the bidder must file a Schedule 14D with the SEC at the
time he makes a tender offer to the stockholders of the
target.1 9 This disclosure under Section 14(d) of the Williams
Act pertains to anyone - including the incumbent target
management - making recommendations to the target stockholders
with regard to the acceptance of a tender offer. The Schedule
14D disclosures the reasons for the recommendation and any
arrangements made between the purchaser and the target's
management. As a defensive measure, the target management
usually has a Schedule 14D fully prepared with an agent
in Washington ready to be filed with the SEC in the event
of a hostile tender offer, allowing a swift public recommenda-
tion to their stockholders.
In addition to the disclosure requirements, Section
14(d) imposes several requirements on the tender offeror
to protect the target stockholders. First, persons tendering
their shares to the bidder have the right to withdraw their
shares during the first seven days in which the offer is
19As originally introduced, the Williams Bill required
the bidder to disclose his plans in a Schedule 14D for a
tender offer before actually making the tender offer. This
obviously gave incumbent management an unfair advantage;
and thus, the bill was changed to require filing simultaneous-
ly with the transmittal of the tender offer.
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outstanding or after sixty days from the making of the offer.
This permits target stockholders to change their minds if
a more attractive competing offer is made soon after the
first tender offer. Second, if the offer is for less than
all of the outstanding shares of the target and if a greater
number of shares are tendered than will be accepted by the
bidder under the terms of his tender offer, the bidder must
accept the shares tendered in the first ten days pro rata.
This prevents the bidder from, as was frequently done prior
to this act, giving preferential treatment to some stockholders
by making the offer on a first-come, first-served basis.
In addition, this requires the bidder to hold the offer
open for a minimum of ten days.
Section 14(e) of the Act makes the disclosures contained
in Schedules 13D and 14D effective by providing a general
antifraud provision which prohibits material mistatements
or omissions or other deceptive acts related to the tender
offer. Target managements have used this provision to sue
the bidder in an attempt to ward off the tender offer (or
at least to delay the offer) or to tarnish the reputation
of the bidder influencing the stockholders' tendering deci-
sion. Prior to the Williams Act, the courts had held that
only the target stockholders - and not the management -
had standing to challenge fraudulent actions by the bidder.
The 1970 Amendments to the Williams Act expanded
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the scope of the Act to cover exchange offers. 20 Furthermore,
the 1970 Amendments through Section 14(e) granted the SEC
the power to make rules to "define, and prescribe means
reasonably designed to prevent, such acts and practices
as are fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative."21  While
this increased power of the SEC sounds quite noncontroversial,
the SEC has interpreted section 14(e) quite broadly establish-
ing sweeping regulation over most takeovers. Several of
the more significant rules resulting from this new power
are worth mentioning. First, target management is required
to inform other stockholders how whether or not they intend
to tender their own shares in the target. Second, the SEC
made "short-tendering" illegal. Brokers and arbitrageurs
previously could short-tender by tendering more shares than
they actually owned, promising to make delivery within a
short period of time. The SEC felt that this practice was
abused by arbitrageurs who, by betting on oversubscription
to a pro rata tender offer, would tender more shares than
they planned to purchase in order to have proportionately
more shares accepted by the bidder than other tenderers.
This rule has the effect of causing tender offers to remain
open longer.22
2 0Exchange offers are tender offers in which payment
is made (at least partially) with the bidder's stock or
bonds rp her than entirely with cash.
Brown (1971), p. 1647.
2 2 This happens because the bidder making the tender
offer must wait for stock certificates to be delivered.
68
In summary, the Williams Act and Amendments were
designed to protect target stockholders by enabling them
to make "better" decisions through increased disclosure
(particularly by the bidder) and more time before the tender
offer expires. In practice the Williams Act does much more:
it gives the SEC broad rule-making power, and through its
broad proscription of fraud, provides much new ground for
litigation. Faced with a hostile tender offer, incumbent
managements have learned to use these new sources of litiga-
tion most effectively, often scaring away the bidder or
dramatically slowing the tender offer process. And in take-
over battles, the success of a tender offer depends a great
deal on its speed of execution.
4.2.3 State Takeover Legislation
Prior to the Williams Act in 1968, only Virginia
had a state law directly regulating tender offers. Today,
38 states have enacted takeover legislation, some of which
are much more stringent on bidders than the Williams Act.
The provisions of most state takeover statutes are similar
to the Williams Act in that they require increased disclosure
and delay periods, but often the hurdles for bidders are
more onerous and are the result of different motivations
than the Williams Act. Although most state takeover statutes
have similar themes, almost every state structures its specific
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provisions differently. 2 3  Most states claim that their
duplication and extension of federal regulation increases
investor protection, but in reality some of the state provi-
sions significantly increase the ability of incumbent manage-
ment to successfully fend off a hostile takeover bid.
State tender offer laws base their jurisdiction over
tender offers upon the relationship between the target corp-
oration and the state. A combination of factors usually
is used to determine this relationship, such as state of
incorporation, principle place of business, or location
of substantial assets. Like the Williams Act, the state
laws apply once the bidder has acquired a specific number
of shares of the target. All state tender offer statutes
require the bidder to disclose information about itself
and its intentions, but generally these disclosure require-
ments are much more extensive than the federal Schedule
13D filing. Under the Williams Act, tender offer disclosure
is made on the day of the actual tender offer, whereas all
state laws are more stringent requiring disclosure of tender
offer plans well in advance of making the actual offer. 2 4
The state laws also require tender offers to remain open
23For a detailed discussion on the differences between
the various states having takeover legislation, see Aranow,
Einhorn & Berlstein (1977). Also, Jarrell & Bradley (1980)
provide a comprehensive chart summarizing the ciritcal issues,
pp. 406 407.
Most states require disclosure between ten and thirty
days before the offer is announced, giving incumbent manage-
ment more time to prepare a defense.
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longer than the period required under federal law or by
the SEC.25  Furthermore, state laws provide rather liberal
withdrawl rights to tendering stockholders which also tends
to lengthen the time the tender offer must remain open.
The most important provisions of state takeover regu-
lation establish administrative procedures by which a tender
offer can be significantly delayed or directly outlawed
if it goes against the state law. The state securities
commissioner can request and, in many states, the target
management can demand a hearing to determine whether full
and effective disclosure has been made and if the offer
is in compliance with statutory requirements for tender
offers. In several states, the commissioner also has the
power to prohibit any offer that he finds to be unfair or
inequitable to the target stockholders. 2 6 The state statutes
back up the commissioner's authority by giving him the power
to seek an injunction in state court to delay or prevent
the tender offer.2 7 In addition, many of the state statutes
provide that an offeror who violates the state law shall
be liable for damages to an offeree (and, in a few instances,
to non-tendering stockholders). Most of the state laws
also make violations a criminal offense and subject violators
25Massachusetts and Michigan require that tender offers
under t4ir jurisdiction remain open 60 days!
Neither the federal courts nor the SEC has comparable
power u9 er the Williams Act.
In Virginia the commissionor actually has the authority
to issue the injunction directly with the same force and
effect as if it was issued by a court.
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to fines and/or imprisonment.
In general, the intent of federal takeover legislation
has been to benefit the aggregate economy and to protect
target stockholders, whereas state legislators have often
acted to benefit more local interests. Quite often these
local interests include efforts to maintain the independence
of the target firm to ensure the future of local employ-
ment and local corporate taxes. Conceivably, such efforts
to maintain the independence of the target through state
takeover statutes could prevent target stockholders from
receiving a significant takeover premium and rob the larger
economy of the beneficial synergies created by the combination
of the two firms.
This conflict in legislators' intents provides the
basis for a continuing struggle to determine the constitution-
ality of many state tender offer laws and of states jurisdic-
tion to regulate takeover bids. Often the constitutionality
of these state laws is not tested until a bidder brings
a counter-suit against its target, following the target's
filing of a suit claiming violations of state takeover laws
by the bidder. Unfortunately, by this time the bidder's
tender offer has become so deeply embroiled in litigation
that it has very little chance of success.
4.2.4 Hart-Scott-Rodino Act
The Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act,
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which became effective in 1977, amends the Clayton Act requir-
ing the bidder to make direct notification of tender offer
plans to the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Antitrust
Division of the Department of Justice. The law effects
companies of $100 million or more in sales or assets that
expect to acquire companies of $10 million of more in sales
or assets. The Hart-Scott-Rodino Act provides for a waiting
period during which the antitrust regulators have the oppor-
tunity to examine the proposed takeover for violations of
the antitrust before the transaction may proceed. Furthermore,
the FTC or the Justice Department can extend the waiting
period by making further requests for information on the
proposed combination. This provides yet another delay in
the tender offer process, a delay which reduces the bidder's
chances of success. Also, this pre-notification to antitrust
officials releases valuable information to the market, particu-
larly to other potential competitors, which was costly for
the initial bidder to collect. Thus, Hart-Scott-Rodino
disclosures tend to discourage bidders from attempting takeover
bids because (1) it causes delays in the takeover process,
and (2) it forces the bidder to give up (costly) information.
Both effects tend to shift the balance of power towards
the target management.
4.2.5 Accounting Principles Board Opinions 16 and 17
The Accounting Principles Board (APB) Opinions 16
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and 17 restricted the use of the pooling-of-interests account-
ing method to only those business combinations meeting twelve
different criteria. APB Opinions 16 and 17 also required
amortization of the excess in the purchase price over the
book value of net assets acquired (i.e. goodwill) for business
combinations using the purchase method of accounting. Pooling
accounting was the dominant accounting treatment used for
mergers in the wave of conglomerate mergers in the late
1960s, but some people criticized the method as misleading
and unfair in that pooling tended to overstate current earn-
ings. The Accounting Principles Board issued these two
opinions in 1970 in response to these criticisms.
But many merger specialists argued against the new
accounting restrictions convinced that many worthwhile combi-
nations would be barred. The adverse effects predicted
by the opponents of the APB Opinions were based on the expected
effects of purchase accounting on the accounting numbers
of the combined entity. Purchase accounting invariably
leads to lower reported earnings per share than does a pooling-
of-interests. The choice of accounting method for the merger
has no effect on the actual future cash flows of the merged
firms. According to finance theory, which believes that
investors can "see through" the higher EPS generated by
pooling accounting, the choice between pooling or purchase
accounting will have no effect on the real economic value
of the merger.
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Consequently, one could argue that these APB Opinions
have no effect on takeover activity nor do they influence
bidders' decisions to proceed with a takeover transactions.
But to the extent that bidder managers believe that reported
accounting earnings do in fact impact stock prices (as opposed
to expected cash flows), these APB Opinions restricting
the use of pooling accounting and requiring the amortization
of goodwill will tend to discourage takeover attempts.
Schipper and Thompson (1983) also argue that APB Opinions
16 and 17 may have other indirect effects for individual
firms whose lending agreements depend on the firm's accounting
numbers. To the extent that some bidding firms are constrained
by these loan agreements, their stockholders are made worse
off by the accounting rules.
4.2.6 The Impact of Takeover Regulation
The most significant impact of takeover regulation
by federal and state statutes and SEC rule-making has been
to provide the management of target companies with substantial
warning of pending offers. These takeover regulations make
it more difficult for the bidder to prepare its offer in
the total secrecy often required for successful execution,
and they give the target's management ample time to respond
to the offer. After receiving notice of a proposed tender
offer, the target management has a variety of opportunities
to delay the effective date of the offer or to tarnish the
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reputation of the bidder in an attempt to influence target
stockholders: (1) file suit against bidder for improper
or fraudulent disclosure on Schedules 13D and 14D; (2) file
suit on the basis of not adhering to minimum tender offer
waiting periods as dictated by the Williams Act, the SEC,
or the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act; (3) demand a hearing before
the state securities commissioner if a state tender offer
law applies; (4) prepare an effective public relations cam-
paign against the bidder. From the standpoint of the bidder,
any form of regulation or any action by the target which
serves to delay the tender offer process functions to reduce
the probability of successfully completing the takeover
and to increase the probability that a competing offer will
be made, forcing the offeror into a bidding war.
Whereas the Williams Act probably creates a more
equitable balance between the bidder and the target, the
state takeover statutes tend to push the balance too far
in favor of the target. The increased disclosure required
by state takeover statutes over and above that dictated
by the Williams Act provides little marginal value to stock-
holders. However, the statutory disclosures do provide
vastly increased opportunities for target managements to
find fault with the disclosures made by the bidders and
to obtain injunctions halting the takeover bids. Regardless
of the ultimate success of the target's suit against the
bidder over the accuracy and sufficiency of disclosure,
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the statutes provide numerous opportunities for the target
to challenge, and thereby delaying the offer and its proba-
bility of success. In addition, disclosure requirements
impose direct administrative costs on the bidder. But there
is also the possibility that the disclosure and the delays
place less knowledgeable stockholders on an equal footing.
In this respect, the benefits obtained from the disclosure
may far outweigh the costs to the bidder.
The regulatory provisions lengthening the time in
which a tender offer must remain open likely have a beneficial
effect on takeover transactions. To the extent that the
takeover statutes facilitate better, more rational decisions
on the part of target stockholders, the social welfare of
the aggregate economy is improved. Furthermore, these take-
over regulations may benefit target stockholders by causing
the bidder to raise its tender offer price in order to obtain
the approval of the target's management. In addition, during
the waiting period the stockholders may be offered a better
price from a competing buyer. On the other hand, if takeover
regulation disrupts the control transfer process so much
that prospective bidders refrain from making takeover bids
or withdraw from contested situations, then stockholders
lose the opportunity to obtain a control premium for their
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shares.28
4.3 L itigation and Other Legal Recourse
If the target management plans to present any sort
of defense in response to a takeover bid, the most likely
initial action will be to hire antitakeover defense lawyers.
Legal defenses which utilize the judicial system to the
hilt require the masterful minds of Wall Street defense
lawyers and investment bankers. The amount of litigation
involving corporate control transactions continues to mount
each year. Not only have target managements learned how
to use litigation as an effective defensive tactic, target
stockholders are beginning to stretch their legal muscle
in the courts by filing lawsuits against "entrenched" manage-
ments whose defensive tactics prevent them from obtaining
premiums for their stock.
Direct attacks on the legality of a takeover bid
can be made in both judicial and regulatory forums at both
the federal and state level. In addition to bringing its
own proceeding in one of these forums, the target can approach
federal and state regulatory agencies urging the government
to commence its own action against the bidder. An aggressive
target may even purchase shares of the bidder and thereby
28These various hypotheses concerning the effects of
takeover regulation on the welfare of bidder and target
stockholder groups have been examined by several authors
and will be discussed in section 5.2 of Chapter Five.
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qualify to bring a stockholder suit to block the acquisition.
Quite often the target is relatively unconcerned about the
ultimate disposition of these legal proceedings, but rather
the lawsuits are used as a tactical advantage to buy time
and "chill" the arbitrage activity in the target's stock. 2 9
Some of these lawsuits, particularly those involving antitrust
issues, are real "show-stoppers" in the sense that the liti-
gation halts the takeover bid dead in its tracks; others
are considered merely "roadblocks" delaying the takeover
process.
Using litigation as a defensive tactic, the target
will seek to assert as many challenges in as many forums
as possible. The target need only win one motion for a
preliminary injunction in one court or obtain one hearing
before one regulatory agency to significantly delay the
takeover process and to force the bidder from the offensive
to the defensive. On the other hand, the bidder has to
fend off every challenge in every forum to ensure that its
takeover attempt proceeds with the requisite speed. To
the bidder, defending against these defensive legal affronts
consumes both management time and money.
These lawsuits hope to accomplish several possible
results as defensive measures. First and foremost, the
lawsuits are intended to have offers which fail to meet
2 9 Many of the legal proceedings brought during a take-
over battle never actually reach the stage of a final decision.
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legal requirements (e.g. in disclosure or in tender offer
mechanics) either quashed or withdrawn. Second, the intention
is to gain time - time for the target to mount a campaign
against the bidder through letters, advertisements, telephone
calls and through the press denigrating the bidder and his
offer.
As a defensive tactic, a lawsuit in federal court
seeking equitable relief to prevent a takeover bid from
going forward will generally set forth one or more of the
following causes of action: (1) disclosure violations;
(2) margin violations; 30 (3) breach of fiduciary duty by
a party to the proposed transaction or a conflict of interest
involving such a party; and (4) antitrust violations.3 1
Regardless of whether the takeover attempt is through merger,
tender offer or proxy fight, there exist many variations
on these four basic themes by which the target could mount
a credible legal defense. Some of the more significant
will be mentioned.
The tender offer disclosure requirements of the Williams
Act and the SEC's rules (as discussed above in section 4.2)
provide a fertile source of challenge for the target. Schedule
30The Federal Reserve, through its rules Regulations
U and T, imposes limits on the amount of credit that can
be used to acquire publicly-traded securities. The amount
of borrowing must be disclosed by the bidder on Schedule
14D. The target may use this information to file a suit
claiming that the bidder has over-extended its margin limits.
Lipton & Lesser (1982) present this basic outline
for various types of litigation as a defensive tactic.
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14D presents the most vulnerable point of attack due to
the numerous specific topics which must be disclosed by
the bidder. In addition, the Williams Act imposes a general
obligation on the bidder for full disclosure of material
information under which the creative target can allege some
error or omission within this "catch-all" requirement.
These disclosure violations are not show-stoppers because
the target can correct its disclosure, but they often buy
valuable time and serve to embarrass the bidder.
Banks which finance tender offers play a "critical
role in determining whether tender offers will go forward"
and as a result exert a "significant influence in determining
whether [target] management survives."32  The banks provide
bridge financing to the bidder in order to complete a tender
offer during a relatively short period of time, and the
number of financial institutions able to extend credit in
sufficient quantities is limited, particularly given today's
multibillion dollar mergers. Consequently, a relatively
small number of commercial banks have the resources to finance
a bidder's takeover attempt, but those same banks often
have client relationships with the target firm. This places
the banker in a difficult dilemma: customers on both sides
32Humana, Inc. v. American Medicoro, Inc., CCHFed. Sec.
L. Rep. 96,286 at 92,829 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
of a hostile takeover.33
These conflict-of-interests situations furnish the
target with the opportunity for making embarrassing and
reputation-damaging charges of breach of fiduciary duty,
conflict of interest, and misuse of confidential informa-
tion. 3 4  This breach of fiduciary duty defense is not a
show-stopper, because a court may rule that a particular
bank cannot finance the tender offer, but it will not grant
an injunction against the tender offer on this basis. However,
this defense does create a credible roadblock.
An antitrust challenge is potentially the most signi-
ficant defense to a takeover because, if successful, it
is frequently a show-stopper in that the bidder is forced
to withdraw his hostile takeover. To obtain an injunction
against the bidder, the target can file suit directly or
it can request the Justice Department or the FTC to examine
the proposed takeover. Claims are usually made under the
Sherman Act Section 1 or the Clayton Act Section 7 alleging
that the merger will lessen competition in the relevant
3 3 The same delimma often arises for the limited number
of investment banking and law firms that have mergers and
acquisition expertise. These conflicts are not new to these
firms, for potential conflicts of interest arise virtually
every day in their respective businesses. See Shapiro (June
1979), "Bankers in a Bind," for an interesting discussion
of this 3roblem.
Commercial and investment bankings have developed
internal systems, known as a "Chinese Wall," to control
the flow of confidential information between departments
within the bank. The courts have recognized and approved
these "Chinese Wall" systems.
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geographic and/or product markets. The Antitrust Division
of the Department of Justice has issued "Merger Guidelines,"
setting forth the standards it applies in determining whether
it will challenge the proposed takeover. The bidder may
possibly be able to persuade the court that it will abide
by any divestiture rulings following the completion of the
merger, but generally the courts are leery of these promises
and will likely put an end to the takeover attempt.
There exist many other types of legal defenses, most
notably claims of violations of state takeover statutes
(as discussed in section 4.2.3). An interesting legal angle
was attempted by Marshall Field & Co. in its defensive fight
against investor Carl Icahn.35 Marshall Field charged Icahn
and his group with "racketeering," based on the federal
Racketeering Influenced & Corrupt Organizations Act of 1970
(RICO). RICO was originally passed to provide a basis to
prosecute companies associated with organized crime. Marshall
Field used the law with a different twist, never claiming
that Icahn was connected to organized crime. But the adverse
publicity surrounding the rackteering charge fulfilled its
intended purpose: an injunction was issued against Icahn
giving Marshall Field time to arrange a merger with a "white
knight."
35 See Business Week, May 24, 1982, p. 91.
4.4 Scorched Earth
The term "scorched earth," derived from the traditional
war technique of starving an invading army by razing the
home countryside, denotes a defensive tactic where the target
makes itself significantly less attractive in an effort
to discourage the bidder. It is difficult to categorize
the various scorched earth defensive tactics because they
usually depend upon the unique characteristics of the target
company. Generally, a scorched earth defense includes any
action taken by the target to make its company less appealing
than it currently is to the bidder, i.e. action which will
likely reduce the target's market value when combined with
the bidder. The McGraw-Hill/American Express battle in
1979 serves as an illustrating example.
In response to an unsolicited tender offer by American
Express, McGraw-Hill Chairman Harold McGraw did everything
in his power to convince American Express that the company
would be decimated by critical employee defections if the
takeover bid went through. For example, when Business Week
editor Lewis Young wrote a memo to his staff expressing
his concern that American Express might not respect the
editorial independence of the magazine, McGraw-Hill's defense
team made sure that copies of the memo were made available
to the press. McGraw Hill sent a letter to the board of
American Express, reprinted in a two-page newspaper ad,
in response to "concerns voiced by many of the constituents
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served by McGraw-Hill - authors, journalists, business people
around the world, employees and shareholders of McGraw-Hill,
Inc." 3 6 It is significant that shareholders were listed
last. These actions led American Express to fear that McGraw-
Hill might really become a "shell" after a long and acrimonious
takeover fight. Consequently, American Express withdrew
its tender offer and McGraw-Hill's stock dropped precipitously
to its pre-offer level.
Many variations on this basic scorched earth theme
are possible and many involve strong personal attacks.
The specific scorched earth tactic employed depends to a
great extent on the specific characteristics of the target
and bidder, and on whether the target board has the stomach
for such tactics. Often the scorched earth action involves
(1) sale of attractive or under-valued assets, (2) partial
liquidation or spin-off, (3) total liquidation, or (4) self-
tender which places the company severely into debt. Scorched
earth tactics can function as a double-edged sword: an
angered bidder may attack that much more aggressively and
stockholders often file a spate of lawsuits against the
management.
Some courts have expressed outrage at various scorched
earth tactics. In a takeover battle with Joseph E. Seagram
& Sons, the target management of St. Joe Minerals proposed
selling a significant division (Can Del) and threatened
36 1nstitutional Investor, June 1979, p. 35.
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to liquidate the company if Seagram proceeded with its offer.
Judge Pollack of the Southern District of New York expressed
his view of such tactics:
It is inconceivable that an alleged flourishing enter-
prise has authorized its board to subject the assets
and charter of the company to a scorched earth policy
to be accomplished in the name of an exercise of
business judgement . . [The intent of the actions]
is to keep control of the company entrenched within
the present board of directors regardless of the
company's real best interests . . .regardless of
the proclaimed profitability and in the absence of
all evidence whatsoever that the actual owners of
the enterprise want its demise.37
The courts have indicated that they may not consider such
scorched earth tactics to be acceptable under the business
judgement rule, and might intervene to stop defensive tactics
which seem to go too far.
4.5 Third-Party Acauisitions or Mergers
If the above defensive tactics have failed, the most
common strategy for a target of an unsolicited takeover
attempt is to search for an alternative buyer of its own
choice, a "white knight." With the help of investment bankers,
the target searches for a buyer that can meet two criteria:
(1) able and willing to bid equal to or greater than the
price asked by the hostile bidder, and (2) a buyer with
which the incumbent management is likely to have a more
corrigible relationship or who will being willing to let
3 7 JoseDh E. Seagram & Sons v. Abrams, 510 F. Supp. 860,
861, 862 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
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the company retain some of its operating independence.
Companies do exist which are eager for an acquisition, but
would never make an unfriendly offer. Finding white knights
can be difficult, 3 8 and getting the new suitor to top the
hostile party's bid can be nearly impossible. Another problem
with the white knight strategy is that once the white knight
search has begun, it is difficult to control. A white knight
search often attracts "gray knights" or even "black knights,"
i.e. companies watch out for their own interests first
and often cannot pass up a good deal.
Should the target opt for the white knight strategy,
various devices, known collectively as "lock-ups," may be
employed to make the consummation of the transaction more
certain. A lock-up has the advantages to the target of
encouraging bidders who might otherwise be unwilling to
participate in an auction of the company, and discouraging
potential or actual hostile bidders from disrupting the
transaction. Lock-up agreements often consist of one or
more of the following types of arrangements:
1) Stock purchase agreements. The target may sell the
friendly buyer preferred stock with special voting
rights;39 or arrange for the third party to buy the
381nvestment bankers use both personal contacts and
sophisticated computer packages to identify potential white
knights 3 9This tactic will be considered more fully in section
4.6 below. Other bidders may attack this tactic on the
grounds that it "manipulates" the market for the target
stock.
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target's common stock from treasury or on the open
market.
2) Stock options. Options contracts can be written
with great flexibility.
3) "Crown jewel" options. Sometimes the target has
a particular asset - the crown jewel - which is the
primary reason the bidder is going after the target.
The target could agree to sell this crown jewel to
the white knight, or to give an option on the asset. 40
Like most other defensive tactics, there are many variants
to these basic lock-up agreements. The target must be aware
that a court may ask it to show the "business judgement"
in its lock-up agreement and to show that it was not intended
to choke off a potential auction for the company.
Alternatively, the target can pursue its own acquisition
program in an attempt to ward off the hostile bidder. While
most acquisitions attempted under takeover conditions share
the common purpose of frustrating control bids, the means
of achieving the desired end fall into two quite different
categories. In the first are acquisitions made to complement
existing lines of business, usually transacted through nego-
tiated security exchanges. These acquisitions serve to get
more shares into friendly hands, or if transacted with cash,
to deplete the cash reserves of the target making it less
4 0 These crown jewel options are particularly vulnerable
to claims of manipulation.
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attractive to bidder. These sort of acquisitions used as
a defensive tactic need to be thought out and preliminary
arrangements made well before receiving the hostile takeover
bid.
The other group of third-party acquisitions is intended
to make the merger impossible for the bidder. Because these
defensive acquisitions usually require some time to complete,
the target has to purchase the business prior to being subjected
to an unfriendly takeover bid. Three possible types of acqui-
sitions exist fitting this requirement. First, the target
could purchase a business which would create antitrust problems
when combined with the bidder. For example, the purchase
of a coal producer by a target that is the subject of a tender
offer from a company with interests in the energy field may
be sufficient to halt the offer on antitrust grounds. The
effectiveness of this strategy has weakened given the Justice
Department's increased willingness to allow horizontal mergers.
Second, the target could acquire a Canadian subsidiary
which will at least delay or deter a bidder. Under the Foreign
Investment Review Act of Canada, any change of control of
a Canadian business must be approved by an agency of the
Canadian government as being likely to be "of sufficient
benefit to Canada." However, the target must bear in mind
that the Canadian statute applies to friendly as well as
unfriendly changes in control.
Finally, another possible defensive purchase for the
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target is to acquire a business in a regulated industry or
which requires a license from a governmental regulatory author-
ity, such as a small air carrier, or a radio or television
station. A change in the control of the target company may
then be subject to the approval of the regulatory authority.
This will produce obvious delays. The risk that a successful
takeover may result in the loss or forced sale of a valuable
license or regulated business may discourage potential bidders,
especially foreign buyers.
4,6 Stock Issuance
Section 4.5 pointed out the possibility of entering
a lock-up agreement with a friendly third party by selling
him a block of the target's common either out of treasury
or arranging for the third party to buy the stock on the
open market. By putting this stock in "friendly" hands,
the target is more likely to retain its independence and
ward off the hostile bidder. The courts have upheld these
treasury share sales and options to white knights if the
target claims that it was done in connection with obtaining
a higher bid. This stock issuance has become common practice
in takeover battles.
A defensive strategy involving the distribution to
stockholders of a special-characteristic preferred stock
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has been attempted in four recent takeover battles, 4 1 and
the courts have not yet resolved the legality of the stock
issue. Essential to this strategy is the availability of
"blank check" preferred stock authorized under provisions
in the target's charter giving the board of directors power
to specify the terms of the issue and to issue without further
stockholder vote.4 2  The target's objective is to impose
special, onerous charter requirements on the bidder. The
special characteristics of the preferred issue depend upon
the unique takeover situation. Takeover specialists have
named these defensive preferred issues "poison pills" because
the terms of the stock are constructed so as to be difficult
for the bidder to swallow. The Lenox/Brown-Forman transaction
illustrates the use of this novel technique.
In mid-1983, Brown-Forman tendered for all of the
outstanding shares of Lenox common stock.4 3 The Lenox board
rejected the offer (quite aggressively) and declared special
preferred stock dividend on its common stock. Each preferred
share, created by the board out of pre-existing "blank check"
41"Poison pill" preferred stock has been used in the
following takeover battles: El Paso/Burlington Northern,
Lenox/Brown-Forman, Bell & Howell/National Education Corp.,
and at Superior Oil in response to actions taken by major
stockholders to find a buyer for the company.
One of the event studies in the empirical section
of the thesis analyzes the stock price effects of a target's
creation of a special class of voting preferred stock. This
"blank check" preferred must first be approved by the stock-
holders
dersFogg & Foye (1983) provide a legal discussion and
the speofic tactics used in the four attempts to use "poison
pill" preferred in a takeover defense.
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preferred, was convertible into 40 common shares in the event
of a takeover. This new preferred, on a fully converted
basis, represented 50 percent of the equity of Lenox.
The preferred contained a unique "forced equity"' provi-
sion that, absent the vote of 95 percent of the holders of
the preferred, in any business combination the preferred
automatically became convertible into the voting stock of
the acquiror. This "forced equity" provision of Lenox's
preferred created two problems for Brown-Forman. First,
Brown-Forman had hoped to complete the transaction entirely
for cash; the "forced equity" provision required issuing
new Brown-Forman stock. Second, the Brown family had histori-
cally retained control of Brown-Forman through a system of
two classes of common stock, one voting and the other non-
voting. Forced conversion of the Lenox preferred into voting
Brown-Forman common would have diluted the Brown family's
voting position so that the family would no longer retain
voting control. In a letter to Lenox stockholders, the Lenox
chairman stated that "the preferred stock is intended to
cause Brown-Forman to rethink its ill-advised attempt to
acquire Lenox."
Brown-Forman obviously filed a lawsuit declaring that
the Lenox's "poison pill" preferred stock was illegal. Unfor-
tunately, this case did not determine the legality of the
use of "blank check" preferred as a defensive tactic. After
Brown-Forman raised its tender offer price, the Lenox board
92
gave in, accepted the takeover bid, rescinded the prefer-
red stock dividend, and all lawsuits were dropped.
To be an effective deterrent against unsolicited take-
over bids, the preferred should not be callable for a prolonged
period (e.g. 10-15 years). This in turn may have an adverse
effect on the target's prospects of being acquired in a friendly
transaction of by a "white knight." Furthermore, if the
target does in fact ward off the bidder, then it is left
with this big chunk of preferred in its capital structure
which has a fixed dividend senior to the common dividend.
Conceivably, by putting half or more of its market value
into preferred stock, the issuance of the "poison pill" pre-
ferred may have an adverse impact on the liquidity of its
common stock. Finally, the "poison pill" preferred may have
little deterrent effect against a bidder willing and finan-
cially able to tender for any-and-all of the shares of the
target. The preferred is likely to have its greatest value
as a last-resort tactic in combatting a two-tier offer where
significant doubt exists that the second tier would be fair
and where alternative transactions for the target are not
likely.
4.7 Standstill Agreements and Negotiated Stock Repurchases
Negotiated stock repurchases and standstill agreements
are not actually defensive tactics, but rather are methods
of resolving the conflicts between two parties created in
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a contest for control. The typical chain of events is as
follows: The bidder accumulates a position in the stock
of the target, either through open market purchases or a
tender offer, in an attempt to gain control. The target
management presents a stiff defense usually resulting in
lawsuits and counter-lawsuits. Given the aggressiveness
of the incumbent management's defense, the bidder chooses
to give up his contest for control of the target, but now
he is left with a sizable block of the target's stock (e.g.
10-40 percent). To settle their differences, the target
agrees to repurchase the block held by the bidder and to
drop all legal action, but the bidder demands a purchase
price for his block at a substantial premium to the currently
traded price. In exchange for the purchase premium, the
bidder enters into a "standstill agreement" whereby he agrees
to not to purchase any common stock of the target for a speci-
fied period of years.
These standstill agreements and negotiated stock repur-
chases at a premium above the market price are transactions
which (1) reduce competition in the market for control and
(2) provide for differential treatment of large block stock-
holders. The stock repurchase often causes the target's
stock price to fall, i.e. those stockholders not involved
94
in the repurchase suffer a wealth loss. Whether target
stockholders benefit or not from these transactions depends
upon whether one accepts the managerial entrenchment hypothesis
or the competing stockholder interests hypothesis (see Chapter
Three).
The business rationale for these defensive agreements
is simply to allow incumbent management to better manage
the company. The incumbent management argues that to the
extent that the holder of the block is truly dissident and
at odds on significant policy matters with at least a majority
of the board, the block imposes costs on the management of
the firm and should be eliminated. Unfortunately for the
incumbent management, stockholders who have just suffered
a loss due to the negotiated repurchase often do not agree
with this line of reasoning and file lawsuits against the
management. Particularly if the purchase is at a significant
premium over the market, the target's purchase of a large
block of its own stock raises concerns of fiduciary duty
and fairness to the remaining stockholders. To minimize
the risk of litigation on this basis, the target management
often tries to avoid disclosure of the transaction, or if
that is not possible, to maintain as low a disclosure profile
The existence and magnitude of this wealth loss due
to stock repurchases and standstill agreements will be tested
in the empirical part of the thesis, Chapter Six. Conclusions
as to whether target stockholders benefit or lose from these
transactions will be discussed in Chapters Seven and Ei'ght.
as possible. 45
The courts have held that these standstill agreements
and stock repurchases are legally valid, and that differential
payments can be made to large block stockholders as long
as the firm demonstrates a valid business purpose for the
transaction. Nathan & Sobel (1980) maintain that these busi-
ness purposes include (1) "differences in business philosophies
between the corporation's management and the selling share-
holders," or (2) "eliminating what appeared to be a threat
to the future of the business and preserving an established
management's business policy." 46
Several individual investors and companies (e.g. Carl
Icahn, Victor Posner, Mesa Petroleum) have made significant
profits through the process of accumulating stock in a target,
threatening a takeover or proxy fight, and then eventually
settling the dispute by selling the shares back to the target
at a substantial premium. Critics of this process have named
the technique "greenmail" - legal corporate blackmail by
villainous raiders.
4.8 Investor and Public Relations Efforts
Target managements often underestimate the defensive
effectiveness of attacking the bidder through shareholder
45If the stock repurchase is large enough to be material
to the firm, SEC rule 10b-5 and the stock exchange disclosure
policies require the issuance of a press release describing
the tras action.
Nathan & Sobel (1980), pp. 1547-1548.
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and public relations. A vigorous public attack, in the form
of press statements, shareholder letters, and so forth, can
often make the difference between winning and losing a battle
for control. As illustrated earlier in section 4.4, Harold
McGraw stopped American Express' tender offer by virtually
screaming bloody murder and by undermining the reputation
of American Express management. Compared with the alternative
tactics, publicity is both relatively inexpensive and relative-
ly effective.
Management-shareholder relationships are critical
in building a long range takeover defense. Developing a
supportive relationship takes time and concerted effort on
the part of management. Investor relations programs have
become virtually standard at every major corporation, and
there has been a marked increase in the number and profession-
alism of investor communications. To effectively use investor
and public relations as a takeover defense, target management
needs to know exactly who its stockholders are and what their
attitudes are towards the company. Armed with this basic,
yet critical information, target managers can contact major
stockholders quickly in the event of a takeover attempt,
sometimes even before these owners are aware of the takeover
bid.
Typically, when confronted by the uncertainty of a
control battle, stockholders are inclined to side with incumbent
management and to somewhat distrust the hostile bidder.
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Any investor or public relations effort that feeds on this
normal inclination can only benefit incumbent management.
If the stockholders, both individual and institutional, have
confidence in management's judgement, they are more likely
to accept its word that an unfriendly offer is underpriced
or not in the best interests of the stockholders. Just as
important, stockholders must approve advance antitakeover
planning such as antitakeover charter amendments. The slightest
mistrust of management's motives can quickly turn the tide
against the incumbents during the volatile dynamics of a
takeover battle. As in adverse selection, those managements
which lose the trust of their stockholders are the most likely
targets of hostile bidders.
4.9 Other Defensive Responses
The first eight sections of this chapter have provided
a discussion of the principal antitakeover defensive tactics
employed by target-company managements. Many more defensive
tactics exist and takeover specialists have refined all of
these methods. Many new defensive tactics will likely be
developed by the creative minds on Wall Street as the statu-
tory and regulatory framework of takeover battles evolves.
The following is a list and brief explanation of other anti-
takeover defensive tactics which are less frequently used
or which apply only in limited situations:
1) Dividend and stock split declarations. This tactic
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primarily functions to "signal'? stockholders that
management firmly believes that its strategic plan
for the company will maximize the investors' wealth.
2) Establish an employee stock ownership plan (ESOP).
Issuing shares to employees as compensation places
shares in friendly hands. Employees have an obvious
interest in preserving their jobs, which is most
likely (at least in the short run) as an independent
entity.
3) Disaggregation defenses. Included in this group
are liquidations and self-tenders. These defensive
maneuvers usually come under consideration where
the target believes its stock price does not adequately
reflect underlying asset values.
4) Double pac-man defenses. A double pac-man is a counter
tender offer where both the target and the bidder
attempt to swallow each other. The final result
of such a strategy depends upon skillful manipulation
of the tender offer rules. Bendix/Martin Marietta
is the most celebrated example.
5) Various threats. Key members of the incumbent manage-
ment team may threaten to resign if the target loses
its independence - usually effective in a "people"
business. Target managements may also ask politicians
or unions to intervene on their behalf to put heavy
pressure on the bidder.
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Chapter 5. Review of the Analytical Literature on Anti-
takeover Defensive Tactics
Economists have qualitatively discussed corporate
mergers and the existence of "merger waves" for many decades,
but only in the last ten to twelve years have researchers
taken a scientific approach to mergers in an attempt to
quantify the wealth effects on acquiror and acquiree stock-
holder groups. The first quantitative research focussed
on the stock price impacts of a takeover announcement on
the two stockholder groups, and tested for the amount of
economic value created in corporate mergers. These studies
measured the effect of mergers on stock prices by employing
"event studies 'l which estimate the abnormal stock price
changes around the date of announcement. Although Mandelker
(1974) was the first to use these methods to quantify the
stock price effects of mergers, Dodd and Ruback (1977) were
the first to focus the event study on the date of the first
public announcement of a takeover, on which date the market
should capitalize the news of the takeover.
The bulk of the scientific studies done during the
1970s concentrated on the stockholder returns to targets
and bidders, the source of the merger gains, and the aggregate
lFama, Fischer, Jensen & Roll (1969) first used this
methodology in their study of the price effects of stock
splits. The empirical part of this thesis uses similar
event study techniques. The event study methodology will
be explained in detail in Chapter Six.
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benefits of mergers to the economy. Only in the last several
years have any researchers turned their efforts toward the
examination of antitakeover defensive tactics. Except for
several studies dating back to 1980, the first thorough
tests on the stock price effects of defensive tactics were
published in the Journal of Financial Economics, Volume
11 (1983). Roughly half the journal articles published
in this volume were devoted to examining the effects of
defensive tactics, usually focussing on a single antitakeover
provision and using event study techniques to analyze the
impact on the target's stock on the day of announcement.
The authors of these studies have examined the following
defensive tactics: (1) antitakeover charter and by-law
amendments, (2) government takeover regulation, (3) antitrust
litigation, and (4) standstill agreements and negotiated
stock repurchases. This chapter will summarize the results
of these antitakeover studies so that they can be contrasted
with the empirical findings of this thesis in Chapter Seven.
Virtually all scientific studies of defensive tactics
employ the "event study" methodology. Event studies measure
the abnormal returns in stock prices in the days just preceding
and following the announcement of the defensive measure-
the "event." Abnormal returns are measured by the difference
between actual and expected stock returns, the announcement
event having caused the deviation. The expected stock return
is measured conditional on the realized return on a market
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index to take account of the effects of general marketwide
events on the returns of the individual securities. This
basic methodology was used in each of the following studies
discussed in this chapter.
5.1 Charter and By-Law Amendments
DeAngelo & Rice (1983) and Linn & McConnell (1983)
offer the two most complete studies examining the effect
of the adoption of antitakeover amendments on stock prices
of the target firms. Both studies introduce the managerial
entrenchment and stockholder interests hypotheses as competing
explanations of why target managements propose and why stock-
holders approve these antitakeover provisions. Although
both sets of authors recognize that the event studies on
the announcement of antitakeover amendments contain various
biases against the managerial entrenchment hypothesis, 2
their test between the two competing hypothesis is as follows:
a) The managerial entrenchment hypothesis predicts a
negative abnormal return on the announcement date
reflecting the erosion of stockholders' voting rights.
b) The stockholder interests hypothesis predicts a positive
2Their test samples contain unavoidable biases. It
is presumed that managers (with inside information) who
assess an increased probability of merger or tender offer
are more likely to propose defensive charter amendments.
Since stockholders in acquired firms typically earn large
abnormal returns, any such signal that a takeover may be
imminent should impart an upward bias to the announcement
return.
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abnormal return on the amendment announcement date
as stockholders now believe that the probability
of incurring the costs of a control battle have been
decreased.
The authors concede that many other possible explanations
exist, including that the changes in voting rights associated
with antitakeover amendments have no effect on stockholder
wealth, but that the above two hypotheses appear to provide
the most plausible explanations and that they can be readily
tested using event study techniques.
DeAngelo & Rice examined 100 firms that adopted super-
majority voting, staggered board, fair price, and lock-up
provisions over the period 1974-1978. For the day of and
the day after the mailing of the proxy statement containing
the proposals, they found negative abnormal returns averaging
-0.16% for the sample. But these findings were not statis-
tically significant in that the t-statistic was -0.41.
The cumulative abnormal returns covering the period of 10
days preceding the announcement through 11 days following
the proxy mailing was a statistically insignificant -0.90%
(t=-0.70). Given the low t-statistics in their findings,
DeAngelo & Rice could not unequivocally support one hypothesis;
but they do state that if forced to choose, the preponderance
of observed negative returns would support the managerial
entrenchment hypothesis, particularly given the natural
upward bias of the returns in their sample.
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Linn & McConnell performed a similar study for a
sample of 388 firms that adopted antitakeover amendments
over the period 1960-1980. They reasoned that it is difficult
to identify the precise date on which information about
the antitakeover provisions is actually released and capital-
ized into the market.3 Consequently, they ran several event
studies which examined the stock returns around: (1) dates
on which boards of directors ratified the proposals containing
antitakeover amendments; (2) dates on which proxy statements
describing the amendments were mailed to stockholders; and
(3) dates of the stockholder meetings at which the proposals
were ratified.
Linn & McConnell's results are somewhat ambiguous,
but tend to lean towards the stockholders interest hypothesis.
Using daily data, they found no statistically significant
abnormal returns for any of the three event days examined.
On the other hand, using monthly data, Linn & McConnell
found a positive cumulative abnormal return of 1.43% (t=3.41)
from the day before mailing the proxy through the day before
the stockholders meeting. The aggregate cross-sectional
3 Conceivably, the information could first be realeased
when the board aprroves the antitakeover provision to be
put on the proxy, but generally this information is not
reported in the press until much later (if at all). Quite
often the results of the voting by stockholders on these
proposals at the annual meeting do not even get reported
in the Wall Street Journal. It seems likely that the infor-
mation about the adoption of these proposals gets released
at different times by different companies. The proxy mailing
date probably serves as the "best" event date.
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cumulative abnormal for the other periods were slightly
positive, but all had insignificant t-statistics. Linn
& McConnell also performed some other tests on firms which
had repealed antitakeover amendments and on firms which
were incorporated in Delaware when Delaware changed its
takeover statute requiring only a simple majority vote to
approve a merger rather than two-thirds. These tests showed
negative abnormal returns in the month of the events, but
the results are tarnished by sample selection bias and the
use of less-precise monthly data. Linn & McConnell conclude
that generally their results are consistent with the stock-
holder interests hypothesis.
In addition to these two studies, Dodd & Leftwich
(1980) examined a topic somewhat related to antitakeover
charter amendments. Dodd & Leftwich examine stock price
returns for 140 companies that changed their state of incor-
poration during the period 1927-1977. The vast majority
of these reincorporations were into the state of Delaware.
The authors present two hypotheses motivating these reincor-
porations which are tested by their event study:
a) The stockholder-exploitation hypothesis maintains
that managers change the state of incorporation of
their firms to enrich themselves at the expense of
stockholders. This hypothesis uses basically the
same reasoning as the managerial entrenchment hypothe-
sis.
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b) The cost-avoidance hypothesis argues that managers
select the state in which to incorporate where the
corporate code minimizes the expected costs of the
firm's production-investment and financing activities.
As in the previous studies, the former hypothesis predicts
negative abnormal returns and the later predicts positive
abnormal returns on the day of announcing the reincorporation.
Unfortunately, Dodd & Leftwich had difficulty determin-
ing the actual date of the first public announcement of
the change in incorporation for many of the companies.4
This problem reduces somewhat the power of their tests.
Nonetheless, using monthly return data, their results show
that stockholders earn positive abnormal returns of 30.25%
(t=7.90) over the 25-month period preceding and including
the month of the change. Recognizing that these returns
seem to be too large to result only from the change in incor-
poration, Dodd & Leftwich use a variety of tests to separate
out the gains associated with reincorporation from gains
driven by other factors - a very difficult task. They end
up concluding that firms usually change their state of incor-
poration after a period of exceptionally good performance,
and rule out the possibility of explaining managers' motiva-
4 For 50 of the 140 firms, Dodd & Leftwich found announce-
ments in the Wall Street Journal. For the other firms,
they had to use the proxy mailing date, the stockholder
approval date, or the date of formal registration of the
new charter. Obviously, this left open the possibility
of many inconsistencies, and did not ensure that the date
of first public announcement was used as the event day.
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tions by the stockholder-exploitation hypothesis.
5.2 Federal, State and SEC Regulation of Takeover Battles
As discussed in Chapter Four, the government regulates
takeover situations in order to protect target stockholders
by providing them with more information about the bidder
and by giving them more time to decide whether or not to
tender their shares. These regulatory disclosures and delays
impose costs on the takeover process: who bears these costs
and how great are they? Does takeover regulation discourage
bidding firms from attempting takeovers, and does it impact
the split up of synergy gains between the two firms? Several
groups of researchers have performed studies in an attempt
to answer these questions concerning the effects of takeover
regulation.
Jarrell & Bradley (1980) take a sample of 161 targets
acquired during the period 1962-1977 and divide them into
three subgroups covering two periods:
1) Unregulated (pre-July 1968): the period prior to
the passage of the Williams Act.
2) Federal regulated (post-July 1968): acquisitions
occurring after the passage of the Williams Act,
but in states not governed by state-level takeover
statutes.
3) Federal and state regulated (post-July 1968): take-
overs completing following enactment of the Williams
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Act and in states with their own takeover statutes.
To test their theory that federal and state laws increase
tender offer premiums, Jarrell & Bradley compared the average
tender premium across the three subsamples of actual tender
offers. They found that the mean tender premium and the
average cumulative abnormal returns were for each group,
respectively:
Subsample Premium CAR(5) 5  t-statistic
Unregulated 32. %A 22.0% 12.9
Federal Regulated 52.8% 40.0% 19.2
Fed. & State Reg. 73.1% 35.0% 5.1
Jarrell & Bradley perform a variety of other tests on these
three subgroups to get at the actual effects of takeover
regulation, which are likely quite complicated.
Attributing the above differences entirely to regulation
would lead one to conclude that the Williams Act increased
tender premiums by 20 percentage points and the state laws
increased tender premiums by yet another 20 percentage points.
This implies that the regulation serves to increase the
returns of the target stockholders at the expense of the
stockholders of the bidding firm. On the basis of Jarrell
& Bradley's tests, one can reasonably safely draw that conclu-
5CAR(5) represents the cumulative abnormal return
for the period of 40 days before the takeover announcement
through five days following the announcement.
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sion, but there are other possible effects as well. Jarrell
& Bradley argue that the takeover regulation deters bidders
from attempting many takeover bids, so that the regulation
effectively functions as a tax on takeovers. Some acquisitions
that would be profitable absent the takeover laws will be
deterred by the higher tender premiums caused by regulation.
Furthermore, they argue that the information leaked by the
disclosure regulations before the actual takeover bid reduces
the amount of resources (skill and knowledge) committed
to takeover attempts. Therefore, takeover regulation -
essentially a tax - tends to decrease the aggregate gains
to the economy created through takeovers, and functions
primarily to redistribute the gains from bidders to targets.
Asquith, Bruner & Mullins (1983) provide similar
evidence in a study of the gains to bidding firms from take-
overs. For mergers prior to October 1, 1969,6 they found
average abnormal returns to bidders of U.40% over the period
20 days before through the first public announcement and
average abnormal returns of 1.7% to bidders after October
1, 1969. They conclude that the market for control changed
due to the new government regulation of takeovers.
Schipper & Thompson (1983b) examine the economic
impact of four merger-related regulatory changes during
1966-1970: the Williams Act, the 1969 Tax Reform Act, Account-
6 This is the date on which the SEC adopted permanent,
binding rules implementing the Williams Act.
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ing Principles Board (APB) Opinions 16 and 17, and the SEC's
segment disclosure rules. Recognizing that event studies
present the problem of high cross-sectional correlation
in security returns when the announcement event occurs on
the same calendar day, Schipper & Thompson employ an alterna-
tive technique to estimate the effects of the regulatory
changes. Rather than focus on the the stock price impacts
of individual acquisitions, their approach conditions the
return-generating process on the presence of regulatory
change and employs generalized least squares (GLS) estima-
tion. 7  Studying the effects of the four regulations on
39 firms during the regulatory change period of 1969-1970,
they find that the Williams Act reduced the equity values
of the acquiring firms by -6.0 percent. Compared to this
evidence, the findings for the other three regulatory changes
measured by Schipper & Thompson are comparatively weak and
suggest an overall insignificant impact for these regulations.
5.3 Antitrust Litigation
Ellert (1976) sets the stage for latter studies on
the effects on target stockholder wealth caused by antitrust
opposition to takeovers. Ellert examined the risk and return
characteristics of 205 companies whose acquisition activities
7Schipper & Thompson's type of test should give more
accurate results than standard abnormal return event studies
when the problems of multiple announcement events, cross-
sectional correlation, and small sample sizes exist.
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were challenged by the Justice Department or the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) over the period 1950-1972. As usual,
Ellert proposes two competing hypotheses on manager's motives
for takeovers with respect to antitrust problems:
a) Monopolist hypothesis: Mergers involving large com-
panies are likely to be motivated by considerations
of monopoly power or other anticompetitive advantages
associated with increases in business size.
b) Benign merger hypothesis: The mergers actually chal-
lenged under the Clayton Act Section 7 are relatively
benign in their anticompetitive effects, and they
perform a useful function in promoting competition
in the market for corporate control.
Ellert found that companies indicted under antimerger
law earned average abnormal returns of 23.3% over the eight
years preceding the antitrust complaints, but the market
adjusts their stocks downward only 1.83% when the Justice
Department or FTC files its antitrust case. On the basis
of this evidence, Ellert sides with the "benign merger"
hypothesis and concludes that merger gains do not come from
the acquisition of monopoly power. He argues that mergers
serve a useful economic function in reallocating resources
from less efficient to more efficient users. Antimerger
litigation, including its use as a defensive tactic, imposes
costs on stockholders and can be interpreted as a regulatory
tax on wealth accumulation.
111
Wier (1983) extends Ellert's analysis to show that
when acquisitions are canceled following antitrust complaints
(usually motivated as a defensive tactic), the losses to
the target firms are substantial and completely offset the
positive gains generated by the takeover bid. For a sample
of 17 target firms whose takeovers were canceled after anti-
trust complaints, Wier found that the group had an average
cumulative abnormal return of 9.25% for the 30 days prior
to and including the announcement of the takeover proposal.
But for the period following the announcement of the takeover
proposal up through the day of the the antitrust complaint,
the firms recorded average cumulative abnormal returns of
-10.85%. The firms then lost an additional -0.51% up through
the actual cancellation period, netting the target firms
an average cumulative abnormal return for the antitrust-
defeated takeover attempt of -2.11%. Thus, the antitrust
defensive tactic employed by incumbent managements not only
prevented the stockholders from realizing a substantial
abnormal gain, but in the end it actually hurt the stock-
holders by a significant -2.11%.
Eckbo's (1983) findings are similar: for the days
surrounding the announcement of an antitrust complaint,
the targets suffered an average abnormal return loss of
-9.27% (t=-7.61). He concludes that antitrust enforcement,
whether initiated by suits from the target or from the govern-
ment, is effectively a regulatory tax, and that this cost
112
is imposed most heavily on the most profitable mergers.
On the basis of his empirical tests, Eckbo also concludes
that takeovers are not motivated by the search for monopoly
power or collusion. Therefore, antitrust defensive tactics
not only harm target stockholders, but they also impose
a social cost by distorting the allocation of corporate
resources by making some efficient mergers unprofitable.
5.4 Standstill Agreements and Negotiated Stock Repurchases
Two recent studies, Bradley & Wakeman (1983) and
Dann & DeAngelo (1983), examined the wealth impacts of share
repurchases that restrict participation to a particular
subset of a firm's stockholders.8 Bradley & Wakeman break
their sample of targeted share repurchases, taken from the
period 1974-1980, into two sub-groups on the basis of whether
or not the repurchase settled a takeover dispute:
1) No merger termination (15 firms). Typically, share
repurchases in this category were made to all stock-
holders owning less than 100 shares, for which the
average premium offered was 10%.
2) Merger termination (61 firms). These single block
repurchases settled the disputes between the two
parties locked in a takeover battle. The average
8Other studies have also looked at the issue of stock
repurchases more generally. See Masulis (1980), Dann (1981),
and Vermaelen (1981).
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premium paid was 18.9% with a range from -23.3% 9
to 98.2%.
In the former case, Bradley & Wakeman found that the announce-
ment of these stock repurchases generated a positive abnormal
return of 1.25% in the case of small shareholdings, and
1.9% for repurchases from insiders. In the case of small
shareholdings, this represents the reduction of the relatively
high costs involved in maintaining small shareholdings,
such as the costs of mailing dividend checks, annual reports
and proxy statements. In addition, these repurchases likely
provide a signal of positive information to the market.
The latter case, single block repurchases ending
hostile takeover battles, is of more interest to the thesis
topic. Their results show that the stockholders of the
repurchasing firms in the merger-termination group sustain
a significant wealth-loss as a result of the repurchase.
For the target repurchasing firms, they found that the average
abnormal return associated with the announcement of the
block repurchase was -5.50% (t=-7.14). This evidence, along
with their other tests measuring the "information effect"
of an announcement, suggests that block repurchases that
signal the termination of a pending takeover significantly
reduce the value of the purchasing firm beyond the wealth-
9Bradley & Wakeman calculated these premiums relative
to the closing stock price two days before the repurchase.
For all but one of the single block repurchases, the offer
price was greater than the lowest daily market price during
the prvious month.
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transfer associated with the repurchase premium. Bradley
& Wakeman's results support the managerial entrenchment
hypothesis: the intent of the managers of repurchasing
firms in buying back the block is to thwart a profitable
takeover, presumably to enhance their own welfare. The
repurchase premiums can be interpreted as direct payments
to potential bidders to cease takeover activity.
On the other hand, Bradley & Wakeman's evidence shows
that the firm selling the stock back to the target (i.e. the
bidder in the takeover attempt) realized an abnormal return
of 1.82% (t=1.74). Apparently, any negative effect of the
cancellation of the takeover on the value of the bidder
is more than offset by the premium received in the stock
repurchase.
The findings of Dann & DeAngelo on negotiated block
repurchases concurs with that of Bradley & Wakeman. For
their sample of 41 repurchases involving a premium, Dann
& DeAngelo found an average abnormal return on the repurchas-
er's stock of -1.76% (t=-3.59) on the day before and the
day of the announcement. They also performed similar tests
on 30 target firms which entered into standstill agreements
with their hostile bidders. This group realized an abnormal
return of -4.52% (t=-5.72) on the day before and the day
of the announcement.
The evidence from these two studies demonstrates
the significant transfer of wealth between two sub-groups
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of the target's stockholders: from the non-participating
stockholders to the blockholder receiving the premium.
Standstill agreements and premium buybacks reduce competition
in the market for corporate control and provide differential
treatment for large block stockholders. Their findings
are inconsistent with the hypothesis that these target manage-
ment actions are in the best interests of the stockholders,
at least the non-participating stockholders.
5.5 Management Resistance in General
Few researchers have specifically focussed on the
wealth effects of general management resistance against
takeover attempts. Those authors interested in defensive
tactics have chosen to isolate one particular tactic and
analyze its effect on the stock of the target (note that
all the papers discussed so far in this chapter fall into
this category). Nonetheless, several authors have touched
on the wealth effects of management resistance in their
broader studies of takeovers and stockholder returns. The
results of these findings will be discussed in this section.
Krummer & Hoffmeister (1978) begin their work on
the valuation consequences of cash tender offers with four
hypotheses:
1) Target firms are expected to have abnormally low
returns prior to takeover because of managerial inef-
ficiency as well as other possible reasons;
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2) Those firms involved in target takeovers faced with
management resistance will display poorer performance
(prior to takeover) relative to friendly takeovers;
3) The bid premium required for unfriendly takeovers
will be greater than for friendly takeovers; and
4) Bidding firms will increase their shareholder wealth
in the event of a takeover.
Their evidence, based on takeovers occurring during the
period 1958-1974, supports these hypotheses. When they
broke their sample of successful takeovers into two groups
- opposed and unopposed by target management - they found
stockholders earned abnormal returns in the announcement
month of 16.45% (t=15.16) when management did not oppose
the offer, and 19.80% (t=13.62) when management fought the
takeover.
Thus, target management resistance forced bidders
to pay higher premiums, at least for those mergers which
were successful. This appears to support the stockholder
interests hypothesis that defensive tactics tend to enhance
the wealth of target stockholders. But Krummer & Hoffmeister's
evidence is far from conclusive. First of all, these results
are based only on successful takeovers. If the loss of
takeover premium in unsuccessful attempts were included,
it could be that the net impact of defensive tactics is
negative, or that the choice of defensive tactic and the
intensity in which they are pursued by the target management
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makes a material difference. Second, to the extent that
investors anticipate management's use of defensive tactics,
investors could discount the price of the target's stock
by that amount when buying it. Then the higher premiums
received by stockholders when management opposes in successful
takeovers represents both a control premium and an elimination
of this negative effect on the stock due to expected management
opposition to takeovers. Finally, it could also be that
target management opposition reduces the frequency of take-
overs. The higher returns to targets with managerial resis-
tance could arise because only the more profitable takeovers
will be attempted when the bidder anticipates the target's
resistance and its relatively higher execution costs.
A study by Dodd (1980) appears to lend evidence that
generally defensive tactics harm target stockholders, but
if the defensive tactics lead to higher takeover bids at
sometime in the future, they might be beneficial. Dodd
collected a sample of terminated merger proposals and divided
it into two groups: (1) mergers terminated by actions of
the target, and (2) mergers terminated by either the bidder
or some other party. The average abnormal return on the
day before and the day of the termination announcement was
-5.57% for the former group and -9.75% for the later group.
This evidence - as well as that of Dodd & Ruback
(1977), Bradley (1982), and Bradley, Desai & Kim (1983) -
shows that when incumbent management vetoes the takeover
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proposal there is a significant drop in the price of target
shares. But this drop may or may not wipe out the significant
gain obtained when the the takeover attempt is first proposed.
Typically in this case, the target's stock does not fall
to its pre-proposal level, but rather the stockholders retain
some of the initial gain as the market anticipates that
a significant probability exists that another bidder may
make another possibly successful takeover attempt. If another
attempt is made, the defensive actions of the incumbent
management benefited stockholders. If another attempt is
not made within several years, the target loses the entire
initial positive abnormal return, and the defensive tactics
were detrimental (also remember that defensive tactics consume
real resources of the target). In the bidder-terminated
merger cases, Dodd found that the price of the target shares
returns (on average) to its pre-proposal level.
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Chapter 6. Empirical Analysis
The thesis discussion to this point has provided
the groundwork and background for the empirical analysis
in this chapter and the discussion of those findings in
the following two chapters. To assess the impact of the
various antitakeover defensive tactics employed by target
managers on stockholder wealth, samples of such actions
for New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and American Stock Exchange
(ASE) listed firms were collected for each category of defen-
sive tactics outlined in Chapter Four. This chapter presents
the empirical findings resulting from using the "event study"
method of analysis on the stock prices of firms using defensive
tactics. From these empirical results, conclusions can
be drawn concerning the wealth effects on target stockholders
caused by target managers' use of defensive tactics.
The chapter opens with a section describing the basic
"event study" methodology. The following five sections
present the results of applying this methodology on five
categories of defensive tactics: (1) antitakeover charter
and by-law amendments, (2) standstill agreements and negotiated
stock repurchases, (3) antitrust litigation as a "show-stop-
per," (4) "poison pill" preferred stock issuance, and (5)
"double pac-man" counter tender offers. Each of these five
sections describes its data sample and reports the empirical
results.
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6.1 Event-Study Methodology
In order to test the two competing hypotheses - mana-
gerial entrenchment versus stockholder interests - presented
in Chapter Three and to determine whether or not stockholders
benefit from defensive tactics, the thesis measures price
impacts relative to a benchmark estimated from the simple
market model:
Rjt = ej + 3jRmt + Gjt, (1)
where
Rjt = rate of return of security j over period t (period
t is one day in this empirical analysis),
Rmt = rate of return on an equal-weighted market index2
on day t,
= E(Rj) - (jE(Rm),
Ejt = disturbance term of security j at day t, and E(Sjt)=O
,
= cov(Rjt,Rmt)/var(Rmt).
The disturbance term, Ejt , is interpreted as a measure of
the abnormal return to stockholders of firm j on day t.
It is an abnormal return in the sense that it represents
1This is the standard capital market residual technique
first developed by Fama, Fischer, Jensen & Roll (1969) and
further explained by Fama (1976, pp. 63-132). Brown & Warner
(1980) compare the explanatory power of this market-model
event study methodology against that of various other method-
ologies. Also, Langetieg (1978) uses merger data to compare
the market model with a more complex three-factor performance
index methodology. This simple market model performs well
under a2wide variety of conditions.
Brown & Warner (1980) find that using an equal-weighted
market index, as opposed to a value-weighted market index,
offers no systematic disadvantages and perhaps slight advan-
tages in detecting price impacts.
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the deviation of the return on the security from its expected
return (based on all available information capitalized into
the price), given the return earned by the market index
on that day. That part of the return to security j represented
by (jRmt is presumed to be caused by market-wide changes
on day t, and the disturbance term captures the effects
of changes on day t due to firm-specific variables. When
a large group of firms experiences the same event (e.g. the
proposal of an antitakeover charter amendment), the disturbance
terms averaged over all the firms in the sample is interpreted
as capturing the economic impact of that event.
In each of the five samples of various defensive
tactics, the "event" (day t=O) is the first public announcement
of that defensive tactic. The abnormal return on the stock
of the target using the tactic for that "event" day and
for each day surrounding the "event," is estimated by
A A
ARjt = Rjt - (0(j + jRmt), (2)
where ARjt is the abnormal return to security j on day t.
The coefficients a and Pj are estimated using stock price
data from a period outside of (i.e. not including) the period
of interest around the announcement of the defensive tactic.
Day t is equal to zero on the announcement date, is negative
for days before the announcement, and is positive for days
after the announcement. Generally, the coefficients in
the market model were estimated by regressing over the fol-
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lowing periods: 3
a) For days up to and including the event, coefficients
were used that were estimated over a minimum of 100
and a maximum of 200 trading before the analysis
period (i.e. before day t=-60).
b) For days following the event, coefficients were used
that were estimated over a minimum of 100 and a maximum
of 200 trading after the analysis period (i.e. after
day t=+60).
The market model (1) and the calculation of abnormal
returns (2) are applied to all firms in each sample. An
average abnormal return (ARt) for each day t is calculated
for the N firms in each sample. These average abnormal
returns of each day are summed over different defined periods
(depends upon the tactic) to obtain cumulative average abnormal
returns (CAR). For example, the cumulative abnormal return
for the eleven days before and including the announcement
date (i.e. from t=-10 through t=O) is the sum of the abnormal
returns for each of those eleven days and is denoted CAR_ 10,0.
In a perfectly efficient market where all information is
3Generally, this period was used for each event study,
if not, differences will be mentioned in the relevant results
section. Sometimes there was not enough data following
the event to estimate the "after" coefficients because the
event dates were close to the end of 1983. In each case
different estimation periods were tried, but all produced
esentially the same final results. Rick Ruback kindly let
me use his computer program to process multi-company event
studies; Robyn McGlaughlin and Bob Clyatt provided a great
deal of computer assistance.
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immediately reflected in stock prices, the average abnormal
return for the sample on the event date, AB0, should represent
the wealth effect of the defensive tactic. Generally, one
wants to consider the cumulative abnormal return leading
up to and including the actual event day, because quite
often information leaks to some people in the market before
the event is actually announced to the public - either directly
by the company or in the Wall Street Journal. Assuming
that there are no other "events" during this period, this
CAR should capture the stock price effect associated with
the action of the defensive tactic.
The primary statistical procedure employed to test
the statistical significance of ARt and CAR is a t-test.
The t-statistic provides a confidence factor as to the like-
lihood that the actual abnormal return is some percentage
other than zero. This t-statistic is given by
t = ARti0
where " is the estimated standard deviation of the abnormal
returns over the analysis period for each sample.
In all of the event studies, the daily stock price
data was taken from the Center for Research in Securities
Prices (CRSP). The market index used was the CRSP equal-
weighted return index of NYSE and ASE firms. Although many
over-the-counter (OTC) firms have used defensive tactics
in fighting off bidders, none of the samples in any of the
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event studies contain OTC firms because CRSP does not record
data for OTC companies. Announcement dates were generally
taken from the Wall Street Journal and the Wall Street Journal
Index. Events that had other announcements made by the
company (e.g. declaring dividends or obtaining a significant
new contract), which could possible confound the results,
were eliminated from the sample.
6.2 Antitakeover Charter and By-Law Amendments
6.2.1 Data Sources and Sample Construction
During the proxy seasons covering the period 1979-1983,
253 firms presented antitakeover charter and by-law amendments
to stockholders for their approval. The OTC firms and
the firms with nearby confounding events were eliminated
bringing the sample size down to 159 firms. Table 1 shows
the frequency distribution of the antitakeover proposals
according to the proxy season in which they were proposed.
The table shows that 84% of the firms proposing antitakeover
amendments did so in the 1983 proxy season. A possible
explanation for this sharp increase in the number of proposals
may be a reaction to the well-publicized and very hostile
takeover battles the previous summer of 1982: Cities Services/
I must thank Chuck Cory (Morgan Stanley) for providing
this listing of firms that proposed antitakeover charter
and by-law amendments during 1979-1980.
125
Mesa Petroleum/Occidental and Bendix/Martin Marietta/Allied.
Table 1
Frequency distribution, by
year, of the number of proxy
statements that contained
antitakeover amendments, 1979-
1983.
Number of
Year proxy statements
1983 134
1982 5
1981 5
1980 8
1979 7
Total 159
Although generally not included in the final sample because
their stocks are traded on the OTC market, many commercial
banks have recently proposed antitakeover amendments in
response to the many bank mergers motivated by creeping
interstate bank (e.g. in New England). Early indications
this spring show that the pace of antitakeover amendment
proposals in the 1984 proxy season should be at least as
great as that of the 1983 season.
Table 2 contains some descriptive data on the final
sample. Panel A of Table 2 is a frequency distribution
of the different types of antitakeover provisions proposed
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Table 2
Description of antitakeover amendments and by-law changes
proposed in the sample of 159 proxy statements, 1979-1980.
------------------------------- ---------
A. Frequency distribution by type of amendment
Number of
proxy
Type of amendment statements
1. Supermajority approval required for
mergers, consolidations, and sale
of major assets
2. Supermajority approval required to
amend charter/by-laws
3. By-laws amended by board only
4. Supermajority approval required to
remove or change number of directors
5. Fair price provisions
6. Classified board of directors and
staggered elections
7. Removal of directors for cause only
8. Advance nomination of directors
required
9. Only board can fill vacancies
10. No right to written consent
11. Special meeting to be called by
board only
12. Increase percentage required to call
a special meeting
13. Elimination of cumulative voting
14. Non-tendering stockholders can demand
redemption in unfriendly takeover
15. Elimination of preemptive rights
16. Limit voting power of substantial
stockholders
17. Offer review - board must consider
social factors
18. No ESOP shares tendered without
directions
19. Bar foreign ownership
20. Change in business or capital
structure (e.g. state of
incorporation)
21. Create class of voting preferred
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86
3
32
77
73
45
3
5
42
7
2
10
2
6
1
4
2
1
2
19
Total 526
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Table 2
(continued)
~--------------------------------------------
B. Frequency distribution of multiple amendments per proxy
Number of
proxy
Multiple amendments proposed statements
----------------------------------------------------
1. Single amendment only 43
2. Two amendments only 40
3. Three amendments only 24
4. Four or more amendments 52
Total 159
----------------------------------------------------
C. Frequency distribution of amendments with "lock-in"
provision
Number of
proxy
Type of proposed amendment statements
--------------------------------------------
1. Supermajority merger approval and
supermajority approval required
to amend charter 67
2. Supermajority approval required to
remove/change number of directors
and supermajority approval required
to amend charter 25
3. Limitations on right to act by written
consent, and supermajority approval
required to amend charter 33
Total 125
---------------- ~--------------------------------
by the 159 firms in the sample. The most popular provisions
were supermajority merger approval, fair price provisions,
and classified boards with staggered terms; and these were
often "locked-in" by an amendment requiring supermajority
stockholder approval to change the firm's charter and/or
by-laws. Of the 526 antitakeover amendment proposals, 224
required supermajority stockholder approval for some action
128
to be taken by the firm. Curiously, Linn & McConnell (1983)
had found relatively few proposals for fair price provisions
(only 24 of 998 proposals) in their sample taken from the
period 1960-1980. The relative increase in popularity of
fair price provisions may be a reaction to some of the recent
two-tier tender offers in which the remaining non-tendering
target stockholders were bought out at a price significantly
below the initial tender offer price. An alarming number
of companies (19) created a class of special-voting preferred
stock to hold in reserve for use as a "poison pill."5
Because many of the proxy statements contained multiple
amendment proposals, the total number of proposed antitakeover
provisions shown in panel A is greater than the total number
of firms proposing antitakeover amendments. Panel B shows
the distribution of the number of proposals per proxy state-
ment. Nearly 73% of the firms in the sample presented multiple
amendments to their stockholders.
Panel C of Table 2 gives the frequency with which
various types of antitakeover amendments were "locked-in,"
so that if a bidder did happen to obtain a minority board
seat or purchase a minority block in the target, it would
be difficult for him to circumvent other antitakeover provi-
sions by amending the charter and/or by-laws. Typically,
this was done by simply requiring that a supermajority vote
5A separate event study involving those firms creating
"blank check" preferred will be studied in section 6.5 along
with other companies who have actually used this poison pill.
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of the stockholders is needed to amend the charter/by-laws.
This can provide an effective "lock-in" for a wide variety
of other antitakeover provisions. Three of the more popular
combinations are given in Panel C. In other cases, this
sort of "lock-in" provision was not needed, because the
state law covering the particular firm provided enough cover-
age. 6
The vast majority of these antitakeover proposals
were approved by the firms' stockholders at the annual meet-
ing. Of the 159 firms in the sample, stockholders failed
to approve the proposals at only 11 companies.7 Many of
these rejected proposals actually received majority votes,
but did not top the supermajority required by the particular
corporation laws governing that firm. In addition, several
of the companies failing to pass the proposals were considered
likely takeover targets or had been in recent takeover battles
where stockholders had been denied substantial premiums
because of target management's defensive actions.
6.2.2 Specifics of the event study
In the case of amendments proposed to stockholders
6The corporation laws of many states already require
more than a simple majority of the firm's stockholders is
needed o amendment the firm's charter and by-laws.
Those firms rejecting the proposed antitakeover amend-
ments were Black & Decker, Canal Randolph, Castle & Cook,
Data General, Enstar, Fox-Stanley Photo Products, International
Paper, Northwestern Steel & Wire, Pogo Producing, Sherwin-
Williams, and Tech-Sym.
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through proxy statements, it is difficult to determine when
the event - the realization that management is trying to
impose antitakeover provisions on the firm - is made public
to the market, and when the news is capitalized into the
firm's stock price. Obviously, the board of directors does
not consider proposing such amendments on one particular
day, but rather it considers the action over a period of
time and usually with the outside assistance of legal and
investment banking counsel.8 Then the proxy statements
are printed and mailed to stockholders. Generally, these
board considerations and the mailing of proxy statements
are not reported in the financial press. The stockholders'
meeting usually follows the proxy mailing by about 30-45
days, at which time the results are announced. Quite often
these results do not get reported in the press until several
days after the annual meeting, and sometimes they do not
appear at all.
Thus, on which date in this process does the market
learn of the antitakeover amendment proposals and reflect
their value in the firm's stock price? Although the "event
day" likely occurs at different points for different companies
depending upon their size, visibility, etc., I have chosen
the proxy mailing date as the "event date" (day t=O) for
each firm. In some cases, the information may be leaked
8The board has to pass a resolution to get an antitake-
over amendment placed on its proxy, but the firm very rarely
ever issues a press release of these resolutions.
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to the market over time prior to proxy mailing, but on average
the proxy mailing date is likely to be the best "event date."
Many "insiders" likely knew of the event before this date,
but the mailing of proxy statements confirms that the board
plans to go ahead with its proposals, and announces them
to the stockholders. Furthermore, because very few proposals
have failed to meet stockholder approval in the past, the
announcement of the provisions in the proxy is as good as
having the proposals actually passed (i.e. there is little
uncertainty as to their outcome).
6.2.3 Results and Comments
Table 3 presents the sample average abnormal returns
(columns 2 and 5) and cumulative average abnormal returns
(columns 3 and 6) for the days surrounding the mailing of
the firms' proxy statements containing the antitakeover
amendments. Table 4 shows the cumulative abnormal returns
(CAR) for the sample of 159 firms over various periods along
with the t-statistics testing the significance of those
CAR's. Over the 60 days just prior to the proxy mailing
date the firms earn a CAR of 0.929%. This CAR is both small
and statistically not different than zero (t=0.53). Thus,
we cannot conclude that firms attempting to add antitakeover
provisions to their charters were firms that sought protection
from raiders after performing particularly well, but rather
these firms appear to have done about as well as the market,
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Table 3
Daily abnormal returns (in percent) surrounding the mailing
date of the proxies containing the antitakeover charter
and by-law amendments.
(N = 159)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Cumulative Cumulative
Event Abnormal abnormal Event Abnormal abnormal
day returna return day returna return
-60 0.087 0.087 +1 0.081 0.935
-30 0.353 2.304 +2 -0.316 0.619
-20 0.097 1.878 +3 0.031 0.650
-19 -0.284 1.594 +4 0.422** 1.072
-18 -0.090 1.504 +5 0.044 1.116
-17 0.249 1.753 +6 0.236 1.352
-16 0.243 1.996 +7 0.328* 1.680
-15 -0.220 1.776 +8 0.177 1.857
-14 -0.357* 1.419 +9 0.217 2.074
-13 0.059 1.478 +10 -0.094 1.980
-12 -0.326* 1.152 +11 0.305 2.285
-11 -0.031 1.121 +12 0.155 2.440
-10 0.088 1.209 +13 0.244 2.684
-9 0.235 1.444 +14 0.186 2.870
-8 -0.179 1.265 +15 0.385** 3.255
-7 -0.160 1.105 +16 -0.056 3.199
-6 -0.282 0.823 +17 0.139 3.338
-5 -0.070 0.753 +18 0.317 3.655
-4 -0.007 0.746 +19 0.010 3.665
-3 0.020 0.766 +20 -0.055 3.610
-2 0.269 1.035 +30 0.122 14.453
-1 -0.106 0.929 +60 -0.065 6.298
0 -0.075 0.854
a**(*) indicates that the average of the standardized
residuals is significantly different from zero at the 5%
(10%) level of significance using a two-tailed test.
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Table 4
Cumulative abnormal returns over various periods around
the proxy mailing date for the sample of 159 firms proposing
antitakeover charter and by-law amendments during the period
1979-1983.
----------- ------------------------------------
Perioda
Number of Cumulative
Start End days in abnormal T-statistic
date date period return (CAR) of CAR
---------------------- --------------------------------
-60 -21 40 1.62% 1.25
-20 -1 20 -0.83% -0.91
-1 -1 1 -0.11% -0.53
0 0 1 -0.07% -0.37
-1 0 2 -0.18% -0.63
1 10 10 1.13% 1.75
11 20 10 1.63% 2.53
1 20 20 2.76% 3.02
~~---------------------------------------
aThe cumulative abnormal returns are the abnormal
returns beginning on the "start date" up through and includ-
ing the "end date." Periods with the same start and end
dates are the abnormal returns (AR) on that date.
or just as anticipated.
On the days right around the proxy mailing - days
-1, 0 and 1 - the average abnormal returns are -0.106%,
-0.075% and 0.081% with t-statistics of -0.53, -0.37 and
0.42, respectively. None of these appear to be statistically
different from zero. Over the 21 days surrounding the proxy
mailing (from -10 through 10), 12 of the abnormal returns
are positive and 9 are negative. These results do not show
that firms are affected - either positive or negative -
by the mailing of proxies containing antitakeover charter
43
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and by-law amendments. Thus, the data presented to this
point accepts neither the managerial entrenchment nor the
stockholders interest hypotheses. It could be that these
provisions have no effect on stock prices, or it could be
(on average) that the proxy mailing date is not the date
on which the proposal for antitakeover provisions is capital-
ized into the firm's stock price.
But for the 20 days following the proxy mailing,
the group of firms earn a CAR of 2.76% (t=3.02) which does
indicate that on average something has caused these firms
to perform somewhat better than anticipated (see graphs
in figure 1). By day t=60, this CAR following the proxy
mailing has increased to 5.363%. This positive abnormal
performance following the proxy mailing is significant and
is consistent with the hypothesis that antitakeover amendments
have a positive impact on stock price (i.e. the stockholder
interests hypothesis explains why target managers adopt
these antitakeover provisions).
If one concludes that the proposal of antitakeover
amendments produced this abnormal return, then one must
also conclude that either the market is inefficient (unlikely)
or that the news of the firm proposing antitakeover provisions
was not released to the market on the proxy mailing date,
but rather on average sometime just following that date.
Because no one day from the sample shows a particularly
strong positive or negative abnormal return, it could be
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that the news of the antitakeover provisions is released
to the market at different times by different firms. 9 Some-
times the news is released by the board before the proxies
are mailed, sometimes the proxy is the news-breaker, and
sometimes the market does not learn of the new amendments
until several days after the mailing. During the 60 days
following the proxy mailing, each firm holds its annual
meeting and actually votes on the new amendments. Thus,
during this 60-day period, all uncertainty as to whether
or not the antitakeover provisions are going to be adopted
is eliminated.
Based on this set of results, if one were forced
to choose between concluding that antitakeover charter amend-
ments have a positive or negative impact on stock price,
one would have to conclude that the impact is positive,
primarily based on the significantly positive CAR following
the proxy mailing date. Contrarily, there is no evidence
that the impact is negative. Nonetheless, these results
are not definitively conclusive. The sample contained a
wide variety of antitakeover proposals, some of which could
have negative impacts, some neutral, and some positive.
9 In an event study, if the actual release date of
news of the "event" cannot be exactly determined within
a day or two, the confidence intervals (represented by the
t-statistics) blow-up rather quickly. Thus, one loses the
power to pinpoint the AR caused by the event on any one
day, but the CAR over the period still provides some informa-
tion about the effect of the event (assuming no other signi-
ficant events are ocurring at the same time).
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One cannot differentiate between the effects caused by dif-
ferent types of proposals because so many firms proposed
multiple amendments all at once. But on average, antitakeover
charter provisions tend to benefit stockholders, and the
evidence lends credence to the stockholder interests hypoth-
esis.10
6.3 Standstill Agreements and Negotiated Stock Repurchases
6.3.1 Data Sources and Sample Construction
An initial sample of negotiated stock repurchases
for the period 1980-1983 was collected from the Wall Street
Journal Index using the "Reacquired Shares" entry in the
"General News" section of the index. Other repurchases
were added to this sample from a list compiled by the mergers
& acquisitions department at Morgan Stanley. The dates
and the relevant statistics about the repurchase were then
checked with the original stories in the Wall Street Journal.
The final sample had to meet the following criteria:
1) No other significant "events" for the company occurred
around the repurchase date.
10 0ne should keep in mind the bias in such antitakeover
amendment samples suggested in DeAngelo & Rice (1983) and
discussed earlier: the tests are biased against the managerial
entrenchment hypothesis because the proposal of antiatkeover
provisions signals to the market that the firm is likely
to be a takeover candidate.
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2) The date of announcement of the repurchase could
be explicitly pinpointed, and was not part of a prev-
ious plan or the exercising of a previously purchased
option.
3) The repurchase transaction was settled entirely for
cash (no notes or other consideration).
4) The stock repurchase was successful.
5) The repurchasing company was listed on the New York
or American Stock Exchanges (so that data would be
available from CRSP).
This resulted in a final sample of 77 negotiated stock repur-
chases covering the period 1980-1983. This sample was then
broken down into two subsamples: (1) 44 firms repurchasing
their own stock to terminate a control dispute between the
target firm and the external bidder, and (2) 27 firms who
concluded standstill agreements in addition to the block
repurchase.
Table 5 shows some summary statistics for the final
sample of repurchases and the two subgroups. The average
size block of stock repurchased by the target firm is roughly
the same for all three groups - 12% of the firm's outstanding
common stock. But the average premiums paid for the blocks
over the current market price varies among the three groups.
The premiums paid were calculated two ways: (1) the repurchase
price relative to the closing price of the firm's stock
30 days prior to the date of repurchase (no information
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Table 4
Privately negotiated repurchases of single blocks of stock
with strictly cash payments during 1980-1983: Percentage
of outstanding shares repurchased and percentage premium
paid (77 repurchases).
Percentage
of outstanding Repurchase
common stock Premium (mean)a
Type of Number repurchased
Transaction of events (mean) 30 days 2 days
All negotiated 77 11.9% 25.1% 19.6%
repurchases
(entire sample)
Negotiated 44 12.6% 29.8% 25.1%
repurchases
terminating
a takeover
battle
Negotiated 27 12.4% 37.0% 31.5%
repurchases
done with a
standstill
agreement
For the entire
repurchase sample:
Minimum 1.3% 152.0% 144.3%
Maximum 40.5% -31.5% -45.1%
aPremiums measured as the block repurchase price
relative to the dividend-adjusted closing prices 30 days
and 2 days prior to the Wall Street Journal report of the
transaction (which in all cases is the trading day following
the event).
140
of or about the repurchase likely had leaked to the market
at this time), and (2) the repurchase price relative to
the firm's closing stock price two days prior to the Wall
Street Journal announcement. The average two-day repurchase
premiums are 19.6%, 25.1% and 31.5% for the total sample,
the merger-termination group, and the standstill-agreement
group, respectively. These repurchase premiums are of the
same order of magnitude as the premiums offered to stock-
holders by bidders in tender offers. The repurchase premiums
ranged from -45.1% to 144.3%.
Notice that both the 30-day and two-day repurchase
premiums increase over the three groups. Firms repurchasing
their own stock had to pay significantly higher premiums
when the repurchase also involved a merger termination or
standstill agreement than when the repurchase was simple
and straightforward (the highest premiums were associated
with standstills). Thus, to obtain concessions from the
block seller, the firm had to pay higher prices (nothing
is freel). Quite often the repurchases settling takeover
battles also contained agreements in which each party dropped
its lawsuits against the other. Getting the seller to agree
not to purchase any stock in the target company for a signif-
icant period of years is the most costly to firms. These
standstill agreements are relatively long-term contracts
averaging slightly longer than eight years (range from three
to ten years). Although standstills exist which limit the
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ownership of the blockholder to a non-zero percentage, all
the standstill agreements in this sample prevented the seller
from purchasing any shares of the target, and the block
repurchased represented the seller's entire holding in the
target.
6.3.2 Specifics of the Event Study
The "event" date (day t=0O) in the event study was
the day the announcement of the repurchase appeared in the
Wall Street Journal. In nearly every case, the Wall Street
Journal story followed the actual repurchase by one trading
day. So generally the "news" of the repurchase was known
by traders on day -1 and the greatest impact on the firm's
stock should occur on that day. Unlike the previous study
on antitakeover amendments, the event date of repurchase
can cleanly be identified, and there is likely to be little
leakage of information prior to the announcement of the
repurchase.
6.3.3 Results and Comments
Tables 5 and 7 show the abnormal returns (AR) and
the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) to stockholders of
firms repurchasing blocks of their own stock from a substantial
minority stockholder for the entire sample of 77 firms and
the two subsamples, respectively. Tables 6 and 8 present
the cumulative abnormal returns over various periods with
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Table 5
Daily abnormal returns (in percent) to the common stock of
77 firms repurchasing single blocks of their own stock during
the period 1980-1983. The event date (day t=0) is the announce-
ment of the negotiated stock repurchase.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Cumulative Cumulative
Event Abnormal abnormal Event Abnormal abnormal
day returna return day returna return
-0.074
-0.131
-0.476
-0.422
0.455
0.329
-0.137
-0.258
0.474
0.202
0.069
-0.260
-0.035
0.476
-0.192
-0.622**
0.103
0.366
-0.420
0.099
0.110
-2.114**
-1 .628**
-0.074
1.563
1.516
1 .094
1.549
1.878
1.741
1.483
1.957
2.159
2.228
1.968
1 .933
2.409
2.217
1 .595
1 .698
2.064
1.644
1.743
1.853
-0.261
-1.889
+1
+2
+3
+4
+5
+6
+7
+8
+9
+10
+11
+12
+13
+14
+15
+16
+17
+18
+19
+20
+30
+60
-0.166
0.516*
-0.255
-0.593**
0.063
-0.212
0.236
0.019
0.028
-0.688**
-0. 126
-0.501*
-0.036
-0.183
0.035
-0.317
-0.134
-0.584**
-0.135
-0.386
0.335
-0.414
a**(*) indicates that the average of the standardized
residuals is significantly different from zero at the 5%
(10%) level of significance using a two-tailed test.
-60
-30
-20
-19
-18
-17
-16
-15
-14
-13
-12
-11
-10
-9
-8
-7
-6
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
-2.055
-1.539
-1.794
-2.387
-2.324
-2.536
-2.300
-2.281
-2.253
-2.921
-3.047
-3.548
-3.584
-3.767
-3.732
-4.049
-4.049
-4.767
-4.902
-5.288
-4.713
-5.581
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Table 6
Cumulative abnormal returns over various periods around
the date of announcement of repurchase for the sample of
77 firms repurchasing blocks of their own stock during the
period 1979-1983.
Perioda
-------- Number of Cumulative
Start End days in abnormal T-statistic
date date period return (CAR) of CAR
-60 -21 40 1.99% 1.22
-20 -11 10 -0.02% -0.03
-10 0 11 -3.89% -4.53
-1 -1 1 -2.11% -8.33
0 0 1 -1.63% -6.41
-1 0 2 -3.74% -10.32
1 10 10 -1.03% -1.26
11 20 10 -2.37% -2.90
1 20 20 -3.40% -2.94
aThe cumulative abnormal returns are the abnormal
returns beginning on the "start date" up through and includ-
ing the "end date." Periods with the same start and end
dates are the abnormal returns (AR) on that date.
the relevant t-statistics. Time-series graphs of these
data are presented in figure 2.
The two-day CAR over days -1 and 0 should provide
an assessment of the average market price impact of negotiated
stock repurchases and standstill agreements. For the entire
77-firm sample, this two-day CAR is -3.74% and is highly
statistically significant (t=-10.32). Thus, while the selling
minority blockholder is (on average) being paid a premium
of 19.6%, the remaining non-participating stockholders earn
(on average) a negative abnormal return of -3.74% due to
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Table 7
Daily abnormal returns (in percent) to the common stock
of 44 companies repurchasing single blocks of their own
stock accompanied by the settlement of a takeover battle,
and 27 companies repurchasing single blocks of their own
stock accompanied by a standstill agreement with the seller
in the period 1980-1983.
Merger Termination Standstill Agreement
Cumulative Cumulative
Event Abnormal abnormal Abnormal abnormal
day returna return returna return
-60 -0.066 -0.066 0.386 0.386
-50 0.809* 1.309 0.044 1.518
-40 0.058 0.880 -0.307 0.880
-30 -0.169 1.164 0.359 1.002
-20 -0.416 1.433 -0.549 0.496
-10 0.314 2.132 -0.036 2.166
-9 0.314 2.446 0.421 2.587
-8 -0.275 2.171 0.346 2.933
-7 -0.799* 1.372 -1.066** 1.867
-6 0.278 1.650 0.169 2.036
-5 0.357 2.007 0.176 2.212
-4 -0.634 1.373 -0.481 1.731
-3 -0.188 1.185 -0.396 1.335
-2 -0.184 1.001 -0.169 1.166
-1 -3.735** -2.734 -4.899** -3.733
0 -2.056** -4.790 -3.033** -6.766
+1 0.194 -4.596 -0.071 -6.837
+2 1.148** -3.448 0.889* -5.948
+3 0.016 -3.432 0.233 -5.715
+4 -0.878** -4.310 -0.847* -6.562
+5 -0.371 -4.681 -0.641 -7.203
+6 -0.376 -5.057 -0.635 -7.838
+7 0.732* -4.325 0.965* -6.873
+8 0.086 -4.239 0.090 -6.783
+9 -0.060 -4.299 -0.366 -7.149
+10 -1.024** -5.323 0.017 -7.132
+20 -0.366 -6.991 -0.214 -7.697
+30 0.235 -6.025 0.505 -7.092
+40 -0.179 -6.430 -0.017 -7.439
+50 0.034 -8.190 -0.002 -8.573
+60 -0.545 -7.834 -0.570 -8.724
aS------ignificant AR: ** at 5% level, * at 10% level.
aSignificant AR: ** at 5% level, * at 10% level.
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Table 8
Cumulative abnormal returns over various periods around
the date of announcement of repurchase for the samples:
(1) 44 firms repurchasing blocks of their own stock in termi-
nation of a takeover battle, and (2) 27 firms repurchasing
blocks of their own stock with a standstill agreement.
Period a
- -- --- - ---- -
Start End
date date
Number of
days in
period
Cumulative
abnormal
return (CAR)
T-statistic
of CAR
(1) Merger-terminating repurchases
-60
-20
-10
-21
-11
0
-1
0
0
10
20
20
40
10
11
1
1
2
10
10
20
1.85%
-0.03%
-6.61%
-3.74%
-2.06%
-5.79%
-0.53%
-1 .67%
-2.20%
(1) Repurchases with standstill agreement
-60
-20
-10
-21
-11
0
1.92%
1.15%
-8.97%
-4.90%
-3.03%
-7.93%
-1
0
-1
1 10 10 -0.37% -0.25
11 20 10 -0.56% -0.38
1 20 20 -0.93% -0.44
aThe cumulative abnormal returns are the abnormal
returns beginning on the "start date" up through and includ-
ing the "end date." Periods with the same start and end
dates are the abnormal returns (AR) on that date.
0.73
-0.03
-5.01
-10.32
-5.68
-10.72
-0.42
-1.33
-1 .23
0.65
0.78
-5.77
-9.99
-6.18
-11.72
21
-1
-2
-3
-4
-- 5
-60 -50 -40 -30 -20 -10 0 10 20 30 40 50 60
Days Relative to Announcement
Figure
-GO -SO -40 -- 30 -20 -10 0 10 20 30 4.0 s0 GO
Days Relative to Announcement
146
Vl V k V l V 11V
--
' 11 11 111' 111| 1 11 111'11 11 11 11 1 111'11 11 11 11i llil||| l 'l |ill ~i ffl|• I l 1111|111111111111111|1111
2
1
0
-1
-2
-3
-4
-5
-6
-7
-8
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
IlittillHillinIlillillillithillnillittillillHillilutillitlilnilllHHillillilitilitillittilHHillistilittiliTIT
147
-60 -50 -40 -30 -20 -10 0 10 20 30 40 50 60
Days Relative to Announcement
Figure
4
3
2
1
0
-1
-2
-3
-4
-5
-6
-7
-8
-9
-10
-11
-12
-6O -- O -40 -3O -- O -10 0 10 " 30 4.0 so
Days Relative to Announcement
2
1
0
-1
-2
-3
-4
-5
-6
-7
-8
111111 fill 11111111111111111111111111111111111111111 M littitlill 111 1111111 lilt I
43
2
C
r- a,1tl
a. OUL..V
0~
E -3
O
-- 6fr -2
-7
-8Cn -4
>% -5
0
-6
-7
--8
148
-60 -50 -40 -30 -20 -10 0 10 20 30 40 50 60
Days Relative to Announcement
Figure 4
4
3
c 2
r-
S -200CLc -1
4-0
-- 3o
c -5
. -7
E -9
1
--10
-11
-12
-GO -50 --40 -30 -20 -10 O 10 20
Days Relative to Announcement
30 40 50 GO
149
the stock repurchase. There is a direct transfer of wealth
from the non-participating stockholders to the seller receiving
the premium over the current market. For some reason, stock-
holders continue to earn statistically significant abnormal
returns during the period immediately following the repurchase,
particularly over days 1 through 20 where the CAR is -3.40%
(t=-2.94). This is somewhat puzzling. It could be that
the market does not efficiently capitalize the "news" of
the stock repurchase on announcement. Conceivably, the
market may anticipate that another bidder could enter making
a bid for the target now that the substantial minority block
has been eliminated (this rarely happens). Realizing that
another bidder is not around the corner to offer another
premium, the target's stock drops off.
Similar results are found for block repurchases which
involve merger terminations and/or standstill agreements.
From tables 7 and 8, the two-day CAR's associated with the
announcement of the stock repurchase are -5.79% (t=-10.72)
and -7.93% (t=11.72) for the merger-termination and standstill
agreement subsamples, respectively. Again, these negative
abnormal returns are highly statistically significant lending
credence to the hypothesis that non-participating stockholders
are hurt by these actions. As further support of this theory,
the vast majority of these two-day CAR's associated with
the repurchase in both groups are negative (see table 9).
In both groups of repurchases, the firms appear to earn
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Table 9
Distribution of the abnormal returns earned by the stock-
holders of the target firm buying back its own stock to
settle a control dispute. These are two-day abnormal returns
for the day before and the day of the repurchase announcement
(t=-1 and t=O).
---------------- ----------------------------------
Number of observed abnormal returns
Magnitude of Block repurchases Block repurchases----- ---- ----- ----- -----------
two-day terminating a with standstill
abnormal takeover battle (27 repurchases)
return (AR-1, 0 ) (44 repurchases)
------ ------------ -----------------------
AR<-21% 1 1
-21%<AR<-18% 2 2
-18%<AR<-15% 3 2
-15%<AR<-12% 0 0
-12%<AR< -9% 2 2
-9%<AR< -6% 6 5
-6%<AR< -3% 9 5
-3%<AR< 0% 12 8
0%<AR< 3% 7 2
3%<AR 2 0
Total 44 27
Minimum 
-43.05% 
-43.05%
Mean 
-5.79% 
-7.93%
Maximum 6.72% 1.93%
---------------------------------------------
average expected returns (i.e. no abnormal returns) over
the period preceding and following the repurchase announce-
ment. This implies that the market efficiently capitalizes
the "news" associated with the announcement of the block
repurchase and standstill agreement into the stock price
of the target firm.
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The merger-termination group shows a greater wealth
loss than does the entire sample of stock repurchases, and
the group with standstill agreements reports losses greater
than that of either the two other groups. The distribution
of two-day abnormal returns in table 9 is skewed more towards
the negative end for the standstill-agreement group than
for the merger-termination group. This finding is consistent
with the earlier discussion reporting that the repurchase
premiums increase over the three groups and that the repurchase
premiums are commensurate with what the target management
is obtaining from the selling blockholder. In all three
cases, the seller gives up his leverage from which he could
launch another takeover battle. In the merger-termination
and standstill-agreement groups, the target management also
gets rid of a potential bidder and eliminates the lawsuits
(and their related costs) against the company. Finally,
in the case of the standstill-agreement group, the target
management receives even more - an assurance that the bidder
will not return for at least the period of the standstill
agreement. Thus, the more the target asks for in addition
to the repurchase, the more cash they have to give up to
the seller and the greater the wealth loss to the remaining
stockholders.
To summarize, these statistical tests and results
presented in tables 5-9 are inconsistent with the hypothesis
that incumbent managers are acting in the best interests
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of their stockholders when repurchasing blocks of stock
from minority stockholders at a premium over the current
market. This is particularly true when the repurchase termi-
nates a takeover battle and/or when the seller agrees not
to make another attempt in the future. The data suggests
that the intent of incumbent managers in repurchasing the
block is to thwart a profitable takeover, and to secure
their own positions of power and compensation within the
firm. As an additional note, it should be pointed out that
quite often non-participating stockholders file lawsuits
against the management in an attempt to block the repurchase
at a premium.11 This is strong evidence against the stock-
holder interests hypothesis, at least for this defensive
tactic.
On the other hand, the results do not automatically
imply that the managerial entrenchment hypothesis holds.
Even though management's intent may be to "entrench" their
positions, the wealth loss observed in these repurchases
may simply represent the decline in the probability that
the minority blockholder will attempt a control battle in
which the other stockholders would receive a control premium.
Countering this argument is the fact that the elimination
of the substantial block reduces the impediments to other
11The courts, applying the "business judgement" rule,
often rule in favor of the incumbent management in these
cases. Based on the evidence presented here, judges should
reconsider before siding with management in these cases.
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potential bidders; thus, the probability of the target stock-
holders receiving a takeover premium may in some cases actually
increase.
6.4 Antitrust "Show-Stopper" Litigation
6.4.1 Data Sources and Sample Construction
A large list of several hundred mergers involving
antitrust violations over the period 1975-1983 was collected
from the Trade Regulation Reoorter, which contains brief
summaries of all antitrust cases undertaken by the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) and the Department of Justice (DOJ).
To be included in the final sample of target firms using
antitrust litigation as a defensive tactic, each case from
the Trade Regulation Reporter had to meet the following
criteria:
1) The filing of the antitrust suit against the bidder
had to be at least three days after the announcement
of the tender offer bid.
2) No other defensive tactics could be used concurrently
with the antitrust litigation tactic (i.e. during
days -2 through 0).
3) The target firm's stock had to trade on the day before
and the day of the antitrust announcement.
4) The antitrust case had to come under the supervision
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of the FTC or the DOJ rather than some other regulatory
agency (this eliminated bank and insurance mergers).
5) Announcements about the cases had to be found in
the Wall Street Journal.
6) The target had to be listed on the New York or American
Stock Exchanges.
The first three criteria were intended to select only antitrust
cases which were somewhat isolated so that the effect of
the defensive tactic could be measured less ambiguously. 12
Many of the firms in the preliminary sample filed
the antitrust suit, or at least stated their intention to
do so, as their first reaction to the hostile takeover bid.
This announcement usually was made on the day following
the takeover bid, and occasionally the stock exchange had
suspended trading in the target company's stock during this
period. Furthermore, in the vast majority of cases in the
preliminary sample, the antitrust tactic was only one of
many defensive tactics announced on that day, quite often
concurrent with incumbent management's explicit rejection
of the takeover offer. In these situations, any measurable
abnormal return associated with the use of antitrust litigation
as a defensive tactic would be confounded by the other "events"
occurring and being reflected in the firm's stock price
12The actual Wall Street Journal articles covering
the days of the takeover bid through the filing of the anti-
trust suit were studied to filter out all those cases which
had other confounding events.
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at the same time. The first two criteria eliminated all
such cases from the final sample. The six filters reduced
the initial sample down to a group of 19 target firms from
the period 1975-1983.
6.4.2 Specifics of the Event Study
The announcement of the filing of the antitrust suit
in the Wall Street Journal was assigned to day 0, so that
typically the actual filing of the suit and the resulting
stock price impact occurred on day -1. Because the sample
criteria eliminated all cases in which other defensive tactics
were employed on the day before, day of, and day following
the actual filing of the antitrust suit, one would expect
that days -2 and 0 would not show statistically significant
abnormal returns (unless information leaked or unless the
market was not efficient in this case).
For each of the 19 firms in the sample, the takeover
bid was made sometime during the 10 days preceding the filing
of the antitrust suit. Typically, the bidder offered for
the target on days -5 or -4. One should expect to see large
positive abnormal returns for these firms during the period
prior to the use of the antitrust defensive tactic. The
big returns should come during the period -10 through -2,
but positive abnormal returns are also likely before day
-10 as the market anticipates the bid or as information
is leaked out before the actual offer. Unless the market
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gives the antitrust suit a probability of one of successfully
warding off the bidder and that a replacement bidder does
not appear, the abnormal return associated with the antitrust
defensive tactic should not completely eliminate the positive
return associated with the takeover bid. The empirical
results should test these hypotheses.
6.4.3 Results and Comments
Tables 10 and 11 report the results of the abnormal
returns (AR) and the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for
the 19-firm sample of target companies using the antitrust
litigation defensive tactic. The time-series data of the
abnormal returns are shown graphically in figure 5. The
abnormal return generated by the announcement of the filing
of the antitrust suit on day -1 is -3.142% (t=-4.29). In
all but one of the 19 cases, the CAR covering days -1 and
0 is negative (range from -11.99% to 0.33%). Thus, it does
appear that the use of an antitrust block against a takeover
offer is costly to target stockholders. As hypothesized,
because of the sample selection filters, the firms (on average)
do not earn statistically significant abnormal returns on
the days on either side of the actual filing - day -2 has
an average AR of 1.009% (t=1.31) and day O's AR is -0.937%
(t=-1.22).
The announcement of the takeover bid results in signi-
ficant abnormal returns to the target stockholders preceding
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Table 10
Daily abnormal returns (in percent) to the common stock of
19 firms filing antitrust suits against bidders attempting
to take control of the target via a tender offer during
the period 1975-1983. The antitrust suits were filed on
event date (day t=-1).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Cumulative Cumulative
Abnormal
returna
0.312
-0.454
-0.019
0.316
0.491
2.268**
-0.396
1.416
0.833
1.872**
-0.350
1.052
4.898**
2.228**
0.612
1 .574**
1 .054
4.072**
6.710**
-0.052
1.009
-3.142**
-0.937
abnormal Event
return day
+1
+2
+3
+4
+5
+6
+7
+8
+9
+10
+11
+12
+13
+14
+15
+16
+17
+18
+19
+20
+30
+60
Abnormal
returna
-0.503
0.915
0.439
-1.416*
-1.956**
1 .285*
1 .530**
0.324
-1.324*
-0.389
0.826
-0.931
-0.440
-0.739
-0.509
-0.182
0.312
0.930
-0.620
-0.084
0.268
0.226
abnormal
return
21.910
22.825
23.264
21.848
19.892
21.177
22.707
23.031
21.707
21.318
22.144
21.213
20.773
20.034
19.525
19.343
19.655
20.585
19.965
19.881
13.342
16.078
a**(*) indicates that the average of the standardized
residuals is significantly different from zero at the 5%
(10%) level of significance using a two-tailed test.
Event
day
-60
-30
-20
-19
-18
-17
-16
-15
-14
-13
-12
-11
-10
-9
-8
-7
-6
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
0.312
-6.357
-3.115
-2.799
-2.308
-0.040
-0.436
0.980
1.813
3.685
3.335
4.387
9.285
11.513
12.125
13.699
14.753
18.825
25.535
25.483
26.492
23.350
22.413
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Table 11
Cumulative abnormal returns over various periods around
the date of the target filing an antitrust suit (t=-1) against
its hostile bidder as a defensive tactic for a sample of
19 firms from the period 1975-1983.
-------------------------------------------------
Perioda
---------- Number of Cumulative
Start End days in abnormal T-statistic
date date period return (CAR) of CAR
~---- --------------------------- ~--------- ~------------
-60 -21 40 -3.10% -0.74
-20 -11 10 7.48% 3.55
-10 -2 9 22.11% 9.90
-1 -1 1 -3.14% -4.29
0 0 1 -0.94% -1.28
-1 0 2 -4.08% -4.14
1 10 10 -1.09% -0.52
11 20 10 -1.44% -0.68
1 20 20 -2.53% -0.85
------ ~------------------------------ ~--------- ----------
aThe cumulative abnormal returns are the abnormal
returns beginning on the "start date" up through and includ-
ing the "end date." Periods with the same start and end
dates are the abnormal returns (AR) on that date.
the use of the antitrust defensive tactic. During the nine
days preceding the actual filing of the lawsuit (days -10
through -2) which includes the announcement of the takeover
bid, the target stockholders earned a CAR of 22.11% (t=9.90).
The ten-day period preceding this offer period (days -20
through -11) also have a statistically significant AR of
7.48% (t=3.55), indicating that "news" of the imminent take-
over attempt leaked to the market. But during the period
preceding this takeover offer period (days -60 through -21)
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and the period immediately following the filing of the anti-
trust (days 1 through 20), the target firms appear to have
(on average) earned normal, expected returns (i.e. the CAR's
over these periods are not statistically significant).
From a high of 26.492% on the day just preceding the use
of the antitrust tactic (day -2), the CAR of the sample
of 19 firms falls to a low of 12.708% (day 27) during the
60 days following the announcement of the antitrust suit. 13
Thus, the antitrust defensive tactic does incur significant
wealth losses for target stockholders, but it does not elim-
inate the entire abnormal return earned by the stockholders
due to the takeover attempt.
6.5 "Poison Pill" Preferred Stock Issuance
The remaining two categories of defensive tactics
to be examined empirically in this thesis - "poison pill"
preferred stock issuance and "double pac-man" counter tender
offers - will employ an event-study type of methodology.
But because only a few firms have attempted either of these
two types of defensive tactics (no more than five in either
case), the sample sizes are not large enough to perform
the types of statistical tests used in the previous three
13 In many of the cases in the sample, the uncertainty
about the outcome of the antitrust suit and the takeover
attempt was not resolved during the 60 days following the
filing of the antitrust suit.
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event studies. Furthermore, in the case of all of the target
firms using these two defensive measures, there are too
many confounding events occurring on the same day or on
the days just before the action to determine the specific
impact from the one particular tactic. When confounding
events occur concurrent with the "event" under study, the
event study methodology quickly loses its explanatory power.
Therefore, similar to the difference between a civil trial
and a criminal trail, any verdict as to the impact of these
defensive tactics drawn from the presented evidence will
depend upon a "preponderance of evidence" rather than "beyond
a shadow of doubt."
6.5.1 Data Sources and Sample Construction
"Poison pill" preferred stock has only been used
as an antitakeover defensive tactic three times by target
companies:
1) El Paso Company against Burlington Northern (December
1982). Takeover was successful; both preferred and
related litigation was dropped.
2) Lenox, Inc. against Brown-Forman Distillers (June
1983). Takeover was successful; both preferred and
related litigation was dropped.
3) Bell & Howell against National Education Corporation
(July 1983). Litigation on Bell & Howell's preferred
distribution is still pending.
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In each of the three cases, the new preferred issue was
challenged in court, but the legality of this defensive
tactic has yet to be determined.
During the last four proxy seasons, 37 companies 14
have proposed the establishment of a special class of "blank
check" preferred stock, presumably to be held in reserve
for use as a defensive "poison pill." One particular attempt
to create such a class of "blank check" preferred carried
heavy coverage in the press and had a significant impact
on the firm's stock. In November 1983, Superior Oil declared
a special dividend on its common stock that would issue
0.9 of a share of new convertible preferred for each common
share. If a third party were to acquire more than 35% of
Superior's voting stock, holders of the preferred could
demand redemption at the highest price paid by such third
party during the year in which it acquired its 35% interest.
With institutions holding about 35% of Superior's stock,
many stockholders thought that this new preferred dividend
would make the company much less attractive as a takeover
candidate, 1 5 and they spoke out quite vocally against the
new issue. As one bank portfolio manager with more than
a million Superior shares said: "The whole idea of the
14These 37 companies include OTC-listed firms in addition
to the 19 firms establishing such preferred stock included
in the antitakeover charter amendment sample (see section
6
"
2
.1)'15Superior Oil had been considered a takeover candidate
for some time. Previous charter amendmets impeding such
a takeover were changed in the spring of 1983.
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preferred is ludicrous and totally in management's self
interest." Bowing to this pressure and the pressure of
several lawsuits, Superior's management rescinded the new
issue. The evidence below examines the impact on Superior's
stock price.
Thus, this limited sample makes it more difficult
to determine an "average" stock price impact of using "poison
pill" preferred as a defensive tactic. The small number
of companies in this sample prevents the "law of large numbers"
from filtering out the "noise" in this event study. Conse-
quently, the empirical analysis will look at two samples
individually:
1) An event study on the 15 firms that proposed the
creation of a special class of "blank check" preferred
to stockholders in the firm's proxy statement during
the period 1979-1983. Of the 19 firm's proposing
such an amendment form the antitakeover charter amend-
ment sample, these 15 firms had no other antitakeover
amendments (i.e. this proposal was the only antitakeover
provision on the ballot).
2) The abnormal returns earned by the stockholders of
El Paso, Lenox and Superior Oil when the "poison
pill" defensive tactic was attempted will be measured
individually. Bell & Howell was left out of this
sample because there were too many confounding events
on the same day.
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Although these tests are not as powerful as an event study
when the sample size is large, hopefully these two tests
will provide a "preponderance of evidence" showing the impact
of the preferred stock defensive tactic.
6.5.2 Specifics of the Event Study
The 15-firm event study on the "blank check" preferred
charter amendments used the proxy mailing date as the event
day 0. Because the sample size in this event study is rela-
tively small, one would expect that more variance will exist
in the average abnormal returns for each day and that the
t-statistics would be (everything else being equal) less
significant. This in turn would lead to more variation
in the average cumulative abnormal returns over various
periods.
The abnormal returns calculated individually for
the three-company sample employed the same market model
type of methodology as used in the event studies. The beta
coefficient in the market model for each firm was regressed
over 200 days of returns during a period preceding the use
of the "poison pill" preferred.
6.5.3 Results and Comments
Tables 12 and 13 report the abnormal returns and
the cumulative abnormal returns for the 15 firms proposing
the creation of "blank check" preferred to stockholders
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Table 12
Daily abnormal returns (in percent) to the common stock of
15 firms proposing the creation of a special class of "blank
check" preferred stock in the firms' proxy statement sent
out to target stockholders during the period 1979-1980. Al-
though the proxy statement does not explicitly claim that
the new preferred will be used as a defensive weapon, the
creation of such a class of stock implies that the management
intends to use this "poison pill." The proxy mailing date
is day t=O.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Cumulative Cumulative
Event Abnormal abnormal Event Abnormal abnormal
day returna return day returna return
-60 0.488 0.488 +1 0.054 -5.133
-30 0.964 0.610 +2 0.739 -4.394
-20 -0.032 -0.351 +3 0.738 -3.656
-19 -1.140 -1.491 +4 0.451 -3.205
-18 0.334 -1.157 +5 -0.074 -3.279
-17 0.449 -0.748 +6 -0.137 -3.416
-16 0.887 0.139 +7 1.490** -1.926
-15 -0.779 -0.640 +8 0.345 -1.581
-14 -0.645 -1.285 +9 0.281 -1.300
-13 0.367 -0.918 +10 0.505 -0.795
-12 0.860 -0.058 +11 -0.138 -0.933
-11 0.170 0.112 +12 -0.104 -1.037
-10 0.239 0.351 +13 0.677 -0.360
-9 0.627 0.978 +14 1.197* 0.837
-8 -0.010 0.968 +15 -0.330 0.507
-7 -2.287** -1.319 +16 -0.372 0.135
-6 -1.617** -2.936 +17 -0.161 -0.026
-5 0.073 -2.863 +18 0.149 0.123
-4 0.155 -2.708 +19 0.389 0.512
-3 -0.387 -3.095 +20 0.480 0.992
-2 -0.575 -3.670 +30 -0.335 3.271
-1 -0.213 -3.883 +60 1.101 10.056
0 -1.304* -5.187
a**(*) indicates that the average of the standardized
residuals is significantly different from zero at the 5%
(10%) level of significance using a two-tailed test.
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Table 13
Cumulative abnormal returns over various periods around
the mailing date of proxy statements of 15 firms proposing
to establish "blank check" preferred stock to be held in
reserve for defensive purposes during the period 1979-1980.
Perioda
------------ Number of Cumulative
Start End days in abnormal T-statistic
date date period return (CAR) of CAR
-60 -21 40 -0.32% -0.06
-20 -11 10 0.43% 0.16
-10 -1 10 -3.99% -1.47
-1 -1 1 -0.22% -0.29
0 0 1 -1.30% -1.93
-1 0 2 -1.52% -1.39
1 10 10 4.39% 1.61
11 20 10 1.79% 0.66
1 20 20 6.18% 1.59
aThe cumulative abnormal returns are the abnormal
returns beginning on the "start date" up through and includ-
ing the "end date." Periods with the same start and end
dates are the abnormal returns (AR) on that date.
on the firm's proxy statement for vote at the annual meeting.
The time-series representation of these results are shown
graphically in figure 6. The abnormal return for the day
the proxy statements are mailed (day 0) is -1.304%. The
t-statistic for this AR is -1.93 which just misses the cut-
off for statistical significance at the 5% level, but is
significant at the 10% level. None of the days immediately
surrounding the event day appear to have statistically signif-
icant abnormal returns. But notice that the AR's are generally
larger in magnitude (in absolute value) than the AR's from
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the previous event studies. Furthermore, only one of the
15 firms in the sample had a positive two-day CAR for days
-1 and 0 (range of -4.178% to 1.978%). Two statistically-
significant AR's appear on days -7 and -6 which could be
due to a number of different factors: leak of information
about the "blank check" preferred proxy statement, another
significant unexpected event for one of the companies, or
just random noise. These two negative abnormal returns
account for the negative (but not statistically significant)
CAR during the ten-day period just preceding day 0: CAR
for day -10 through -1 is -3.99% (t=-1.47).
None of the other periods before or after the event
day 0 show statistically significant CAR's. Although not
conclusive because of the small sample size and because
of the marginal statistical significance, this evidence
does lend credence to the hypothesis that the creation of
"blank check" preferred held in reserve to be used as a
"poison pill" defensive weapon is contrary to the best inter-
ests of the target stockholders. The preferred stock makes
takeover attempts more difficult and costly, and simply
reduces the likelihood that target stockholders will receive
a control premium.
Notice that this "blank check" preferred subsample
of the larger antitakeover charter amendment sample leads
one to contrary conclusions about the wealth impacts of
antitakeover amendments. From section 6.2.3, the evidence
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supported the hypothesis that, in general, antitakeover
charter and by-law amendments do benefit target stockholders.
In that event study, the abnormal returns associated with
the mailing of the proxy statements were positive. In this
case, a small subsample of the antitakeover amendment sample,
the abnormal returns associated with the mailing of the
proxies are negative, leading one to conclude that "blank
check" preferred stock and the "poison pill" defensive tactic
are motivated by the managerial entrenchment hypothesis.
Turning to the second test of the "poison pill" defen-
sive tactic, table 14 shows how the stock prices of El Paso,
Lenox, and Superior Oil were affected when such a strategy
was attempted. The stockholders of both El Paso and Lenox
earned substantial abnormal returns when their bidders first
announced their intentions to commence with tender offers,
30.84% and 45.58%, respectively. But both groups of stock-
holders were hurt by the incumbent managements' proposal
to block the takeover with "poison pill" preferred stock.
El Paso stockholders earned a negative AR of -6.16% on the
day the "poison pill" was announced. Brown-Forman filed
a lawsuit challenging the legality of Lenox's preferred
on the same day Lenox declared the preferred dividend.
Lenox stockholders were hurt by -1.77% on that day. Five
days later, the federal judge considering the case allowed
Lenox's management to proceed with the "poison pill" defensive
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Table 14
Four firms tried to use "poison pill" preferred stock in
1983. None of the four were carried out to completion,
but each had a significant impact on the stock price of
the target. Three of the four are listed in this table
(the fourth, Bell & Howell had too many other events occur-
ring on the same day to successfully isolate an abnormal
return.
Abnormal
Abnormal return on
return on "poison pill"
Target: Issuer tender offer preferred stock
of preferred stock announcement announcement
El Paso Company/ 30.84% -6.16%
Burlington Northern
Lenox, Inc./ 45.58% -1.77% a
Brown-Forman Dist. -3.96% b
Abnormal Abnormal
return on return on
announcement announcement
Target: Issuer of plan to rescinding plan
of preferred stock issue preferred to issue pref'd
Superior Oil Company -4.89% 5.23%
aLenox announced its intention to issue the "poison
pill" preferred stock on this day (June 15, 1983). Brown-
Forman responded immediately by challenging the new preferred
in federal court.
The federal judge allows Lenox to proceed with its
"poison pill" defense against Brown-Forman on this day (June
20, 1983).
tactic against Brown-Forman. Lenox stockholders suffered
again by -3.96% when the judge made his ruling.
The case of Superior Oil's attempt to create its
own "poison pill" preferred is particularly illuminating
171
because the company was not under the attack of a control
bid at the time. On the day Superior Oil's management an-
nounced its plan to issue the preferred, Superior's stock
had a negative abnormal return of -4.89%. Two weeks later,
under pressure from its stockholders, the management rescinded
its plan to issue the preferred stock. Superior stockholders
benefited from this announcement by earning an AR of 5.23%.
None of the days during that intervening two-week period
showed any statistically significant abnormal returns.
It is interesting to note that the two abnormal returns
associated with first the proposal and then its cancellation
nearly exactly cancel each other out, leaving the stockholders
no better nor no worse off than they were before the "poison
pill" preferred was ever presented.
Although the evidence from the event study and the
three-company sample is not overwhelmingly conclusive, the
results do lead one to believe that "blank check" and "poison
pill" preferred stock used as a defensive tactic against
takeover attempts is detrimental to target stockholder wealth.
Further data is needed to draw more persuasive conclusions.
It could be that the courts will make this defensive tactic
illegal before we get anymore "poison pill" data.
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6.6 "Double Pac-Man" Counter Tender Offers
6.5.1 Data Sources and Sample Construction
As in the previous event study, only a very limited
number of target companies have attempted the "double pac-
man" defensive strategy of repelling a tender offer by res-
ponding with a counter tender offer for the bidder. This
"biting back" sometimes presents some awkward situations
in that the counter tender offer involves a company attempting
to purchase another company five times larger in market
value. The "double pac-man" defensive strategy has been
used in the following five takeover battles (the initial
target using the tactic is listed first):
1) Kennecott Copper/Curtiss-Wright. Curtiss-Wright,
although significantly smaller, held a 14.3% block
in Kennecott after waging a bitter proxy fight against
the Kennecott management. The two firms entered
into a three-year agreement preventing Curtiss-Wright
from gaining further control. Anticipating the end
of this agreement, Kennecott responded with a counter
tender offer for Curtiss-Wright. Two months after
the announcement of the counter tender offer, the
two firms settled their differences, exchanged their
positions in each other, and entered a new ten-year
standstill agreement.
2) Heublin, Inc./General Cinema Corporation. General
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Cinema first bought a 9.7% position in Heublin and
announced its intention of increasing its ownership
to 15%. Heublin first responded by filing a lawsuit
against General Cinema's stock purchase. After that
failed, Heublin purchased a position in General Cinema
and filed its intention with the SEC to purchase
up to 25% of General Cinema. As a "white knight,"
R.J. Reynolds came to Heublin's rescue by buying
the firm and preventing General Cinema from obtaining
control (although General Cinema did reap a hefty
capital gain on the transaction).
3) NLT Corp./American General Corp. American General
opened the bidding with a $1.1 billion stock-swap
offer for NLT Corp. After studying the offer, the
NLT board rejected the offer and counter tendered
for its unwelcome suitor. After a prolonged battle,
NLT agreed to merge into American General for $1.6
billion.
4) Mesa Petroleum/Cities Service. This takeover struggle
was one of the more contested and complicated in
takeover history. Cities Service opened by tendering
for 51% of Mesa; to which Mesa responded seven days
later with its own tender offer for 15% of Cities
Service. Mesa could only go for a relatively small
chunk of Cities Service because it was several orders
of magnitude smaller than Cities. After many rounds
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of bidding and counter-bidding and after several
other players entered the battle, Occidental Petroleum
acquired Cities Service, and (once again) Mesa Petroleum
remained independent.
5) Martin Marietta/Bendix. This is the classic and
most violent case of the "double pac-man" strategy.
The two firms locked horns for several months by
tendering for each other and by filing suits and
counter-suits against each other. In the end, Allied
Corporation bought Bendix and Martin Marietta remained
independent, but not until after great costs to Martin
Marietta stockholders. For a period of time it looked
as if the incumbent management of each company would
totally destroy their company rather than be acquired
by the other - the "scorched earth" defense. The
complex, high-stakes battle kept not only the financial
community, but the whole country captivated for several
months.
Each of these hostile takeover battles took place during
1982, except for Kennecott/Curtiss-Wright which occurred
over the Christmas holidays of 1980.
6.6.2 Specifics of the Event Study
The abnormal return on the day of announcement of
the "double pac-man" counter tender offer for each of the
five targets will be measured. Unfortunately, I do not
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anticipate that this will lead to profound conclusions as
to the impact on the wealth of target stockholders. First,
the sample is quite small. Second, there are so many concur-
rent events taking place at the same time - some positive,
some negative - that any price impact due to the counter
tender offer will be clouded by other events. Finally,
the complexity and speed of events in several of these trans-
actions led to highly erratic stock price behavior, and
likely impeded the market's ability to efficiently capitalize
the value of each event into the firms' stock price.
6.6.3 Results and Comments
Table 15 reports the abnormal returns earned by the
five target companies for the two days: (1) the day of
announcement of the bidder's takeover offer for the target,
and (2) the day of announcement of the target's "double
pac-man" counter tender offer for the bidder. Each of the
targets earned substantial positive abnormal returns on
the day the bidder made its offer (Curtiss-Wright had not
made a tender offer for Kennecott, but rather had previously
attempted a proxy fight). This AR averaged 18.849% for
the four firms receiving a direct takeover offer (this AR
is just the single-day AR for the day of announcement).
On the other hand, four of the five targets earned negative
abnormal returns when they announced their "double pac-man"
counter tender offer. For the five firms on this day, the
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Table 15
The abnormal returns (in percent) earned by the stockholders
of the five target firms attempting to thwart a hostile
takeover bid by countering with its own "double pac-man"
tender offer for the initial bidder. The abnormal returns
are calculated for two days: (1) the day of the initial
tender offer and (2) the day of the "double pac-man" counter
tender offer.
Abnormal
Abnormal return on the
Target (User of return on the day of target's
pac-man tactic)/ day of bidder's pac-man counter
Initial bidder tender offer tender offer
Kennecott Copper/
Curtiss-Wright -2.404%
Heublin, Inc./
General Cinema 2 1 .10 1%a -2.363%
NLT Corp./
American General 21.255% -2.345% b
Mesa Petroleum/
Cities Service 16.704% 0.628%
Martin Marietta/
Bendix 16 .335%c -4.184%
aGeneral Cinema had purchased a 9.7% stake in Heublin
in the open market. This is the CAR over the 13 days prior
to making an announcement about its purchase of Heublin
stock. bThe day following the announcement of NLT's counter
tender offer NLT earned another negative AR of -4.675%.
The two-day CAR associated with the announcement was -7.020%.
CMartin Marietta earned AR's of 8.899% and 6.728%
on the day just prior to and the day just following this
date. The three-day CAR associated with Bendix's tender
offer was 31.962%.
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abnormal return averaged -2.134%. Mesa Petroleum was the
only firm which earned a positive AR on the day of announce-
ment of its "double pac-man" counter tender offer (0.628%).16
The Martin Marietta negative AR on the day of announce-
ment of its counter tender offer for Bendix may be somewhat
underestimated as well. The NYSE had suspended trading
in Martin Marietta stock the morning of the announcement
(before the news was released). The AR calculation was
based on the closing price of the next day when the stock
resumed trading. On that day (the resumption of trading
in Martin Marietta), the stock opened $6 lower than the
closing the day before the NYSE had halted trading; but
by the close, Marietta's price had rebounded significantly
so that the AR was -4.184%. If the AR had been measured
from the stock's opening price (rather than its closing
price) on the day it resumed trading, the AR associated
with the announcement of Marietta's "double pac-man" defense
would have been -16.379%.
One could imagine several different explanations
as to why the "double pac-man" defensive tactic generates
16These abnormal returns for Mesa Petroleum are very
close to what Ruback (1983) found in his careful study of
the Cities Servie takeover. Although Ruback uses this hypoth-
esis to explain Cities Service's negative AR on this day,
it is equally applicable to Mesa (but in reverse). Ruback
suggests that the market had anticipated a Mesa counter
tender offer, but that the price and percent Mesa tendered
for was less than expected. This could explain the market's
positive reaction to Mesa's otherwise negative "double pac-
man" counter tender offer.
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a negative abnormal return for the target. Is the abnormal
return negative because the counter tender offer may prevent
the target stockholders from receiving a control premium?
Or is the negative abnormal return simply indicating that
the investment in the bidding firm at the tender price is
a negative net present value investment? For the target
stockholders, the correct answer is academic. Regardless
of what the actual explanation is, either one suggests that
the incumbent target management is acting out of their own
self interest and not in the best interests of the target
stockholders. It could be that in in their haste to do
anything to remain independent, the target management does
not thoroughly evaluate the economics of making a bid for
the other company.
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Chapter 7. Summary of Empirical Results and Conclusions
Except for the case of antitakeover charter amendments,
target managers are often compelled to employ antitakeover
defensive tactics under the severe pressure - in terms of
both time and emotions - of a hostile takeover battle.
Many incumbent managements have, in advance, considered
what actions they will take in the event of a hostile takeover
bid. These companies often keep an investment banking firm
on retainer to provide advice from time to time and to assist
in the defense against any "raiders." Other firms spend
little time worrying about takeover defense, because they
are too busy running their businesses, certain that no one
will make a stab at them, or intend not to take any actions
to block the takeover attempt. But when faced with a takeover
situation, these managers are then forced to make hasty,
often emotional decisions which present sharp conflicts
between their own employment interests and the interests
of their stockholders.
Whether the target managers explicitly plan their
defensive maneuvers prior to any takeover bid or work out
their tactics in the heat of the takeover battle, the incumbent
managers usually consider the ramifications of their defensive
measures in very qualitative terms. When making presentations
to their clients, investment bankers also discuss the relative
merits of the various defensive strategies in broad, qualita-
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tive terms. The target manager's or investment banker's
usual point-of-view is focussed on what effect the defensive
action will have on the bidder and not on the impact the
tactics will have on the target stockholders' wealth.
The goal of this thesis has been to not only discuss
target managers' motivations for using defensive tactics
and the various defensive measures open to targets, but
more importantly to determine the quantitative effects of
defensive tactics on the wealth of target stockholders.
Although the economics are different in every takeover situa-
tion, target managers and investment bankers can use this
quantitative information, in addition to the qualitative
reasons, in making a decision on how to handle an unsolicited
takeover bid. Hopefully, this will shift the focus from
how to defeat the bidder and remain independent to how to
maximize the wealth of the firm's stockholders. These two
points of view do not have to be mutually exclusive, but
rather, the quantitative information about the wealth impacts
of defensive tactics can help managers make more rational
decisions.
Table 16 summarizes the quantitative empirical results
of this thesis from the event studies performed on samples
of target companies using various antitakeover defensive
tactics. This chapter compares these results with those
of other studies (presented in Chapter Five), and based
on this evidence, draws some generalizations about the effects
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Table 16
Summary of the empirical results derived from the event
studies on the following defensive tactics: (1) antitakeover
charter amendments (1979-1983), (2) negotiated stock repur-
chases and standstill agreements (1980-1983), (3) antitrust
blocking litigation (1975-1983), (4) "poison pill" preferred
stock issuance (1979-1983), and (5) "double pac-man" counter
tender offers (1980-1983). Cumulative abnormal returns
surrounding the event (day 0). T-statistics are given in
parentheses.
Cumulative Cumulative Cumulative
abnormal abnormal abnormal
Antitakeover return for return for return for
defensive tactic days -10,0 days -1,0 days 1,20
Charter and by-law
amendments
-0.27%
(-0.40)
-0.18%
(-0.63)
2.76%
(3.02)
Stock repurchases:
a) Entire sample
b) Merger-termina-
tion sample
c) Standstill
agreement sample
Antitrust litigation
Preferred stock:
a) "Blank check" pfd.
charter amendments
b) Use as a "poison
pill"
-3.89%
(-4.53)
-6.61%
(-5.01)
-8.97%
(-5.97)
22.11%a
(9.90)
-5.30%
(-1.91)
-3.74%
(-10.32)
-5.79%
(-10.72)
-7.93%
(-11.72)
-4.08%
(-4.14)
-1.30% b
(-1 .93)
"Double pac-man" counter
tender offers -2.13%
aThis CAR covers days -10 through 
-2.bThis is the AR for day 0 only.
-3.40%
(-2.94)
-2.20%
(-1 .23)
-0.93%
(-0.44)
-2.53%
(-0.85)
6.18%
(1.59)
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of defensive tactics. Chapter Eight will conclude the thesis
with a discussion of the alternative policies which target
managers could follow with respect to defensive tactics
and takeover bids in general.
7.1 Antitakeover Charter Amendments
Antitakeover charter and by-law amendments may be
the one defensive measure available to target managers which
actually enhances the wealth of the target stockholders,
or at least does not make stockholders worse off. Table
17 compares the empirical results of Linn & McConnell (1983)
and DeAngelo & Rice (1983) with those derived from the event
study on antitakeover charter and by-law amendments in this
thesis. As discussed in section 6.2.3, the event studies
do not appear to pick up any statistically significant single-
day abnormal returns associated with the announcement of
the antitakeover charter proposals. Whether one uses the
proxy mailing date (as all three studies tried) or the day
on which the board passed the resolution placing the proposals
on the proxy statement (Linn & McConnell also tried this)
as the "event" day, the event studies report a normal expected
return for the target firm's stock on the day of announcement.
This could be because target companies release the information
about the antitakeover amendment proposals to the market
at different points in time. If that is the case, the event
study is not powerful enough to pick up any statistically
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Table 17
Comparison of the empirical results of the event study on
antitakeover charter and by-law amendments done in this
thesis with those results found in the studies done by Linn
& McConnell (1983) and DeAngelo & Rice (1983).
Number of
Abnormal
return
generated by
Author (date of proxies Period antitakeover
publication) in sample covered amendments
Duff (1984)
a) Proxy mailing
b) 20 days after
proxy mailing
Linn & McConnell (1983)
a) Board meeting
- on that day
- for 90 days
following
b) Proxy mailing
- on that day
- for 90 days
following
DeAngelo & Rice (1983)
a) Proxy mailing
b) 40 days after
proxy mailing
159
159
172
388
100
100
1979-1983
1979-1983
1960-1980
1960-1980
1974-1979
1974-1979
-0.18%
(-0.63)
2.76%
(3.02)
0.22%
(1.43)
2.58%
(3.11)
-0.02%
(-0.01)
0.90%
(2.19)
-0.13%
(-0.24)
2.04%
(1.08)
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significant average abnormal returns for individual days.
The absence of statistically significant abnormal returns
on the day of "announcement" of the antitakeover proposals
could also be explained by the null hypothesis - antitakeover
charter amendments have no impact on the wealth of target
stockholders.
On the other hand, my event study and both studies
done by Linn & McConnell find that target stockholders earn
statistically significant positive abnormal returns over
the period just following the "event" day. If one accepts
the hypothesis that the news about antitakeover amendments
is released to the market at different times for different
companies, then one would expect to detect the abnormal
return (if any) associated with the antitakeover amendment
not on the "event" day, but rather in the cumulative abnormal
return over a period of time. Based on this evidence and
reasoning, one could conclude that target stockholders do,
in fact, benefit from antitakeover "shark repellent" provi-
sions, and that the stockholder interests hypothesis explains
the motivations behind target managers' use of these provi-
sions.1  This may also explain why target stockholders so
readily approve antitakeover charter and by-law amendments.
This evidence could lead one to the conclusion that
antitakeover provisions in a target's charter discourage
1The analysis of Grossman & Hart (1980b) and Jarrell
& Bradley (1980) also supports this conclusion.
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frivolous bidders from attempting takeover bids, and thus,
ensure that if a takeover bid is to be made for the target,
it will be made by the bidder which can most fully maximize
the value of the combined entity. If antitakeover charter
provisions function in this manner, then target stockholders
are less likely to bear the (real) costs of the incumbent
managers' defensive fight against the bidder when the takeover
bid does not serve the best interests of the stockholders.
Frivolous bidders will find that the costs of the takeover
fight are also too high.
The defensive charter provisions cause a different
slicing between bidder and target of the future "synergy"
gains created by combining the two entities. Although bidders
are unlikely to bid more for the target than the combined
value of the target and the synergy gains, the antitakeover
provisions may force the bidder to give up a larger percentage
of those synergy gains to the target than it would otherwise
have had to do. According to Grossman & Hart (1980b), anti-
takeover charter amendments accomplish this by minimizing
the "free-rider" problem giving target stockholders more
incentive to communally hold out for a higher price.
In summary, antitakeover charter and by-law amendments
can (on average) enhance target stockholder wealth by several
percent. These defensive provisions help to raise takeover
premiums and reduce the likelihood that stockholders will
have to bear the costs created when incumbent managers find
186
it in their own interests to use corporate resources to
oppose takeover bids. Particularly in the last several
proxy seasons, astute institutional investors have begun
to make more selective votes for and against different anti-
takeover amendments. This helps to separate the beneficial
amendments from those, such as "blank check" preferred stock,
which reduce stockholder wealth.
7.2 Standstill Agreements and Negotiated Stock Repurchases
Standstill agreements and negotiated stock repurchases
are transactions which (1) reduce competition for control
over the firm's resources and which (2) provide preferential
treatment for large block stockholders. Target managers
use the premium block repurchases and standstill agreements
to reduce the threat to their control over the firm. In
a sense, they use the repurchase premium to "bribe" the
selling blockholder into giving up his interest in the firm
and preventing him from proceeding with a profitable takeover
of the firm. As a result, the target managers are able
to pursue an operating strategy that is more in line with
their own interests and less in line with those of their
stockholders. In this case, the managerial entrenchment
hypothesis best explains the motivations of the target manag-
ers' use of these defensive tactics.
Table 18 reports the evidence found in the event
study in this thesis and those done by Dann & DeAngelo (1983)
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Table 18
Comparison of the empirical results of the event study of
negotiated stock repurchases and standstill agreements in
this thesis against the results found in the studies done
by Dann & DeAngelo (1983) and Bradley & Wakeman (1983).
Author (date of
publication)
Number of
firms in
sample
Period
covered
Abnormal
return
generated by
the stock
repurchase
Duff (1984)
a) Total sample
b) Merger-termina-
tion sample
c) Standstill
agreement sample
Dann & DeAngelo (1983)
a) Repurchase with-
out standstill
b) Repurchase with
standstill
c) Standstill agree-
ment with no
stock repurchase
Bradley & Wakeman (1983)
a) Total sample of
repurchases
b) Repurchases with-
out merger term.
77
44
27
1980-1983
1980-1983
1980-1983
1977-1980
1977-1980
1977-1980
1974-1980
1974-1980
-3.74%
(-10.32)
-5.79%
(-10.72)
-7.93%(-11.72)
-1.16%(-2.15)
-4.52%
(-5.72)
-4.04%
(-4.49)
-2.85%
(-5.82)
-1.40%
(-1.97)
c) Repurchases with 21 1974-1980 -5.50%
merger termination (-7.14)
--------------------------------------------
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and Bradley & Wakeman (1983) which demonstrate the magnitude
of the target stockholders wealth loss. All three studies
report statistically significant drops in the target's stock
price on the announcement of the block repurchase and/or
standstill agreement. The greater the premium paid or the
more restrictive the agreement, the greater the wealth loss
to the remaining stockholders. Targeted repurchases are
more costly to non-participating stockholders when they
are used to thwart takeover attempts. Standstill agreements
which prevent the potential bidder from making another takeover
run at the firm appear to be particularly costly to stock-
holders.
Whether measuring the price impact of those repurchases
terminating a merger, those which include a standstill agree-
ment, or stock repurchases in general, my event study reports
larger wealth losses than the studies by Dann & DeAngelo
and Bradley & Wakeman. The repurchases and standstills
in my sample were taken from 1980-1983, whereas those in
the other two studies were from the mid-1970s. Conceivably,
target managers are having to pay larger premiums to get
rid of dissident blockholders than in the past; and therefore,
target stockholders are suffering more from these defensive
actions than in the past.
As formulated by Jensen & Meckling (1976), the theory
of agency implies that managers repurchase a single block
of common stock to reduce the probability of losing control
189
of the firm's resources. The target stockholders approve
such repurchases and standstill agreements because it is
more costly for them to monitor and contract with management
to prevent the inherent owner-manager conflicts of interest
than it is to bear the wealth losses from such defensive
actions. But when the drop in the target's stock price
approaches the 5-8% level (or greater), many stockholders
find it in their interests to file lawsuits against the
incumbent management. Traditionally, the courts have dismissed
these stockholder suits by falling back onto the "business
judgement" rule, which keeps the judicial system out of
corporate management except in the most extreme situations.
Based on the evidence of these event studies, the judges
ruling in these cases may want to reconsider their decisions.
7.3 The Costs of Antitrust Defensive Actions
It seems clear from the evidence reported in table
19 that using antitrust litigation to block an unsolicited
takeover bid is detrimental to the welfare of the target
stockholders. The antitrust defensive tactic is often a
"show-stopper" halting the takeover attempt dead in its
tracks. In this respect, the litigation prevents target
stockholders from earning the substantial abnormal returns
generated by the takeover bid. Regardless as to whether
or not the proposed combination actually does violate the
antitrust laws, target managers should not initiate the
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Table 19
Comparison of the empirical results of the event study on
antitrust blocking litigation in thesis with those studies
done on antimerger lawsuits by Wier (1983) and Eckbo (1983).
------------------------------------------------------
Abnormal
return
Number of generated by
Author (date of firms in Period the target's
publication) sample covered antitrust suit
Duff (1984) 19 1975-1983 -4.08%
(-4.14)
Wier (1983)'
a) Convicted firms 24 1962-1979 -2.62%
(-3.97)
b) Dismissed firms 24 1962-1979 -1.53%
(-1.77)
c) Firms that 63 1962-1979 -2.96%
settle suits (-6.56)
Eckbo (1983) 17 1963-1978 -4.63%
(-7.20)
antitrust suit nor should they encourage the FTC or the
Department of Justice to do so. If the government antitrust
regulators file an antimerger suit during the takeover process
or after the combination has been completed, the bidder
bears the costs of defending against the antitrust claims.
If the suit is filed after the takeover transaction has
taken place, the target stockholders will have already received
their large takeover premium and the legal costs of the
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antitrust litigation will fall disproportionately onto the
bidder's stockholders.
If the incumbent management earnestly believes (because
of inside information) that the target firm is truly worth
more than what the bidder is offering, other defensive tactics
exist which are less costly to stockholders that will allow
the management to repel the bidder or to buy time to search
for a "white knight." If the managers intend to seek out
a "white knight" willing to outbid the hostile suitor, filing
an antitrust suit against the initial bidder will likely
raise the same antitrust questions about the friendly "white
knight." Thus, the antitrust defensive tactic may not only
block a marginally profitable combination, but it may also
prevent a friendly, more profitable merger later. The anti-
trust litigation tactic prevents stockholders from receiving
an immediate takeover premium, incurs direct legal expenses,
and imposes the indirect cost of possibly giving up a future
profitable merger. Except for some of the scorched earth
defensive tactics which explicitly decrease the attractiveness
of the target firm, no other defensive tactic has a greater
long-term cost to the target stockholders than the antitrust
blocking lawsuit.
Other types of litigation used as a target defensive
tactic may not be quite so harmful to stockholders, particu-
larly if the litigation is merely a time delay and not a
"show-stopper." Defensive litigation which falls into this
192
category includes lawsuits claiming improper or incomplete
disclosure by the bidder, or charges that the bidder has
violated the federal and/or state takeover laws by not fol-
lowing the proper, timed sequence of events. After all,
these takeover regulations were designed to even the balance
of negotiating power between the two parties. Blocking
or delaying a takeover bid by these means may give target
stockholders more time to evaluate the offer, or it may
provide the opportunity for management and its investment
bankers to seek out another bidder willing to pay a greater
control premium. If the lawsuit does not drive the bidder
away or does not impede other bidders from attempting takeover
bids, then the defensive litigation has the effect of raising
takeover premiums and grants target stockholders a larger
slice of the synergy gains.
Whether or not the market interprets these blocking
litigation tactics favorably or unfavorably depends upon
whether investors trust the intentions of the managers.
Managers build up the trust and confidence of stockholders
over time. In this respect, an effective investor relations
program can be a powerful defensive tactic (note the McGraw-
Hill/American Express battle mentioned earlier). If managers
have performed reasonably well in the past and have not
consumed an unusually large amount of perquisites, chances
are that target stockholders will go along with the managers'
defensive program. But everything has its price. When
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the takeover premium gets high enough, stockholder loyalty
will not keep the company independent.
7.4 The Impact of Other Defensive Tactics
The studies done by other researchers discussed in
Chapter Five and the five events studies carried out by
this thesis reported in Chapter Six have analyzed the stock
price effects of the major types of antitakeover defensive
tactics. I chose to analyze these particular groups of
target defensive tactics in Chapter Six for several reasons:
(1) the tactics were either prevalently used in takeover
contests or were rather new, but controversial; (2) the
way in which the tactic was used had to be relatively similar
across all companies; (3) the "event" dates on which the
tactic was applied had to be identifiable; and (4) any new
study had to add some new value rather than just replicating
the results of previous studies. These criteria eliminated
several of the defensive tactics outlined in Chapter Four
from my analytic scrutiny. Nonetheless, each of these defen-
sive tactics will be considered briefly in this section.
I did not study the stock price effects of federal,
state and SEC takeover regulation because relatively little
substantive regulation has been legislated since the Hart-
Scott-Rodino Act in 1977, except for some SEC tender offer
rules. In particular, the two studies by Jarrell & Bradley
(1980) and Schipper & Thompson (1983b) provide concrete
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evidence as to the effects of takeover regulation on the
wealth of target stockholders. Their results show that
takeover regulation has raised the level of takeover premiums
increasing the returns to the target stockholders at the
expense of the bidders. Two conclusions could be drawn
from this evidence: (1) takeover regulations actually increase
the bargaining power of targets in takeover contests, or
(2) takeover regulation increases the transactions costs
in control transfers effectively eliminating many less-profit-
able takeovers. Based on their evidence and basic common
sense, one would more readily accept the later conclusion
than the former. Regulation over the market for corporate
control tends to discourage only the most highly profitable
mergers, effectively functioning as a tax on the transfer
of control. Because of the takeover regulation, target
stockholders no longer have the opportunity to receive the
relatively modest takeover premiums from low-value takeovers
which would likely exist absent the regulation.2
On the whole, it does appear that much of the federal
regulation does serve its intended purpose in protecting
small stockholders and evening the relative bargaining posi-
tions between bidder and target. The Williams Act likely
2This reasoning assumes that in control transfers
the target derives the majority of the the synergy gains
from combination rather than the bidder. If the market
for corporate control is competitive, this will in fact
happen. The evidence from tender offers shows that targets
earn substantial abnormal returns and bidders earn just
average, expected returns.
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falls into this category of beneficial regulation. On the
other hand, most of the state takeover statutes go too far
in regulating takeovers and ultimately hurt stockholders
because of the elimination of some potentially profitable
mergers. The state takeover regulations extend the waiting
periods and disclosure requirements too far putting the
bidder at a severe disadvantage. Many bidders, unwilling
to be scared off by lawsuits claiming violations of state
takeover regulations, have challenged the constitutionality
of these state statutes claiming that they violate the Williams
Act. A free and unrestricted takeover market best functions
to allocate resources in our economy, and ensures that managers
minimize the inherent conflicts of interest in the owner-
manager relationship.
A second category of defensive tactics not empirically
analyzed in this thesis is the collection of various "scorched
earth" practices. One finds it difficult to determine a
simple average price impact for these defensive actions
because scorched earth defensive tactics vary a great deal
depending upon the particular characteristics of the bidder
and target. Any study of these tactics will have to be
done on a case-by-case basis. True scorched earth tactics,
which devastate the value of the target, have only been
used in a couple of takeover battles, such as McGraw-Hill/Amer-
ican Express and Bendix/Martin Marietta. Usually the tactic
never actually reaches the point of laying waste to the
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target; both sides back down from the takeover battle realizing
that neither party will benefit. If these scorched earth
tactics were to be fully carried out, the target stockholders
would not only forgo the takeover premium, but they would
be left with a severely crippled company worth much less
than before the takeover situation began. Fortunately,
as in the Seagram-St. Joe court case cited in section 4.4,
the courts are taking a dim view of these scorched earth
tactics and are less willing to stay out of corporate affairs
by applying the business judgement rule.
Many of the third-party acquisition defensive tactics
are mild forms of scorched earth. For example, it has been
claimed that Marshall Field purchased or constructed retail
stores in particular markets to build an antitrust block
against the its possible takeover by some of its rival retail
competitors. On a stand alone basis, such acquisitions
may or may not be sound investment decisions, but when incum-
bent managers undertake these projects solely for the purpose
of remaining independent, the projects likely have negative
net present values. Although it is difficult to evaluate
the takeover ramifications of a target's acquisition when
made outside of the the actual control-transfer period,
one can measure the effects of such defensive purchases
when the acquisition is made in haste during the takeover
process.
On the other hand, the search for a "white knight"
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willing to pay an even greater premium for the target is
obviously a defensive tactic that does enhance target stock-
holder wealth. Not only do stockholders receive a greater
premium for their shares, but the transfer of control is
made on a friendly basis decreasing the costs of integrating
the target into the business of the buyer. One may question
the relative value of target managers using management time
and resources to search for buyers when a takeover bid is
not imminent. But once a takeover bid has been made, target
management's search for a "white knight" is surely in the
best interests of the target stockholders.
Another category of defensive tactics somewhat related
to scorched earth is the disaggregation defense - liquidations
and self-tenders. Again, decisions to proceed with either
of these strategies must be based on standard capital-budgeting
investment rules, including the effects the investment may
have on the outcome of the the takeover bid. Self-tenders
may be motivated by either (1) management's belief that
its stock truly is undervalued and therefore a good investment,
or (2) because the costs of acquiring its own shares at
a premium will so financially cripple the company that the
bidder will back down from its offer. Which of these inten-
tions actually motivates the target managers' defensive
self-tender greatly affects the welfare of the stockholders.
The self-tender and liquidation defensive tactics could
be an area that one could further study with the event study
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methodology.
One of the more effective defensive tactics, but
least harmful to stockholders, is an effective investor
and public relations campaign. Some critics have labelled
Gulf Oil Chairman James Lee a "loser" for having lost control
of the company to Standard Oil of California. Contrarily,
Lee effectively utilized the press and the goodwill he had
developed with investors over the years to maximize the
takeover premium received by the Gulf stockholders due to
the control contest first initiated by T. Boone Pickens'
Gulf Investor Group. The economic fundamentals of the situa-
tion dictated that Gulf was going to be acquired by someone.
Rather than employ the "survive at all costs" type of defensive
tactics, Lee primarily used an effective public relations
campaign to resist Pickens until the optimal bid price was
presented by Standard Oil. This strategy maximized the
wealth of the Gulf stockholders by forcing the premium up
at the same time keeping defense costs low. Lee effectively
squashed the desires of his management associates to present
a more vigorous, but more costly (to stockholders) defense
in order to maintain their high-salaried positions. From
my viewpoint, the fact that Gulf stockholders got a high
price for their shares and avoided a prolonged and expensive
defense demonstrates the effectiveness of investor and public
relations tactics. James Lee provided a genuine service
to Gulf stockholders and employees.
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Chapter 8. Defensive Tactics Policy Alternatives
This final chapter considers the merits of several
possible policy alternatives which target managers could
follow when presented with a takeover bid. Obviously, the
specific actions of incumbent managers will depend upon
the characteristics of the particular takeover situation.
Nonetheless, with the knowledge gained from the empirical
studies on antitakeover defensive tactics, one can better
choose the defensive strategy which optimizes the welfare
of the target stockholders. But stockholders are not the
only party impacted by the transfer of control process.
The target firm's employees, customers, suppliers, and com-
munities in which it conducts business are all greatly affected
by the change in control. Because of the broad public interest
in these takeover situations, state and federal legislatures
enact various laws establishing the public policy towards
the market for corporate control. Two such policy alterna-
tives, which are currently being debated within the financial
community and have been introduced in state legislatures
will be discussed in this chapter:
1) A passivity rule whereby target managers are forbidden
from resisting takeover bids, but rather the managers
function to facilitate the auctioneering process
in order to obtain the highest premium at the lowest
defensive cost.
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2) A requirement that any stockholder controlling some
sizable percentage (e.g. 10, 20 or 30 percent) of
a corporation without the approval of its board must
make a tender offer for the remaining outstanding
shares.
8.1 The Managerial Passivity Rule
Over the last four years, a three-cornered debate
has been waged in various law and economic journals over
the relative merits of antitakeover defensive tactics. 1
Law professors Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel have
proposed a managerial passivity rule whereby target managers
are forbidden from using corporate resources to oppose any
takeover bid. At the opposite extreme, specialist mergers
and acquisitions lawyer, Martin Lipton, has rebutted this
passivity rule arguing that corporations have a right to
remain independent and that corporate officers should pursue
this objective by resisting takeover offers with almost
any available device. Then somewhere between these two
viewpoints, two other law professors, Lucian Bebchuk and
Ronald Gilson, have suggested that target managers should
not sit back idly in the face of a takeover bid, but rather
1This exchange has been particularly vigorous and
has uncovered many of the primary issues concerning the
proper role of target management in responding to takeover
bids. See Easterbrook & Fischel (1981a, 1981b, 1982a, 1982b),
Lipton (1979, 1981), Bebchuk (1982a, 1982b), and Gilson
(1981, 1982b).
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should help facilitate the process of "auctioneering," in
an effort to generate competing bids. The hypotheses put
forward and tested by the empirical studies in this thesis
should shed additional light on this debate over the proper
role of target managers in responding to takeover bids.
The proposed managerial passivity rule mandates that
managers should not actively resist takeover bids and defi-
nitely should not expend real corporate resources defending
against the bid. This rule does not prevent target managers
from expressing their opinion about the possible combination
through a press release to stockholders. Nor does the rule
bar managers from providing information about the combination
to the market or from searching for other bidders, possibly
a white knight, willing to pay an even greater premium.
But almost any other defensive action would be banned, particu-
larly those that expend the target's resources and produce
no gains to investors. Thus, management should not propose
antitakeover charter of by-law amendments, file suits against
the bidder, acquire a competitor of the bidder in order
to create an antitrust obstacle, buy or sell shares to make
the offer more costly, give away potentially valuable options
or corporate information to "white knights," or initiate
any other defensive tactic to defeat the takeover offer.
The rationale for such a passivity rule lies in the
theory of agency costs inherent in the owner-manager relation-
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ship and is based upon the managerial entrenchment hypothesis.2
Anyone who hires an agent - the target managers are the
agents of the stockholders - must find some way to control
the agent's conduct. Because the stockholders of a diversely
held public corporation have little incentive on their own
to monitor the actions of their agents and, thus, the stock-
holders tend to "free-ride" on the monitoring efforts of
others, takeover bids provide the primary means whereby
the market disciplines corporate managers who do not perform
well in their role as agents for the stockholders. A pros-
pective bidder can study potential targets, ascertain which
have excessive agency costs, and then make a bid for one
or more of these firms. Both parties in the transaction
gain: the target stockholders obtain a profit because of
the premium bid, and the bidder earns a fair rate of return
on its investment in the search for targets, its acquisition,
and in making improvements in the management of the target.
This argument maintains that takeovers are beneficial
to both sets of stockholders and to society at large. If
takeover offers produce real gains for both the bidder and
the target, it follows (possibly) that any defensive tactics
designed to block such a takeover causes real losses and
reduces total welfare. If the defensive tactics work to
2 See Chapter Three for a discussion of the agency
problems which arise particularly in the transfer of control
process. These agency problems are the foundation of the
managerial entrenchment hypothesis.
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block the takeover preserving the independence of the target,
the stockholders are unambiguously worse off for having
not received the takeover premium. Easterbrook and Fischel
carry the rule to its extreme claiming that even resistance
that ultimately elicits a higher bid is socially wasteful,
because the increase in takeover premium is simply a transfer
of wealth between bidder and target stockholders and the
defensive tactics employed to force that higher premium
consumed significant amounts of real resources. Indeed,
the empirical studies in this thesis have demonstrated just
how significant those defensive costs can be to target stock-
holders.
Defensive tactics and their related costs can readily
be justified if they do, in fact, trigger a bidding contest
for the target firm. Target stockholders are quite pleased
when the defensive tactics produce a higher takeover premium.
Unfortunately, evaluating the intentions and final outcome
of the use of defensive tactics ex ante - that is, before
the takeover process is completed or even before any bid
has been made - is very difficult. Target stockholders
may be willing to accept the first premium offer made for
their shares even though the offer may not be the bidder's
highest price or that defensive tactics may produce higher
offers. The trade-off between accepting this initial offer
(at a relatively low premium) or allowing target managers
to expend substantial resources fighting the takeover and
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running the risk of not receiving any premium at all is
a difficult choice for stockholders to make ex ante. Obvious-
ly, when asked this question ex post, stockholders would
prefer that their managers apply enough resistance to force
the premium up, but not enough to kill the offer. But ex
ante, stockholders may simply want to "take the money and
run."
The real problem with defensive tactics and the primary
justification for the passivity rule is the effect those
tactics have on the incentives for bidders to attempt takeover
offers. If target managers' defensive tactics are completely
effective in forcing all the gains from a takeover transaction
to accrue to the target stockholders, no bidder would have
an incentive to make a takeover offer, and thus no one will
offer a premium for the target's shares. Prospective bidders
incur substantial costs to identify underpriced targets
and to determine how their managements could be improved.
The transactions costs of carrying out the bidder's takeover
are also quite high, and defensive tactics simply add to
these costs. The higher the takeover transactions costs,
the less incentive there is to incur the costs of seeking
out and drawing up plans for takeover targets.
Furthermore, when the bidder announces his takeover
bid and makes the appropriate disclosures required by federal
and state law, other potential bidders have the opportunity
to receive this information without incurring the costs
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of obtaining it, free-riding on the efforts of the initial
bidder. As a result, no firm wants to be the first bidder
unless it has some advantage, such as speed, over subsequent
bidders to compensate for the fact that only the initial
bidder had to bear the search and monitoring costs. 3  Of
course, if there is no first bidder there will be no takeover
premiums.
Although difficult to determine by empirical tests,
it could be that the stock prices of target firms, which
the market anticipates will vigorously use defensive tactics,
are depressed by the higher expected transactions costs
relative to those prices of firms which intend not to defend
against takeover attempts. If defensive tactics in general
raise takeover premiums, then fewer and only the most profit-
able takeovers will be attempted, reducing the total number
of takeover bids. This reduces the effectiveness of the
takeover's role of disciplining managers, and consequently,
the stock prices of target firms will fall to reflect the
reduction in monitoring and the increase in agency costs.
An explicit managerial passivity rule forbidding managers
from using defensive tactics to block takeovers would eliminate
this negative burden on target firms' stock prices. The
rule of acquiescence would encourage more takeover bids,
even if at lower premiums, by reducing the transactions
3Studies have shown that in the vast majority of take-
over cases in which there were multiple bidders, the initial
bidder did not end up as the buyer of the target.
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costs of takeover attempts, and would function to provide
the most efficient cost-benefit reduction in agency costs.
Martin Lipton has criticized this passivity rule
on the basis that takeover offers are detrimental to social
welfare because they adversely affect the ability of managers
to engage in
in order to
this could be
because they
the target's
To do so obv
These bidders
tions on the
of incumbent
long-term planning and jeopardize the economy
benefit short-term speculators.4 Conceivably
true, but generally bidders attempt takeovers
believe that they can create more value from
assets than can the incumbent management.
riously requires some sort of long-term plan.
are willing to put their own wealth and reputa-
line to prove so. The uncertainty in tenure
management functions to spur the incumbent
managers to their best performances and to reduce the inherent
agency problems.
A second objection to the passivity rule and (more
generally) to takeovers has been put forward by former SEC
Chairman Harold Williams, and more recently, by several
Congressmen objecting to the recent multi-billion dollar
oil mergers. These critics argue that takeovers divert
resources that would otherwise could be used for capital
investments, but instead are used only to rearrange the
4Lipton (1979) aggressively attacks the passivity
rule and looks at the stock prices of target firms using
defensive tactics to remain independent in an attempt to
justify defensive startegies at any cost.
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ownership of existing corporate assets. Defensive tactics
are beneficial because they prevent such a waste of limited
capital. These critics simply misunderstand the nature
of financial markets. The fund's paid to the target's stock-
holders do not disappear; investors receiving the takeover
premium reinvest the money. There is no reason to think
that the stockholders receiving these payments will burn
the money or go out and increase their consumption. The
funds are recycled through the economy and reallocated to
more efficient investments. One cannot conclude a priori
that an active takeover market diverts funds from capital
investment.
8.2 The "10% Solution" to Takeover Offers
In response to public concern over violent defensive
tactics, especially those used in the Bendix/Martin Marietta/
Allied Corp. battle in 1982, the Securities and Exchange
Commission last year formed an Advisory Committee on Tender
Offers made up of prominent corporate officers and Wall
Street takeover specialists. From the committee's final
report has sprung the idea of the "10% solution" to the
problem of partial bids, which their critics maintain should
be abolished because the partial bids "stampede" stockholders
to tender lest they miss out on the premium. The "10% solu-
tion" would require that any stockholder purchasing more
than 10% of the outstanding shares of a company without
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the approval of its board of directors would be required
to make a tender offer for all of the remaining shares.
This idea has been proposed by merger lawyer Martin
Lipton (who served on the advisory committee) and appears
to have support among some lawmakers. Congressman Timothy
Wirth (D-Colorado), chairman of the House securities subcom-
mittee, has indicated great interest in the idea. A bill
requiring purchase of all remaining shares once a stockholder
controls 30% of a corporation has recently been passed by
large margins in both houses of the Pennsylvania state legis-
lature, and now awaits the approval of the governor. On
the other hand, other people, such as Lipton's chief opponent
Joseph Flom, strongly criticize the forced tender-offer
rule, maintaining that front-end-loaded or partial tender
offers are viable mechanisms and function to compensate
bidders for undertaking the costly process of searching
and bidding for takeover targets. This section will consider
the relative merits of these arguments and the proposed
"10% solution."
Those in the Lipton camp argue that the two-tier,
front-end-loaded takeover technique - such as the Mesa Petro-
leum tender offers for Cities Service, General American
Oil and Gulf Oil - abuse target stockholders. The device
allows professional investors to take advantage of the many
small, unsophisticated stockholders by rushing them into
tendering their shares early and to avoid the fear of having
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to be bought out at the lower second-step merger price.
Critics maintain that the bidders do not take sufficient
risks in these offers because they use the target's own
balance sheet to finance the raid, often creating highly
leveraged companies with enormous debt. The Lipton camp
argues that all stockholders should be treated equally,
which seems quite democratic. The "10% solution" would
accomplish this be forcing anyone wanting to acquiring more
than 10% to buy the entire company at one price to all stock-
holders.
The other side of the argument is that bidders incur
substantial costs in prospecting these takeover targets,
in making their bids, and in developing alternative plans
to better utilize the target's assets. To accomplish this
position, the bidder needs only to obtain a controlling
interest in the target. Those stockholders who tender their
shares to the bidder share in the economic gains brought
about by the bidder's more efficient management. On the
other hand, those stockholders who do not tender and intend
to "free-ride" on the monitoring and better management of
the bidder may not deserve to receive as substantial a take-
over premium. The non-tendering stockholders have not com-
mitted their wealth nor have they incurred the costs associated
with making the takeover bid. They are "free-riders."
By allowing two-tier, front-end-loaded tender offers, the
incentives for prospective bidders are increased, and conse-
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quently, the entire economy is made better off by their
existence. Furthermore, in a market system where stock
trades at different prices each day, it is difficult to
recognize why all stockholders should necessarily be paid
the same price for their shares in a takeover offer.
In addition to front-end-loaded takeover offers,
the "10% solution" is targeted at the practice of "greenmail, -
legal corporate blackmail by raiders who accumulate 10-25%
of a company's stock and then threaten a takeover or proxy
fight if not bought out at a premium. Lipton argues that
this "greenmail" technique preempts the ability of the target's
board of directors to establish long-range plans for the
firm and to determine the desirability, price, form and
timing of a merger. Because Lipton believes that antitakeover
defensive tactics benefit the long-term interests of stock-
holders by avoiding the costly takeover process and maintain-
ing the target firm's independence, he argues that the target
has the duty to repel the "greenmail" raider even if it
involves paying a premium to the greenmailer. Lipton poses
the following question to stockholders: "Would you rather
that corporate management focus on new plants, new products
and increased employment or would you rather they divert
their attention to the latest shark repellent charter amend-
ments and other means of defending against corporate raiders?"
Of course, the answer is the former. But only given
the insecurity of possibly having a takeover bid made for
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one's company can stockholders rest assured that the incumbent
managers will put forward their best efforts in managing
the firm's assets and will minimize their consumption of
perquisites. The empirical evidence in this thesis has
shown that stockholders suffer a wealth loss when the target
managers buy out at a premium the minority positions of
greenmailers. With the possible exception of some antitake-
over charter amendments which function to discourage frivolous
bids, the majority of antitakeover defensive tactics harm
target stockholders and tend to serve only the interests
of the incumbent managers.
Ultimately, the target management's best and only
defense against a takeover bid is a high stock price. High
stock prices are the result of good management and efficient
use of corporate assets. Directors should view a new minority
position or takeover bid not as a threat, but as an indicator
that business operations may need a critical reappraisal
because the market price seems low to an informed investor.
It should not be a signal to build artificial and costly
defenses. Antitakeover defensive tactics are likely to
lead investors, in the aggregate, to lower stock prices
to compensate for the higher takeover premiums and costs
resulting from the target manager's defensive tactics.
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ADDENDUM
For those readers who have not yet determined
why target managers use antitakeover defensive
tactics after reading this lengthy thesis, possibly
this piece from The New Yorker will prove explana-
tory:
ý__- &- %i- I I
"They own fifty-one per cent of the company stock." DrawTh by LU•, e we,9•
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